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Abstract 
This thesis journeys through a series of events to develop a concept of “imperceptibility” 
as a mode of resistance to contemporary sexual surveillance.  The events I examine 
include biometric recognition of gender and race at airport security checkpoints, the 
heteropatriarchal colonial surveillance of Indigenous peoples at Standing Rock, various 
protest actions, and the political potentials of glitch art. Exploring their unexpected 
points of connection, my goal is to bring into view acts of resistance against sexual 
surveillance that already operate below and above the threshold of everyday perception. 
The project advocates for a philosophy of resistance that underscores the political 
importance of creating new modes of existence.  Rather than engaging in the 
problematic of devising a new model of subjectivity, I argue that what is needed to 
escape from contemporary systems of capture and control is to turn from the Self as the 
primary site of concern and affirm instead the potentials of becoming-imperceptible.  
Imperceptibility signals not invisibility, but the act of relinquishing identity in favour of 
moving toward becoming everybody/everything.  Far from a homogenizing or unitary 
endeavour, I propose imperceptibility as a radical celebration of difference that surges a 
revolutionary desire for social transformation through interconnectedness. 
Activating Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s pragmatic philosophy and style of 
writing, which emphasize multiple relations over binary oppositions, I introduce “a queer 
politics of imperceptibility” as a conceptual framework that takes a both/and approach to 
consider resistance.  That is, I work with and between the tensions of feminist theories of 
ii 
recognition and Deleuze and Guattari’s nonrepresentational philosophy.  I develop this 
framework in each chapter by mapping a constellation of interacting forces and affective 
intensities between bodies, both human and non-human.  A Queer Politics of 
Imperceptibility makes an important intervention into the fields of feminist surveillance 
studies, posthumanism, affect theory, postcolonial theory and queer theory by revealing 
the ways in which imperceptible relations of resistance cascade into the political to 
generate new potentials to act in the world. 
Keywords 
Imperceptibility, becoming, surveillance, sexuality, queer, gender, postcolonial, Standing 
Rock, DAPL, glitch, art, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Rosi Braidotti, posthuman, 
recognition politics, politics of location, faciality, colonialism, resistance, panopticism, 
biometrics 
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Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation locates imperceptibility as a mode of resistance to sexual surveillance. 
 
It takes an exploratory approach to theorize how embodied experiences of resistance 
spark fresh ways of thinking, feeling, and connecting in the world. The project advocates 
for a philosophy of resistance that underscores the political importance of creating new 
modes of existence.  However, it is not interested in the problematic of devising a new 
model of subjectivity—unless it is one that considers the possibility of a “subjectless 
subjectivity” (Bains 2002).  As it has been well argued, the problem with the traditional 
notion of the subject is that it presupposes a discernable and unitary self that is both 
distinct and separate from the object it perceives.  This proposition enables the subject to 
become the object of others and reduces difference to a notion of given oppositions rather 
than recognizing difference as a spontaneous event that draws things into relation. 
Surveillance operates by way of subject/object dualisms—the subject is surveilled as a 
static object and represented through a system of signification.  The body is either 
divided into discernable chunks of information or it is observed as a surface of truth. 
What is needed to escape from contemporary systems of capture and control that reduce 
the body to a fixed and essentialized notion of identity is to abandon the Self as the 
primary site of concern and affirm instead the potentials of imperceptibility.  “Becoming- 
imperceptible,” which is not the equivalent to being invisible, is the idea of relinquishing 
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identity in favour of becoming everybody/everything.  Far from a homogenizing or 
unitary endeavor, becoming-imperceptible is a radical celebration of difference that 
surges a revolutionary desire for social transformation through interconnectedness. 
This thesis journeys through a series of events to theorize a strategy of resistance 
that, despite its imperceptibility, I see as already in action.  The events I examine include 
detention at the airport for additional security screening, the failure to be recognized by 
biometric machines, the heteropatriarchal colonial surveillance of Indigenous peoples, 
various protest actions, and the process of making activist artwork.  Exploring their 
unexpected points of connection, I reveal the under-theorized ways in which surveillance 
and resistance affect the capacity of a body1  to act and be acted upon.  Mobilizing Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s pragmatic philosophy and style of writing, which emphasize 
multiple relations over binary oppositions, I consider the “eventfulness” of each situation.  
I explore the interacting material and immaterial forces intrinsic to each occasion of 
surveillance and resistance I discuss.  As we shall see, investigating the eventfulness of 
surveillance permits an exploration of a wide range of relations that contribute to specific 
instances of sexual surveillance and control.  These include relations of power, relations 
between bodies, ideologies, digital technologies, and the interplay between social and 
1 By “body” I do not refer to a unitary structure or a self-contained organism.  Rather, following 
Rosi Braidotti, I understand the body as “a surface of intensities and an affective field in 
interaction with others” (NS 25).  That is, throughout the project I consider the body to be a fluid 
non-unitary assemblage composed of multiple relations with other bodies, both human and non- 
human.
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material forces that precipitate varying degrees of gendered, racialized, ableist, 
nationalist, classist and sexualized practices of discrimination.  At the same time, 
analyzing surveillance as an event reveals the imperceptible flows of resistance that 
circulate therein.  Resistance is conceptualized here not as an oppositional force but as 
an event that moves through the eventfulness of surveillance.2 
 
My main argument is that although contemporary surveillance attempts to capture 
and control the body by reducing it into a static being, the potentials for escape are 
already at play given that the body is perpetually becoming and always exceeding the 
boundaries of being.  The concept of “becoming,” as I will discuss at length in chapter 
three, signals an intensive state of transformation that undercuts the notion of identity.  
What is at stake is that the intensity of this resistance and the consideration of its political 
potentials may be dulled by an overemphasis on highly visible forms of resistance, such 
as representation and recognition, that continue to take up the theoretical spotlight.  My 
goal then, is to develop a conceptual framework that brings into view becomings as acts 
of resistance that already operate below and above the threshold of everyday perception.  
This framework, what I call “a queer politics of imperceptibility” maps a constellation of 
interacting forces and affective intensities to consider the social and material ways in 
 
2 My argument that resistance moves through surveillance corresponds to Deleuze’s contention 
that “The event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the purely 
expressed” (LS 149, emphasis added).  I explicate this notion further in chapter three where I 
explore how Indigenous resistance emerges as an event within the occurrence of colonial violence 
and heteropatriarchal surveillance during the anti-Dakota Access Pipeline demonstrations at 
Standing Rock. 
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which resistance actualizes as political action.  The following questions underpin my 
investigation: How does resistance work?  What can a politics based on imperceptibility 
do?  How do imperceptible and embodied intensities of resistance cascade into the 
political to generate new potentials to act in the world? 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic philosophy is particularly suited to my project 
because it provides the concepts and theories necessary to map the imperceptible 
movements of resistance that I wish to explore.  The concept of the rhizome questions the 
hierarchical organization of knowledge and binary structures of thought that make 
superficial cuts between ideas, bodies, events, and things.  Against this “arboreal logic,” 
Deleuze and Guattari introduce the notion of “rhizomatic thinking” which emphasizes 
multiplicities over dichotomies.  They explain that “unlike trees or their roots, the 
rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to 
traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even 
nonsign states” (ATP 23).  The value of rhizomatic thinking is that it draws new lines of 
thought by mapping unexpected connections between various points.  In accordance, a 
rhizomatic approach to sexual surveillance considers relations between highly organized 
structures of control and molecular flows of the body to locate unexpected interactions 
and map new lines of escape.  In addition to the rhizome, I draw on several of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concepts including “becoming,” “desire,” “faciality,” “lines of flight,” and 
“abstract machines” amongst many others as they are needed.  I do not attempt to “apply” 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts to “describe” sexual surveillance and resistance; rather, I 
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use them as tools to map a new line of resistance.3  I define resistance as an affective 
encounter that transforms relations of power by generating new and unpredictable 
intensities to act.  In this sense, resistance does not have an origin or terminus.  It is, as 
an event, an atmosphere that “rise[s] like a vapor from states of affairs themselves” (WP 
127).  Resistance creates a “zone of indiscernibility” (ATP 280) in which new events of 
resistance may be brought to bear. 
 
I introduce a “queer politics of imperceptibility” as a framework of resistance that 
considers how political action might be thought beyond recognition, identity, and 
subjectivity.  However, the schematic I develop attempts to hold the theoretical tension 
between a philosophy of becoming-imperceptible and feminist theories that stress the 
importance of a politics of recognition centered on the subject.  My reason for this is 
twofold; first and quite simply, I want to resist the tendency to oppose one theory against 
the other in hopes of circumventing the construction of yet another dualism 
(imperceptibility of the subject versus recognition of the subject).  My second reason for 
considering recognition alongside a politics of imperceptibility is more complex.  I 
passionately believe that a feminist contribution to knowledge of this magnitude should 
propose concepts and theories that can be put into practice and that provide politically 
useful insights on the ways in which to view and initiate social change.  Of course, as 
feminist theory has shown time and again, such an endeavor requires a careful 
 
3 I call this new line of resistance the “line of pure resistance.” I introduce and develop my 
concept of the line of pure resistance in chapters three and four respectively.  
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consideration of the politics of location by asking: for whom is this project useful?  In 
responding to that all-important question, I necessarily engage “the subject” and 
questions of recognition in order to locate the politics of imperceptibility.  It is clear to 
me that if a politics of imperceptibility is to be considered seriously as a strategy of 
resistance it ought to propose a philosophy based on developing affinities with other 
feminist perspectives that have, for perhaps good reason, maintained the theoretical 
spotlight.  Although I will thoroughly address the contentious relationship between 
imperceptibility and recognition in chapters three and four, where I also spend 
considerable time hypothesizing the possibility of a reconciliatory coalition, I want to 
offer some preliminary arguments on their frictions here.  This will allow me to provide 
a more detailed sketch of the queer politics of imperceptibility I propose. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I provide a brief overview of Judith Butler’s queer 
theory alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming to define sexual 
surveillance and sexuality.  Although I do not revisit Butler or queer theory explicitly in 
the remainder of the dissertation, I discuss them here to lay the groundwork for my 
forthcoming elaboration of how a philosophy of becoming can be developed in relation to 
(rather than apart from) queer theories on sexual subjectivity.  Importantly, I want to be 
clear that despite my attempt to point toward the potential for a theoretical alliance 
between two disparate approaches to political autonomy, I remain firmly critical of the 
1: Introduction 7 
regime of recognition.4  As I will argue in chapter three, recognition whether practiced as 
a politics of resistance or enforced by the State, not only upholds oppressive structures 
endemic to the subject/object binary, but also solicits practices and technologies of sexual 
surveillance. 
While sexual surveillance is broadly defined as the observation and data collection 
of gender and sexuality, it should be immediately understood that I am not interested in 
engaging surveillance as a distinct and separate object that acts on an otherwise knowable 
subject.  Instead, I theorize surveillance as a rhizomatic assemblage of technologies and 
practices that overcode sexuality as identity.  Surveillance, as I will demonstrate in 
chapter two, operates as an apparatus of capture that suspends the body’s movements, 
relations, and potentials to act in the world.  It gridlocks the positive flows of potential 
that emerge between bodies by capturing and categorizing the rhythms, intensities, 
tactilities, textures, and corporealities of sexuality within a rigid system of signification.  
As we shall see, sexual surveillance subjugates the movement of sexuality—its 
happenings—to a regime of representation and recognition that exhort regulatory 
practices of sexual identification. 
4 By “regime of recognition” I refer to the institutional structure of recognition, namely State 
forms of recognition.  By “a politics of recognition,” I mean feminist politics that engage in the 
discourse of rights and recognition and that seek acknowledgment for subjects based on making 
identity claims. 
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My characterization of sexual surveillance as an apparatus of capture follows from 
my understanding of sexuality as an impersonal movement that materializes between 
bodies as a positive and connective force, which has nothing to do with sexual 
reproduction.  Sexuality is thought here as a “peopling by contagion” (Deleuze and 
Guattari ATP 241)—which is “not the man and woman as sexual entities, caught in a 
binary apparatus, but a molecular becoming” outside of identity (Deleuze and Parnet 
102).  Importantly, I am not suggesting that sexuality precedes or exists exterior to the 
body, nor do I understand it to be in any sense apolitical or generalizable.  The movement 
of sexuality will vary in intensity, speed, and duration depending on the body’s territorial 
relations; that is, its embedded and embodied social location.  By “impersonal 
movement” and “connective force” I refer to the unrepresentable qualities of sexuality 
that extend beyond the boundaries of flesh and signification—which is to say that 
sexuality is thought here as an affective energy apart from genitality and the notion of 
“sexual orientation.” 
 
Emphasizing the asubjective aspects of sexuality does not repudiate its social 
construction nor does it deny the diverse ways in which sexuality is experienced and 
expressed through a complex interplay of material, social, and symbolic forces.5  But it 
 
5 For example, in The Epistemology of the Closet, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argues that the 
multiple and varied manifestations of sexuality demonstrate the ways in which sexuality always 
retains an element of “pure difference” that is capable of disrupting normative notions of sex, 
gender, and (hetero)sexuality and activating new potentials for how sexuality can be thought (25, 
emphasis original). 
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does posit sexuality as a productive force that germinates new modes of existence 
through the “circulation of impersonal affects” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 233).  
Throughout the text, I refer to the act of circulating affects as “conjugations.” Deleuze 
and Guattari use the term conjugation to signal a non-reproductive6   temporary and 
mutual exchange or streaming7  of intensities between bodies.  Conjugation extends 
beyond human-to-human interaction to include relations between humans and non-human 
entities including conjugations with technology, atmospheric qualities, the environment, 
and so forth.  While “conjugation” (the circulation of affects) does not entail sex per se— 
it is nonetheless sexual insofar as it is productive.  The concept of conjugation enables us 
to consider sexuality as an affective and materially productive force without slipping 
back into an “arboreal logic” of filiation and reproduction. 
Furthermore, using the term conjugation to gesture toward the productive potentials 
of sexuality emphasizes that sexuality is a movement that never moves alone.  That is, 
sexuality is one of “several fluxes [that] combine to form a bloc of becoming” (Deleuze 
6 Deleuze and Guattari also use the term “involution” to designate non-reproductive creativity.  
The term involution is meant to signify a transformation that is neither linearly successive 
(evolution) or regressive (devolution).  Involution signals the involvement between things that 
moves each from one state to another.  (ATP 164, 238-9).
7 I am particularly attracted to the word conjugation given its frequent use in the sciences to 
define non-human practices of production.  For example, in biology, the term conjugation is used 
to refer to the productive transport of nutrients and proteins within a cell, also called “cytoplasmic 
streaming.” The term is also used when referring to an exchange of matter between protozoans.  
“Conjugation” then, illustrates how affect and the embodied experience of its circulation is a 
productive event that happens beyond identity. 
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and Parnet 102).  As Deleuze and Claire Parnet state, “Sexuality can only be thought of 
as one flux among others, entering conjunction with other fluxes, emitting particles which 
themselves enter into particular relationships of speed and slowness in the vicinity of 
certain other particles.  No assemblage can be characterized by one flux exclusively” 
(101-2).  It is not surprising then, that the assemblage of sexual surveillance, as I will 
demonstrate in chapters two, three, and four, is characterized by several fluxes of control 
that conjugate sexual discrimination with anti-black racism, ableism, settler colonialism, 
Islamophobia, and xenophobia. 
 
As I mentioned above, my thinking of sexuality as a creative flux and flow between 
bodies is informed by queer theory on the one hand and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy on the other hand.  For some, this theoretical pairing may appear at odds 
given their ostensible incompatibility: queer theory begins and is concerned with the 
subject whereas Deleuze and Guattari wish to decenter the subject and attend instead to 
the “prepersonal intensities” of desire and sexuality—that is, the ways in which desire 
moves the body from one experiential state to another (ATP xvi).  Moreover, queer theory 
considers resistance in terms of subversion and resignification while Deleuze and 
Guattari affirm the political potentials of novel creation through asignification. 
 
I do not mean to suggest that the entire field of queer theory is centered on the 
subject or concerned only with representation.  There is not one queer theory from which 
all others follow.  Indeed, any attempt to provide a pithy summation of queer theory’s 
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multiple, dynamic, and contested undertakings would unfairly paint it with too broad of a 
brush.  To be specific then, the queer theory I refer to is that which challenges monolithic 
understandings of sexuality by examining the discursive and linguistic formation of the 
subject and that aims to destabilize the notion of a natural or fixed identity by positing an 
analytic of performative resignification.  Espoused most notably by Butler, this branch of 
queer theory insists that gender is not a given but constituted through the compulsory 
repetition of norms (Gender Trouble 179). 
 
In brief, Butler argues that the gendered subject only becomes intelligible as such 
upon receiving recognition for its “repeated stylization” of social, political, and 
historically sanctioned gender norms, which “congeal over time to produce… a natural 
sort of being” (Gender Trouble 43-4).  Yet, in addition to the performative self, she 
affirms that there exists a psychic self who is neither reducible to the performance of 
norms nor who can be recognized as being either this or that (“he” or “she” and arguably 
“they”).  She argues that with every performative iteration of gender, this “unintelligible” 
self destabilizes the norm by its failure to be wholly captured within it.  Gender 
performativity, the embodied repetition of norms through speech acts and symbolic 
representation, is, to use Butler’s phraseology, an “internally discontinuous” imitation of 
an uninhabitable ideal (179).  The inevitable failure of the subject to fully adhere to the 
norm undermines the hegemonic structure of gender and queers the seeming naturalness 
of heterosexuality. 
1: Introduction 12 
 
 
 
 
In her comparative essay of Butler and Deleuze, Claire Colebrook further 
explicates that “For Butler a queer theory is one in which the conditions of being a 
subject are essentially queer—one must claim to speak as a self but can do so only 
through an other who is not oneself.  At the same time, the condition for being queer is 
being a subject: one must be recognised as having a claim to speak, be and exist” (“On 
the Very Possibility” 20, emphasis added).  In other words, gender performativity both 
troubles and constitutes the subject; it is both the subject’s doing and undoing.  Butler 
argues that internal to the performative act then, is an expropriative queering of gender 
norms and the heterosexual matrix that governs them (Bodies that Matter 177).  Rather 
than positing this as an escape route from norms and binaries, Butler firmly asserts that 
the “undoing” and agency provided by performativity “is not freedom, but a question of 
how to work the trap that one is inevitably in” (Butler qtd in Kotz 83).  The trap of 
normativity catches the subject in an incomplete and ongoing struggle of obtaining 
intelligibility within a structure that maintains its authority precisely by ensuring the 
continuance of certain subjects’ unintelligibility.  In response, Colebrook argues that 
queer theory does not “queer” anything insofar as it is unable to dismantle the stronghold 
of identity.  Indeed, she claims, that queer, in Butler’s theorization, becomes the 
condition of gender identity rather than its subversion given Butler’s proposition that 
queer (understood as the failure to perform the norm) is integral to performativity. 
 
“Working the trap” is a catch-22 situation.  It means battling the structure of 
recognition by asking for recognition.  A politics centered around recognition, in which 
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its constituents ask to be seen and heard as intelligible subjects (i.e. as normative), risks 
perpetuating the “naturalness” of the norm and its authority to decide which bodies are 
perceptible and which are not.  “Working the trap,” as Butler acknowledges, 
paradoxically entails fighting against political derealization and dehumanization by 
speaking from a recognizable and coherent subject position.  The problem with both 
queer theory and recognition politics is that although they call into question the 
conditions of “the subject,” albeit in different ways, they never allow the subject to 
escape from regulation.  Thus Colebrook argues that queer theory only seeks to retool 
the subject rather than affirm its capacity for autonomy beyond subjectivity—that is, its 
ongoing process of becoming.  In this regard, she argues that queer merely beseeches the 
normal insofar as it “allows for the (albeit problematic) maintenance of identity politics” 
(“On the Very Possibility” 15).  She reasserts that Butler’s theory of gender 
performativity is therefore not fundamentally queer in the sense that it offers something 
new from which to view politics but is queer only insofar as “the queer body becomes 
exemplary” as a subversive site of resignification (14).  Queer theory confers that 
naturalness of identity by heralding it as the site of difference (20). 
 
Attempting to develop an alternate notion of queer, Colebrook claims that because 
Deleuze organizes his philosophy around the notion of pure difference (difference itself 
beyond any notion of the subject) then it follows that a Deleuzian queer theory would 
also consider queer not as difference from (the norm) but a difference that is radically 
new.  She claims, “For Deleuze, then, the conditions of the queer and the conditions of 
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the new are the same” (“On the Very Possibility” 20).  Hypothesizing Deleuze’s take on 
queer theory, Colebrook argues that the concept of queer cannot (or should not?) be 
reduced to notions of identity, subversion, and resignification.  Instead, she asserts that 
the function of queer ought to actualize difference by staging an encounter with various 
intensities that exist beyond “the self and the organism” (20).  Queer, she posits, is a 
becoming.  For Colebrook then, Butler’s brand of queer theory, which focuses on 
performative acts of deviation and subversion from the norm, is predicated on a post- 
Hegelian theory of dialectical negation.  Against this, she advocates for an anti-Hegelian 
Deleuzian-inspired queer theory, which, in accordance with the notion of becoming, 
offers the affirmative “power to create relations, to make a difference, to repeat a power 
beyond its actual and already constituted forms” (23). 
 
Unlike Colebrook, I do not think it is necessary to choose one frame over the other.  
As we can see from her evaluation, the primary disjuncture between Butler and Deleuze 
is that the former considers agency as that which is always mediated through the 
discursive formation of identity, whereas the latter envisages autonomy as a prepersonal 
intensity beyond subjectivity and discursive thought.  The queer politics of 
imperceptibility that I propose considers how both perspectives may be thought together 
in politically fruitful ways.  This approach does not aim to collapse one theory into the 
other to create for example a Deleuzian queer theory or to queer Deleuzian philosophy; 
instead I begin from the middle to explore the imperceptible potentials of resistance to 
sexual surveillance that exist in-between.  That is, I attempt to theorize a queer approach 
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to becoming that acknowledges that while there is no such thing as a unitary subject, 
identity, or entity, the experiences and expressions of a body’s becoming are deeply 
entangled with its social and material relations including its relation to identity 
(Braidotti 2011). 
 
Rosi Braidotti’s feminist philosophy that proposes the concept of “nomadic 
subjectivity” is instructive because it approximates a reconciliation between queer 
theory’s “maintenance of identity politics,” as Colebrook puts it, and Deleuze’s concept 
of becoming.  Braidotti acknowledges that all becomings must begin from somewhere.  
Every becoming has a territory composed of unique and dynamic relations that are 
embedded, embodied, and embrained (“A Theoretical Framework” 7).  In her 
formulation, “Being a nomad, living in transition, does not mean that one cannot or is 
unwilling to create those necessarily stable and reassuring bases for identity that allow 
one to function in a community.  Nomadic consciousness rather consists in not taking 
any kind of identity as permanent: the nomad is only passing through” (NS 64).  
Braidotti’s nomadic philosophy simultaneously acknowledges the importance of 
decentering the subject to envision a new political landscape of affirmative 
interconnectedness and that identity is often an act of survivance that enables a body to 
endure becomings of this scale.  The politics of identity does not foreclose the potentials 
of becoming so long as it is thought rhizomatically—as fluid and transitory; hence her 
concept of nomadic subjectivity. 
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Braidotti is careful to warn, however, that a nomadic approach that zigzags between 
the politics of location and a philosophy of becoming is neither an easy nor a painless 
feat.  Indeed, as I have discovered in writing this text, moving between feminist theories 
that center the subject and a philosophy of imperceptibility that decenter the subject is a 
rather tricky situation that risks running up against several conceptual contradictions. 
But, these contradictions, as I have hoped to show, should not be taken as theoretical 
deficiencies or critical impasses; rather, as I see them, they are opportunities for new 
rhizomatic ways of thinking.  As such, the framework of queer imperceptibility that I 
propose welcomes contradictions; it dares to venture between imperceptibility and 
recognition, becoming and identity without ever compromising on the argument that to 
escape sexual surveillance one must dismantle the Self, divest from psychic attachments 
to identity, and go beyond a politics of recognition. 
 
Imperceptibility is not a strategy of resistance that seeks political recognition.  It is 
an affective encounter with other bodies, both human and non-human, that initiates a 
becoming beyond the self.  It seeks to increase the potentials of every body to act.  The 
queer politics of imperceptibility I propose prioritizes an encounter between things above 
all else.  As I will attempt to demonstrate, becoming-imperceptible as a mode of 
resistance forces new thought through sensation.  The qualities of resistance that I see in 
becoming-imperceptible align with the following passage from Deleuze: 
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Something in the world forces us to think.  This something is an object not of 
recognition but of a fundamental encounter…It may be grasped in a range of 
affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering.  In whichever tone, its primary 
characteristic is that it can only be sensed.  In this sense it is opposed to 
recognition.  In recognition, the sensible is not at all that which can only be 
sensed, but that which bears directly upon the senses in an object which can be 
recalled, imagined, or conceived…The object of encounter, on the other hand…
is imperceptible precisely from the point of view of a recognition. (DR 139-40, 
emphasis original)
In similar fashion, becoming-imperceptible is an encounter with resistance beyond 
recognition. 
Nevertheless, I have spent some time outlining Butler’s queer theory above because 
I want to make it clear from the outset that I agree with her that it is critical to “mobilize 
the necessary error of identity” (Bodies that Matter 174).  This is particularly true when it 
comes to sexual surveillance.  We will see in chapter two, for example, that 
contemporary practices and technologies of surveillance use identity error against certain 
bodies to sanction increased practices of control.  In response, in chapter five I consider 
the emerging art activist practice of glitching digital images as a creative means to 
corrupt repressive systems of identification.  With reference to my art project Queer-Alt- 
Delete, I illustrate the ways in which glitch art mobilizes computational errors of identity 
to play with the political potentials of asignification. 
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Against this theoretical backdrop, between the vicissitudes of queer theory and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic philosophy, and with Braidotti’s nomadic feminist 
philosophy, I pose the following questions: How does contemporary surveillance restrict 
social and political mobility by rearticulating the body and autonomy in terms of identity 
and recognition respectively?  In what ways can we disarticulate sexuality from 
contemporary systems of control?  What new modalities of political action does a 
politics of imperceptibility reveal?  How does becoming-imperceptible generate the 
potential for new ways of existing?  And, how does the concept of imperceptibility 
galvanize new ways of thinking-feeling-doing resistance?  The conjunction “thinking-
feeling-doing” signals the inextricable ways in which thought, sensation, and activity 
move through one another in the course of a body’s becoming.  Inspired by Brian 
Massumi’s concept of “thinking-feeling,” the phrase thinking-feeling-doing as it appears 
throughout the dissertation refers to a style of resistance in which new thought emerges 
during political action.  It is thought perceived through bodily sensation—a felt 
difference (Massumi Semblance and Event 44).  The notion of thinking-feeling-doing 
emphasizes the dynamic momentum and imperceptible movement of change that 
happens during an act of resistance—or rather, that happens as resistance itself.  It 
elevates the experiential and embodied qualities of resistance while it sets in motion a 
new idea for social transformation.  Becoming-imperceptible, so I will argue, is a 
movement that cannot be perceived but that is perceptible nonetheless—it is perceptible 
because there is a felt change or transformation.  However, this change of state is not
1: Introduction 19 
concerned with subjects or objects but with the passages between them.  As will be 
discovered in the pages that follow, a queer politics of imperceptibility stitches together 
various threads of intensity— bodies, politics, space, affects, activisms, and so forth—to 
weave a new pattern of resistance into the fabric of life. 
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2 
Surveillance Assemblages 
 
 
Surveillance is often theorized as a system of control that captures the subject in a state of 
perpetual oscillation between visibility and invisibility.  The individual is rendered visible 
while technologies of observation are carefully hidden from view.  To escape the 
machinic all-seeing eye, one must become invisible to its expansive field of vision. 
However, this strategy of resistance that attempts to subvert the mechanical gaze and its 
enhanced powers to see, either by thwarting visualizing technologies or hiding from their 
perceptual reach, miscalculates the techne of networked surveillance and its all- 
encompassing operations of somatic control.  At the same time, activist efforts that 
attempt to turn the gaze back on itself by “re-claiming” and saturating the field of 
visibility fail to transform the non-visualizing mechanisms of surveillance, ultimately 
leaving systems of capture and control intact.  The failure to transform systems of 
surveillance occurs because contemporary forms of surveillance enact control not only by 
manifesting the individual in a field of visibility but also through networked processes 
that fragment, modulate, divide, and overcode the body as data.  Contemporary 
surveillance has transformed the panoptic diagram of power that produced individuals 
through disciplinary techniques; now, bodies are partitioned into quantifiable information 
as flows of power are redistributed along axes of automated control.  If power is a 
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modulating force as well as a visiblizing practice, the question that arises is: how can 
“we” effectively resist surveillance and forms of control that operate beyond visibility 
when feminist strategies of resistance continue to centre on invisibility and visibility as 
the respective problem and solution? 
This chapter takes issue with ocularcentric preoccupations in surveillance studies 
and forms of resistance.  Privileging vision as the dominant mode of control fails to 
address the affective interactions between surveillance and the body’s sensuous 
expressions and experiences in the world.  Moreover, relying on vision-based metaphors 
and terminology, such as watching, monitoring, the gaze, the all-seeing-eye, Big Brother, 
exhibitionism, exposure, and observation to analyze surveillance, limits how we imagine 
political opposition, and at the same time, it obscures from view the rhizomatic 
arrangements of control.  Concomitantly, while I maintain that visualizing techniques of 
surveillance have transformed, it must be clearly stated that panoptic and disciplinary 
practices of control continue to subjugate individuals.  For this reason, I take issue with 
both ocularcentric and anti-panoptic8  trends in surveillance scholarship that privilege one 
schema over the other as the critical site of investigation.  To understand multilayered 
systems of oppression we need to understand multilayered surveillance practices.  I am 
therefore interested in the ways in which an assemblage of surveillance mechanisms, that 
8 By anti-panoptic I refer to the trend in recent surveillance studies scholarship to dismiss the 
significance of panopticism in favour of a post-panoptic model of surveillance that is wholly 
concerned with the datafication of bodies, which, as I discuss below, tends to minimize 
hierarchical forms and experiences of surveillance that stem from gender, racial, ethnic, 
disability, and sexual discrimination.
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operate on both visual and non-visual planes, work synergistically to produce affective 
states of fragmentation, restriction, and agitation that capture the body as code and 
restrict its social and political mobility.  As we shall see, these techniques of affective 
control transubstantiate subjects from individuals to anatomized bodies, and in the 
process affect the body’s sense of capacity for political autonomy. 
In what follows, I develop a framework of surveillance to outline the ways in which 
I understand sexual control to operate.  I define surveillance as an assemblage of 
overlapping, intricate, and dynamic mechanisms of capture that restrict the body’s 
movement.  I am primarily concerned with three interrelated techniques of surveillance: 
1) spatial arrangements of in-visibility, 2) the digital modulation of the body, and 3) what
I term “somatic suspension.” Briefly, I define spatial arrangements of in-visibility as a 
panoptic mode of surveillance that confines the movement of the body in a field of 
invisibility and visibility.  Different from ocularcentric perspectives on panopticism that 
focus on “the gaze,” following Michel Foucault, I understand in-visibility as a spatial 
technique of surveillance.  The second mechanism of control is digital modulation, 
which, as Deleuze outlines, is a mode of surveillance that controls by turning the body 
into data and networked information.  The third mechanism I define as somatic 
suspension, which I argue occurs between the previous two.  I introduce this term to 
signal the occasion when the body’s movement is suspended, either physically or 
affectively, from crossing a threshold.  I suggest that these three mechanisms of 
control—spatial arrangements of in-visibility, digital modulation, and somatic 
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suspension—form a “surveillance assemblage” in which subjects are made to 
authenticate a socially constructed identity to gain access to political mobility.  Below, I 
outline each of the three techniques of control separately; however, it is crucial to 
understand that in practice they perform in and through one another, as will be 
demonstrated in the following chapters. 
2.1  The “Gaze” in Surveillance Studies 
Bentham's [Panopticon design] is archaic in the importance it gives to the gaze; 
but it is very modern in the general importance it assigns to techniques of power. 
-Michel Foucault, “The Eye of Power”
Although there is a consensus among scholars in the field of surveillance studies that 
there is not one monolithic model that can be used to describe the vast and varied 
technologies, purposes, and effects of surveillance, surveillance is typically 
conceptualized in one of two ways: as a technology of observation that functions through 
a dichotomy of in/visibility or as a mechanism of control that operates along a continuum 
of in-visibility. For the former, surveillance is a technology of enhanced vision that 
reveals a preexisting subject and controls the subject by making her more visible.  For 
the latter, surveillance is a system of power that produces subjects through overlapping 
patterns of exposure and concealment.  Despite their differences, both approaches 
require that the individual become visible to enact control.  But to whom one becomes 
visible remains unclear.  This unidentified gaze in surveillance studies is paradoxically 
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represented as one that is embodied—which is to say that scholars continue to insist that 
surveillance, even if it is automated and unmanned, keeps subjects in line by virtue of the 
possibility that some-one (another person) could be watching over them at any given 
time.  While not an inaccurate summation of panopticism, an overemphasis on “fear of 
the guard” as the primary technique of control provides only a cursory explanation of 
how surveillance functions.  The notion of a “could-be-embodied” and anonymous gaze 
perpetuated in surveillance studies scholarship frames surveillance as a wholly top-down 
intersubjective exercise, which fails to address the diffuse and disperse flows of power 
that function through spatial arrangements of control.  Granted, localized, embodied, 
and hierarchical practices of surveillance absolutely exist, which I will discuss later in 
the chapter, but the problem with this generalized approach to panopticism—that 
privileges the gaze above all else—is that it consequently oversimplifies the whole of 
surveillance as a perceptive and perceptible apparatus of control. 
 
The trend of personifying the gaze and its operations of visibility and invisibility is 
evident in recent theories of surveillance that attempt to expand concepts of surveillance 
beyond a panoptic model.  Although Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of 
panopticism has been pivotal to surveillance studies, contemporary scholars argue that 
its usefulness as a theoretical framework is limited in that it can no longer account for 
the myriad structures of surveillance in the 21st century.  Thus, there is a surge of post-
panoptic concepts in the literature that attempt to address current formations of 
surveillance, such as the “superpanopticon,” “omniopticon,” “electronic panopticon,” 
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“poly-panopticon,” “synopticon,” “synopticon 2.0,” and “interpersonal-panopticon” just 
to name a few.  For example, Thomas Mathiesen introduces the concept of the 
“synopticon” as a direct counterpart to the panopticon.  He argues that mass media 
scopophilia along with advancements in digital technology that provide quick and easy 
access to information reverse the relations of power from the few surveilling the many to 
the many now watching the few (e.g., reality television, celebrity updates, political 
watchdogs9 ).  Building on Mathiesen, Nicholas Gane proposes the concept of 
“synopticon 2.0” to account for the ways in which the many also watch over themselves 
(623).  Relatedly, the “omniopticon” refers to the distribution of the gaze so that the 
many are now capable of watching the many (e.g., social media).  And, “interpersonal 
panopticism” refers to the ways in which people involved in intimate relations watch 
each other through social media (Manning and Stern 2018).  These spin-off theories both 
continue to uphold the idea that the gaze and its corresponding control can be located in 
a subject, whether the subject represents a few or many. 
The tendency to designate surveillance as an intersubjective process merely aided 
by technology rather than produced through it is the result of a misinterpretation of 
Foucault’s theorization of panopticism.  Panoptic surveillance is commonly described as 
a theory of “the gaze” whereby subjects watch over other subjects.  However, Foucault 
9 As others have noted, Mathiesen’s concept of synopticism is tied to a top-down way of 
theorizing surveillance (Doyle 283).  The concept is specific to an analysis of mass media 
surveillance, particularly as it relates to television.  Thus, synopticism, unlike the panopticon, is 
a narrow concept that engages surveillance at the level of the audience/spectatorship and runs 
into conceptual issues when applied to larger systems of surveillance (296). 
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insists that the gaze need not be embodied at all: “[panopticism] is an important 
mechanism, for it automates and disindividualizes power.  Power has its principle not so 
much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, 
gazes…” (DP 202, emphasis added).  As Foucault gestures, surveillance is not 
intersubjective (operating between people); the gaze is an automated and institutionalized 
mechanism of power.  Discipline in the panoptic schema is produced not through the 
embodied gaze of another person but through the material-discursive spatial 
arrangements of visibility.  Consider Foucault’s compelling statement: “He who is 
subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the 
constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in 
himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection” (202-3).  Discipline is not enforced on subjects by other 
subjects.  Panopticism is self-automated: the subject regulates her behaviour by 
internalizing the gaze as a governing structure.  As we shall see next, Foucault’s theory 
of panoptic power is much more complicated than the maxim “the few watching the 
many” would have us believe. 
2.2 The Spatial Arrangements of In-Visibility 
By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out 
precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery.  
They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, 
perfectly individualized and constantly visible.  The panoptic mechanism arranges 
spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize 
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immediately.  In short, it reverses the principle of the dungeon; or rather of its 
three functions—to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide—it preserves only the 
first and eliminates the other two.  Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor 
capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected.  Visibility is a trap. 
 
-Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 
 
 
As Foucault indicates then, spaces of enclosure are a mainstay of punishment from the 
archaic dungeon to the birth of the modern prison.  However, exile alone is not productive 
for society; social pariahs are cast out but left idle.  For punishment to be productive, the 
individual must be shaped and controlled by exacting mechanisms of discipline capable 
of regulating the body and its behaviours.  These mechanisms require knowledge and 
observation of the body, and this knowledge becomes its own form of punishment.  
Regimented through schedules, exercise, chores, diets, labour, and procedures of 
cleanliness, the body is never left untouched nor is it left unseen.  In the modern prison, 
the exiled are not cast aside as an indistinguishable group of lepers;10 they are registered 
and observed, each becoming an individual to be controlled and confined.  Prisoners are 
separated by individual cells and inspected from an inspector who remains hidden from 
view.  Panopticism is a diagram of power in which surveillance is internalized and 
discipline runs like an automated machine. 
 
 
 
 
10 Foucault explains that panoptic power began with the plague in which the contagious had to be 
contained and the healthy sorted from the diseased.  This required an elaborate system of 
inspection, classification, and isolation, effectuating a new form of continuous surveillance.  
(Foucault DP 195-200). 
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In his study of Jeremy Bentham’s architectural design of the Panopticon prison, 
Foucault argues that panopticism is a mechanism of power that disciplines the body by 
subjecting individuals to a field of permanent visibility.  The Panopticon prison is 
designed as a circular building containing a ring of individual cells with a single 
observation tower that stands in the middle of the ring.  The prison cells each have two 
windows—one looking in toward the guard tower and the other facing outside.  The light 
cast from the window facing outside backlights the prisoner thereby bringing her 
silhouette into the guard’s full visibility.  At the same time, the guard is hidden through a 
carefully orchestrated system of light and dark.  The guard tower windows are outfitted 
with venetian blinds so that the prisoners' view of the guard is blocked.  Inside the tower, 
an elaborate maze of hallways and partitions enables the guard to pass through the 
observation quadrants so that her presence is never betrayed by shadow or light (Foucault 
DP 201).  Unable to see the observer, the inmates never know when or if they are being 
watched.  As a result, the prisoners learn to behave as if they are under constant 
surveillance.  Each individual inmate adheres to the rules and regulations because her 
body is always visible within the confinement of the prison cell. 
 
The remarkable aspect of panopticism is that it disciplines the individual even in 
the absence of observation.  Surveillance is automated because it is both visible and 
unverifiable: the individual must always be aware of surveillance but be unable to detect 
with absolute certainty when she is being watched; she must remain sure that constant 
observation of her is possible (Foucault DP 201).  As such, invisibility—the invisible 
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presence or absence of surveillance at any given moment—is crucial to ensure the self- 
regulation of behaviours and actions.  In Foucault’s worlds, there is an axial relation of 
in-visibility that functions “to arrange things [so] that the surveillance is permanent in its 
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; the perfection of power should tend to 
render its actual exercise unnecessary” (201).  Unlike codified power, in which the 
power of the sovereign must be visible to control the populous, in the panopticon schema 
it is the populous that is made visible while power conceals itself. 
 
Foucault explains that prior to the enclosed prison structure, executions and other 
bodily punishments took place in the town square, allowing the public to witness the 
sovereign’s power through the prisoner’s affliction.  Foucault notes that the palatability 
of the tortured body on display incited sympathy for the prisoner and disdain for the 
executioner and the laws governing him.  Hence, if power and discipline are visible, 
they are susceptible to opposition.  As a solution, the modern prison ushered in an “out 
of sight, out of mind” system.  The burden of witnessing punishment was lifted from the 
public and concealed behind prison walls.  Power became diffuse, invisible, and 
unknowable; it resided not with the King but with the institution. 
 
In addition to the power of the guard’s hierarchical gaze, Foucault argues that 
lateral vectors of invisibility “guarantee order” (DP 200).  For example, prisoners are 
separated into single cells and their line of sight is restricted solely toward the guard 
tower.  Inmates are thus prevented from communicating with one another.  According to 
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Bentham, the isolation of inmates lessens the likelihood of revolt (Foucault DP 200).  
The separation of prisoners prevents them from witnessing one another’s subordination. 
A shared sense of injustice is eliminated through the panopticon’s spatial arrangements of 
invisibility. 
 
The function of invisibility in Foucault’s formulation of panoptic power is twofold: 
first, it conceals the operations of disciplinary power, such as the absence or presence of 
surveillance, and second, it partitions individuals to decrease the likelihood of political 
mobilization.  Invisibility and visibility are not a dichotomous pair; they are forces of 
power that overlap and move through one another.  Foucault’s insistence that “visibility 
is a trap” should not be taken to mean that being seen is a trap and going unseen is an 
escape; rather, what snares the individual in the process of subjugation is being caught 
between spatial arrangements of in-visibility central to the disciplinary machine. 
 
For Foucault, Bentham’s prison serves as a model of power for the modern age, but 
the specific techniques of visibility in the prison are not meant to be representative of all 
relations of power or of surveillance as a whole.  The school, hospital, barrack, and 
factory each have their own panoptic techniques of observation and inspection. 
Therefore, one model of panopticism cannot be used to explain the relations of power in 
all other places.  In the school, for example, constant visibility does not control students; 
control is exercised by examination and routine inspection.  Each assemblage of 
panopticism exercises power through different disciplinary techniques and it is possible 
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for them to shift within any given model.  For example, if something in the Panopticon 
prison were to change—a second guard tower is added, or another structure is built 
behind the prison, altering the play between light and dark that serves to illuminate each 
cell—relations of power and disciplinary techniques necessarily change.  Panopticism is 
not a structure but a malleable system.  In the modern prison, for example, panopticism 
functions not only through the guard’s gaze and the gaze of CCTV cameras, but also 
through extended requirements of observation and evaluation such as probation and 
parole that extend control beyond the enclosed space of the prison.  When the spatial 
arrangements of in-visibility change so do the relations of power; elsewhere visibility 
may be automated but not to the same degree.  Discipline may work on the body but not 
in the same way; different techniques of surveillance will have different effects. 
However, regardless of how the technique changes, if surveillance functions to discipline, 
 
a model of panopticism remains. 
 
As mentioned above, recent surveillance studies scholarship argues that 
panopticism is an outdated model of surveillance because it only references top-down 
forms of control.  For example, Kevin D. Haggerty characterizes panopticism as “the 
functioning of a microscope where specific marginalized or dangerous groups are situated 
under the unidirectional gaze of the powerful who can watch while remaining unseen by 
their charges” (“Tear Down” 29).  He argues that the introduction of data collection 
subjects all of society to surveillance and not just the few—everyone is visible under the 
microscope of those in power.  Such critiques present panopticism as a singular and 
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embodied gaze.  However, as Foucault illustrates in his analysis of Bentham’s prison, it 
is the spectre of the gaze—the idea of microscopic surveillance and not its actual 
existence—that produces relations of power.  Panopticism is horizontal and controls the 
individual through institutionalized and internalized flows of surveillance such that 
disciplinary power produces how the individual sees herself.  In fact, continuous 
surveillance is only possible because it does not require “the unidirectional embodied 
gaze of the powerful” that Haggerty suggests.  Indeed, to think that a unidirectional 
embodied gaze exists is precisely panopticism’s trick. 
 
Foucault asserts that “This Panopticon, subtly arranged so that an observer may 
observe, at a glance, so many different individuals, also enables everyone to come and 
observe any of the observers.  The seeing machine was once a sort of dark room into 
which individuals spied; it has become a transparent building in which the exercise of 
power may be supervised by society as a whole” (DP 207).  The point that is missed, but 
clearly elucidated here by Foucault, is that panopticism is not a locatable gaze because it 
is not a specific technique of power that can be harnessed by an individual person or 
entity: panopticism is a diagram that produces power.  He writes, “The panoptic 
mechanism is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power 
and a function; it is a way of making power relations function in a function, and of 
making a function function through these power relations” (206-7).  In other words, the 
function of panopticism cannot be reduced to that of a microscope.  Panopticism 
functions to produce the function of the gaze; it is not the gaze itself.  Panopticism brings 
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things into relation to discipline the body.  Foucault further states: “[panopticism is] a 
figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use” (205, 
emphasis added).  In other words, the Panopticon prison, with its totalizing techniques of 
unrestricted and unobstructed visibility, must be conceived of as “the diagram of a 
mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any 
obstacle, resistance or friction, [and] must be represented as a pure architectural and 
optical system” (205, emphasis added).  The Panopticon prison is an idealized rendering 
of disciplinary power.  The critical distinction between a technique of power and a 
diagram of power is often overlooked and has led surveillance scholars to reject 
panopticism on the basis that it cannot account for surveillance technologies that function 
beyond the gaze.  And yet, when taken as a diagram of power, panopticism can precisely 
address what scholars believe is lacking. 
 
Foucault’s view that panopticism is a diagram of power rather than a specific form, 
technique or example of power allows us to consider how disciplinary surveillance moves 
beyond the notion of the gaze.  A diagram locates and arranges power by mapping 
relations between forms and techniques.  Different than an example (of power), which 
fixes an object by representing something that has already passed, a diagram (of power) is 
unstable and open to mutation—it changes as new coordinates between techniques are 
mapped.  An example is something that has already left its mark.  Panopticism produces 
power in varied ways depending on its context; its operations are always mutating as can 
be seen with disciplinary practices of probation and parole in the modern prison system.   
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For Deleuze, Foucault's diagram of power can be understood in several interlocking 
ways: “it is the presentation of the relations between forces unique to a particular 
formation; it is the distribution of the power to affect and the power to be affected; it is 
the mixing of non- formalized pure functions and unformed pure matter [and] it is a 
transmission or distribution of particular features” (F 61-2).  Deleuze’s tetravalent 
definition of panoptic power highlights its diagrammatic function which is to arrange 
relations between forces. 
Drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power, Deleuze explains 
force as virtual—something that is real but not actual.11  Force is the power to affect and 
be affected (N 62-64).  For Nietzsche, force represents the natural and chaotic forces of 
the world that act outside of knowledge and cannot be measured.  Nietzsche identifies 
two types of force: active and reactive.  In the most basic sense, active and reactive 
forces are two different ways that phenomena act.  The acting of force on force produce 
new phenomena (which are forces themselves).  Everything is the result of force acting 
on force and everything produces new relations of force.  For example, for Nietzsche and 
Deleuze, a chair does not exist because of our perception of it.  A chair is the result of 
interacting matter, properties of metal, the biology of sight, and forces that remain 
unknown.  In this way, the chair is a multiplicity composed of relations of force that can 
affect and be affected by other multiplicities (metal, fabric, vision, human).  The chair is 
more than an object perceived in our field of vision.  It exists in relation with things both 
11 I revisit Deleuze’s concept of the virtual in greater detail in the next chapter.  For a brief 
definition see p.151.
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in and beyond human perception.  The concept of force enables us to conceive of all that 
there is as actions and potentials rather than as predetermined structures or distinct and 
separate objects.  I will expand on the definition and function of the concept of 
multiplicity in the next chapter.  What is important to know here is that the concept of 
force enables us to consider that within the panoptic diagram there are real virtual 
potentials for new relations of power (and resistance) to actualize. 
 
Deleuze explains that for Foucault, knowledge is “the thing that brings about or 
actualizes relations between [virtual] forces” (F 66).  Deleuze calls this process of 
actualization the “statement-curve.” The statement-curve joins potential points in the 
diagram of power together.  However, “the individual points themselves, with their 
relations between forces, do not already constitute a statement: they were outside of the 
statement” (66).  Visible matter in the prison such as various materials like metal, the 
human multiplicity, and sunlight, did not already constitute discipline.  Each exists 
outside of disciplinary power as do their relations of force.  Hence Deleuze’s insistence 
that “the diagram is highly unstable or fluid, continually churning up matter and 
functioning in a way likely to create change” (30).  The statement-curve, the discourse 
of discipline, for example, joins these points (bodies, light, materials) together so that 
they function to produce a new relation of power—“a new kind of reality, a new model 
of truth” (Deleuze F 30). 
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Foucault explains that before the panopticon diagram there were other diagrams of 
power (sovereign power, for example), and there will be new diagrams to follow.  Each 
diagram produces the conditions necessary for the next.  Deleuze describes this 
relationship as a “Markov chain,” which is a statistical term used to define “a sequence of 
events [where] the probability of each is dependent only on the event immediately 
proceeding” (F 71).  All of this is to say that if panopticism is an “outdated model,” as 
Haggerty and others suggest, it is not because its function—to discipline—is obsolete.  It 
is outdated because the conditions of relations of power have changed.  There are new 
points on the diagram that the statement-curve cannot map.  Panopticism is not a tool or 
example of surveillance; it is a diagram that “exposes a set of relations between forces” 
(71).  A diagrammatic understanding of panopticism reveals the potential for new 
relations of force to actualize and the possibility for relations of power to change.  
Further, conceiving of panopticism as a diagram, or as an “abstract machine” as Deleuze 
also calls it (F 30), demonstrates that it is the relation between things that actualizes 
control; control does not precede relations of power and the same can be said of 
resistance.  Therefore, to examine surveillance and envision resistance, we need to look 
at the relations between the actual and virtual, discursive and non-discursive, knowledge 
and power to consider how and what relations function as mechanisms of surveillance. 
 
Panopticism can be summarized as a controlling function that formalizes through 
three mechanisms: spatial relations of separation, diffuse flows of power, and relations of 
forces without origin.  Spatial relations of isolation and separation cut off the “human 
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multiplicity” from all other human multiplicities, reducing the human to an individual 
(Foucault DP 218).  The individual is produced by measuring, recording, and regulating 
every aspect of the human multiplicity.  Discipline reduces and restricts a multiplicity’s 
rhizomatic relations and movement by turning it into a unity.  Foucault elaborates: 
 
This is what discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up 
confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the 
country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions.  It must also 
master all the forces that are formed from the very constitution of an organized 
multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that wishes to dominate 
it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions— anything that may 
establish horizontal conjunctions.  (219, emphasis added) 
 
Discipline moderates the force of a human multiplicity by blocking its movements.  It 
separates bodies to multiply its own controlling force.  Accordingly, panopticism 
discreetly “bring[s] into play the power relations, not above but inside the very texture of 
the multiplicity” so that the human becomes coextensive within and caught by the 
production of disciplinary power (Foucault 220).  In short, the subject becomes the 
mechanism of her own subjugation.  Foucault describes the second mechanism of 
panopticism, diffuse flows of power, as the “panoptic modality of power,” which is the 
notion that power is not constrained to spaces of enclosure or hierarchal apparatuses and 
institutions, but neither is it independent of them.  Panopticism is relational—it 
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formalizes the relation between discursive and non-discursive elements and fastens them 
together; it produces a body-prisoner-light-shadow-machine-complex12—or what we 
could call an assemblage.  Panopticism does not reduce the human multiplicity to an 
object of the gaze; it unifies the human as a subject with the apparatus of production and 
control. 
Lastly, panopticism functions as a relation of forces without origin.  It is 
continuous, inconspicuous, and unknown.  It has the capacity to multiply and expand 
beyond all recognition.  Foucault argues that at its prime, panopticism will no longer 
require techniques of observation to discipline bodies; it will be so internalized that its 
automation will be undetectable: its previous “necessarily spectacular manifestations of 
power, [are] extinguished one by one in the daily exercise of surveillance, in a 
panopticism in which the vigilance of intersecting gazes [is] soon to render useless both 
the eagle and the sun” (217).  Here, Foucault argues that the diagram of panopticism is 
not a structure but an abstract machine that runs on forces and functions rather than gazes 
and subject-to-subject control, enabling examinations without examiners, surveillance 
without observation, isolation and imprisonment without enclosed space. 
The three overlapping functions —separation and partition, diffuse flows of power, 
relations of forces without origin—function through spatial arrangements of in-visibility 
that operate beyond the unidirectional gaze.  These aspects of panopticism are often 
12 Foucault makes this argument earlier in his chapter “Docile Bodies.” See DP 153.
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ignored by critics in favour of a more simplified version of panopticism simply defined as 
“the few watching the many” (Haggerty 2006).  Perhaps Foucault was right when he said, 
“…panopticism has received little attention.  It is regarded as not much more than a 
bizarre little utopia, a perverse dream” (DP 224-5).  Panopticism is not akin to Orwell’s 
nightmarish Oceana.  It is not Big Brother; its gaze is not unidirectional— its operations 
are so subtle that those it controls are unaware that they are under control.  Foucault 
writes, “We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine, 
invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its 
mechanism…At the moment of its full blossoming, the disciplinary society still assumes 
with the Emperor the old aspect of the power of the spectacle” (217).  What does this 
mean?  It means that the moment we think panopticism has disappeared is the very 
moment it takes full control. 
 
2.3 Digital Modulation 
 
Control is not discipline…The control society is the disciplinary society. 
 
-Gilles Deleuze “What is the Creative Act?” 
 
In his succinct and pertinent essay, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Deleuze 
contends we have entered a new digital era of capital control.  Unlike discipline that 
produces the individual through constant observation and meticulous examination, 
control divides the individual into data so that its fragmented pieces can be bought and 
sold to the corporation.  For Foucault, the prison and factory are emblematic of 
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disciplinary power.  For Deleuze, the corporation and “the operation of markets is now 
the instrument of control and forms the impudent breed of our masters” (6).  According 
to Deleuze, disciplinary environments of enclosure are in crisis.  The individual no 
longer moves from one closed disciplinary space to the next—church to school to factory 
to home.  Control spreads across all aspects of life so that “nothing is left untouched for 
too long” (4).  The prison, factory, and school merge not because they operate alike 
through similar disciplinary techniques of power, but because they are networked through 
free floating forms of corporate regulation (6).  The individual is split, everywhere all at 
once.  Control operates not through rules and regulations but quantification and rapid 
rates of digital modulation. 
 
Recall that disciplinary power, through spatial arrangements of in-visibility, 
establishes a continuous relationship between the visible and invisible.  The society of 
control perverts the regime of visibility by ignoring the invisible altogether (Colwell 
215).  Deleuze argues that surveillance in a control society only takes interest in the 
exterior movements of the body—its surface and outward manifestations, positions and 
identities—what it can quantify and code like “a sieve whose mesh will transmute from 
point to point (“Postscript” 4).  In disciplinary societies the prison, school, and factory 
are like moulds or castings that shape the individual as an indivisible unit (4).  
Differently, Deleuze argues that in a control society, control seeps between the cracks of 
enclosed spaces like a “gaseous mass” that moves with the body everywhere—in open 
space (4).  In this new system of domination, surveillance does not seek to make the 
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subject visible to society or to oneself but relies instead on the disciplined individual’s 
internalized desire to be seen, which in turn, opens one up to control.  A society of 
control modifies the disciplinary mechanism of visibility so that the visible is not what 
can be seen but what can be counted. 
 
In the society of control, surveillance no longer disciplines individuals or masses 
through signatures or numbers: instead, surveillance controls by vivisecting the 
individual into undulatory segmentations where “individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ 
masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze “Postscript” 5).  Corporations do 
not want individuals; they want discrete datasets that can be entered into an endless loop 
of capital circulation.  It is through the numerical compartmentalization of the body’s 
behaviours and movements that, “we have passed from one animal to the other, from the 
mole to the serpent, in the system under which we live, but also in our manner of living 
and in our relations with others” (5).  Capitalism promotes rivalry and competition, 
opposing individuals against one another, dividing them apart from each other as well as 
dividing each individual from within (5).  Capitalism divides through deformable and 
transformable mechanisms of perpetual training, performance assessment, and micro- 
management enforced not by an individual owner or private corporation but “transient” 
and coded figures (5).  Capitalist control reduces life to a series of repetitive short-term 
activities and tasks where subjects focus only on “getting ahead” and what is promised to 
come.  This form of power prevents the subject from sustaining and enduring the 
temporality of the here and now. 
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To summarize Deleuze’s comparison between control and discipline, we could say 
that discipline fine tunes the body, regimenting its behaviour according to the proscribed 
norms of a particular place.  Whereas control invests the body in perpetual training and 
retraining so that it can exceed the norms and progress forward on an endless trajectory 
that aligns with the telos of the corporation.  Access to space is not a matter of adhering 
to norms but of modulating one’s movement at the borders of various spaces to acquire 
the right “passwords” that either grant or deny the body access to “orbit in a continuous 
network” (5).  In this schema, control functions by granting or denying the codes 
necessary for political, social, and physical mobility. 
 
Thus far, I have contrasted discipline and control to mark out their differences as 
Deleuze sees them.  However, in their provocative video essay, Clare Birchall, Gary 
Hall and Peter Woodbridge question such a comparison and the usefulness of Deleuze’s 
framework altogether.  Their concerns merit attention because they illustrate the risk of a 
misreading and dismissal of Deleuze’s analysis: 
 
Can… disciplinary societies and societies of control be so easily contrasted?  Didn’t 
forms of what Deleuze refers to as “control” exist in disciplinary societies and vice 
versa?  Are the institutions of the disciplinary society really finished?  Everywhere?  
Isn’t this a too linear and straightforward model of development?  Don’t some 
societies in other spaces and places around the world still rely on the deployment of 
disciplinary technologies of power and production and so on?  (…. And if that is so, 
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doesn’t “control” rely on and support a disciplinary and disciplined other?) Don’t 
even some aspects of our own society still rely on disciplinary technologies—not 
least the prison system?  Surely the deterrent of incarceration relies on its break 
from the more quotidian flow of controlling forces in our lives?  It relies upon its 
distinctive disciplinary powers. (6) 
Birchall et al. argue that Deleuze’s analysis of control falls back on a structuralist 
understanding of power.  They claim that Deleuze’s conception of power in a control 
society relies on several sets of structuring binaries—discipline/control, 
prison/corporation, body/gas, machine/computer and analogue/digital— which produces 
a linear narrative of historical development and progress whereby the latter terms are 
given privilege over the former.  They argue that “Postscript” offers a seductive, yet 
simple, theory of power that “meets a need for large explanations of contemporary 
societies, the workings of which can otherwise often appear too ambiguous, complex, and 
difficult to grasp” (6).  Birchall et al. claim that these explanations have “an added 
advantage in that they can also be contrasted to previous ‘structuralist (post- or 
otherwise)’ theories, thus helping the user to feel as if they are indeed, very much at the 
‘cutting edge’ of some fashionable new ‘Deleuzian’ paradigm” (8). 
To challenge Birchall et al., in my view Deleuze does not claim that we are leaving—
or have left— disciplinary societies behind in their entirety or that disciplinary mechanisms 
of power no longer exist (“Postscript” 7).  He argues that disciplinary society has adapted 
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and transformed its techniques of control with the introduction of the computer and 
networked technologies (Saladdin Ahmed 5).  He does not propose an opposition 
between discipline and control (this also goes for the binaries listed above that Birchall et 
al. point to); rather, he understands the pair as an entanglement of relations that divide 
the individual as one moves between the clashing and complementing mechanisms of 
discipline and control.13   Societies of control do not supersede disciplinary societies so 
much as they fold into them. 
If we consider Deleuze’s claim that societies of control transpose onto and mutate, 
rather than supplant disciplinary societies, and that power circulates in an endless loop 
among the two, the idea that disciplinary society proper still exists today is an illusion.  
Take for example, Birchall et al.’s assertion that the prison continues to operate as a 
disciplinary enclosure in contemporary society.  Is this wholly the case?  If “control is 
 
13 Deleuze’s philosophy is not based on binary dualisms.  Although concepts often appear in pairs 
(deterritorialization and reterritorialization, virtual and actual, stratified and smooth space, etc.), it 
is not the opposition or the similarity of terms that interests Deleuze.  What he is concerned with 
is the relation between the two and the basis by which that relation is formed.  He does not seek 
to collapse binaries, free one from the subordination of the other, or add additional terms to 
overcome the constraint of two (Grosz “Bergson, Deleuze” 6).  Dualisms are the representation of 
an underlying “stratum” of difference in which binaries are produced through differences of 
degree between impulses, energies, and tensions (6).  Thus, any pair that Deleuze names should 
not be thought of as a dualistic binary but a relationship between degrees of difference.  Each 
term is a multiplicity that acts on another multiplicity and thereby forms a relation.  Going 
forward, any concept introduced by Deleuze should be understood as an intensity that is in flux 
and changes depending on its interactions, functions, and forces.  The multivalent quality of 
Deleuze’s concepts can be attributed to their changing nature.  For example, it is not uncommon 
for the definition of a concept to change or contradict the way in which it was used prior.  If the 
meaning of a concept changes it is because its relation has changed (it has entered into a new 
relation with different concepts). 
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short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit,” as 
Deleuze states, we can surely see this happening within the prison system.  The revolving 
door of incarceration creates a growing population of people with criminal records, while 
court and bail hearings, parole, probation conditions, revoking voting rights, criminal 
record checks— enact “limitless postponements of control.”14  While Birchall et al. might 
be right to argue that the prison still signifies disciplinary space, and is therefore used as a 
symbol of power to deter people from committing crimes, the prison does not actually 
function as a disciplinary space. It does not seek to produce “the individual” nor is it an 
enclosed space that can be simply avoided by adhering to the law.  The prison is a system 
that is networked with advanced capital control and systemic class racism. 
The Prison Industrial Complex (PIC) constitutes a flow of overlapping capitalist and 
government interests that extend control beyond the prison walls and penal system.  The 
PIC encompasses not just the prison but probation, parole, policing, surveillance, the 
economic limitations imposed on families of those incarcerated, as well as the 
corporations that profit from the prison system.  The prison is a machine, not an 
enclosure.  The PIC modifies and divides individuals—creating “dividuals”— by 
continually extending and transforming the terms of incarceration.  Sentence length and 
quality of life in the prison adjust to capital flows of power.  For example, feminist 
theorist Sherene Razack contends that “The state criminalizes Blacks both in order to 
14 For example, the U.S. has the highest rate of incarceration in the world with the lowest rates of 
crime (Razack 2). 
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benefit from their labour in prison, but also to mark them as racially defective and outside 
the bounds of humanity and citizenship” (2).  Extending American scholarship on racism 
and the PIC to Canada, Razack argues that both Black and Aboriginal people 
overpopulate Canadian prisons: “As with Blacks whose labour and collective 
stigmatization enriches Whites, a direct connection can be established between 
incarcerated Aboriginal peoples and land” (2).  Thus, we could add settler colonialism as 
another profiteer of the Prison Industrial Complex. 
 
In the prison, control, just as it manifests in Deleuze’s description of the corporation, 
is cultivated through “states of perpetual metastability” (“Postscript” 4).  These states 
may operate through prison privatization, forced labour, and State racism that coincide 
with larger structures of capital.  For example, prison labour is a capital endeavor that 
provides lower operational costs for the prison system while turning a profit for the PIC’s 
corporate investors.  Prison factory jobs produce goods for corporations at slave labour 
wages.  Human rights organizations and activists condemn the prison industrial complex 
for its well-known labour exploitation, dubbed as modern-day slavery.15  As Angela 
Davis puts it, the prison system has simply moved Black people from the “prison of 
 
15 Corporations pay prison workers in North America extremely low wages that average twenty- 
five cents per hour (Pelaez).  And, in some prisons, if inmates refuse to work, they are placed in 
solitary confinement (Pelaez).  Scholars argue that the disproportionately high incarceration rate 
of people of colour, particularly Black men, is linked to this labour exploitation and the corporate 
demand to fulfill low-paying jobs contracted to prisons.  See Davis, Angela.  “Masked Racism: 
Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex.” History is a Weapon.  
http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/davisprison.html 
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slavery to the slavery of prison” (Davis quoted in Razack 2).  The PIC works through 
both discipline and control.  The disciplinary mechanism of labour streamlines the 
prisoner into a vast network of capital control. 
 
The pivotal difference between disciplinary societies and control societies, as 
Deleuze understands it, is not how they work but what they produce.  Discipline 
produces the individual and control creates the modulated dividual.  In C. Colwell’s 
formulation, disciplinary “power is less concerned with what we do than it is with 
ensuring that we construct our identities out of what we do.  The body is simply a means 
to producing effects on interiority” (212).  However, discipline, it should be noted, is 
concerned with what we do.  As Foucault elucidates, the body in the panoptic schema is 
regulated through schedules, rules, examination and so forth not only to ensure the 
construction of an identity but also to increase productivity, obedience, and order in the 
interest of the State.  The principal difference between discipline and control for Colwell 
then, is that control, unlike discipline, is concerned only with the exterior actions of the 
body.  In Colwell’s words, “[control] is concerned less with how we construe ourselves 
than with how we act” (212).  The body as surface is the prime target.  Colwell continues 
that the more destabilized the individual is and the more attuned she is to the body as a 
surface the more effective control becomes (212).  Control incites short term “identities” 
that arise immediately in relation to situations and activities.  These identities are 
transient and appear just as fast as they disappear depending on the space through which 
one moves.  Yet, Birchall et al. maintain that Deleuze does not offer a new 
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conceptualization of power and only gives us different technology-based metaphors— 
computers, codes, machines and so on—to describe disciplinary power.  But for 
Deleuze, technology is not a metaphor for control, like pulleys, levers, and clocks are for 
Foucault’s discipline.  Deleuze understands technology as a rhizome that effectuates the 
ways in which control flows.  The “Postscript” essay has received as much criticism as it 
has praise.  Deleuze is either criticized for not offering anything new or different from 
Foucault’s model of disciplinary power or he is accused of proposing a radical new 
theory of power that repudiates discipline. 
 
Little has been said on how discipline and control work together in the essay—or 
more interesting still, what new mechanisms of power might exist between discipline and 
control.  Deleuze's essay should not be taken as an either/or proposition of power (either 
discipline or control).  The point of the essay, as I understand it, is to illustrate the ways 
in which control societies repurpose and modulate the disciplinary tools of the past. 
Disciplinary power conditions the emergence of the society of control—one diagram 
moves into another.  Disciplinary power coerces individualization through mechanisms 
of surveillance to discipline the body whereas control fragments this identity.  Discipline 
constrains the body by enforcing the norms of each enclosed space onto the individual; 
control regulates access at the borders of those spaces.  The field of visibility remains 
but what we consider “visible” has changed.  Rather than considering how one society 
produces the conditions for the next and how they are therefore capable of working 
together yet remaining distinct, Birchall et al. unlink discipline and control from their  
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Markov chain.  Perhaps therefore they have a tough time understanding the distinction 
Deleuze makes between the two societies—which is the way in which each diagrams 
relations of power. 
 
Birchall et al. conclude their essay with a second and more inventive critique of 
“Postscripts.” After questioning the relevancy of Deleuze’s essay on control given that it 
was written before the Internet as we know it, they note that he presents a model of 
control whereby the definition of control itself is continuously modulating and 
transforming—which, they argue, begs the question: how can we map contemporary 
mechanisms of control if control is in constant flux?  How can Deleuze create a concept 
of control if control itself cannot be pinned down?  In their words: “Is there a danger that 
using this concept [of control] to interpret the web will not only run counter to Deleuze’s 
emphasis on creativity and experimentation (as opposed to representation) by saying ‘this 
is that,’ but will in effect result in an attempt to discipline the web in order to make it 
more like Deleuze’s philosophy?” (10).  While this question is worthy of consideration, 
Deleuze’s essay does not provide a framework for a new type of power.  He is not 
imposing a concept of control to make definitive statements on the operations of modern 
power.  Deleuze posits the society of control as a new diagram of power to expose new 
relations of force. 
 
“The society of control” gives us new tools to consider contemporary relations of 
power, which enables us to envision different tactics of resistance that, like control, 
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modulate and mutate the organization of power.  Deleuze affirms that disciplinary power 
is susceptible to “the passive danger of entropy” and “active danger of sabotage,” and that 
control is vulnerable to the passive danger of “jamming” and active danger of “piracy and 
the introduction of viruses” (“Postscript” 6).  He makes a point to note that one society is 
not worse or better than the other—societies of control are equally qualified as 
disciplinary societies to create repressive regimes as well as liberatory potentials (7).  His 
point is that we need to look for new “weapons” if we are to resist the encroaching, 
machinic, modulating, and disperse patterns of control that we now live with (7).  As I 
have argued in this section, both control and discipline function in relation to each other 
and result in the formation of new mechanisms of power.  Control does not replace 
disciplinary mechanisms including the spatial arrangements of in-visibility, it modulates 
them. 
 
 
2.4 Reassessing “The Surveillant Assemblage” 
 
In 2011, Rogers Canada, the biggest communications conglomerate in Canada, launched 
a software system called Rogers Smart Home Monitoring with the added tagline “more 
than just security.” When the system was first introduced it offered users the ability to 
have their home monitored around the clock by “certified security staff” who work at 
Rogers’ “central monitoring station” (“Rogers Launches”).  Rogers marketed the system 
as an effortless way to have remote access to your home both for security and for 
convenience.  For example, in one of their early commercials they advertise the service 
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as a way for you to turn lights on and off, adjust the thermostat, and receive alerts to let you 
know when your child has arrived home from school (“Rogers Launches”). 
 
In more recent commercials the phrase “home automation” is emphasized above 
security.  In 2016, they introduced the “small appliance module” that allows you to 
connect the Monitoring system to virtually any electronic in the home: “set the coffee 
maker so that there is a fresh pot in the morning, connect the fan to give the cats a nice 
cool breeze on demand, or give the housekeeper some music while they work by 
connecting the stereo, the options are nearly limitless” (“Get to Know Rogers”). In this 
updated commercial, there is no mention where the data is going and who is watching.  
Home security systems may provide conveniences, but they also open your home and its 
inhabitants to corporate monitoring, data collection, and to the risk of “unauthorized” 
people who are capable of exploiting cybersecurity vulnerabilities.  For example, in 
2015, a family in London, Ontario realized their home security system had been hacked 
when they heard someone whispering through the video monitor in their child’s room 
that they were being watched (“Family’s Home-Monitoring”).  The family was shocked 
and fearful that someone could actually be watching (“Family’s Home-Monitoring”).  
The success of home monitoring systems, despite their failure and security vulnerability, 
demonstrates the ease with which users consent to the collection of personal data. 
Personal data in this example is the collection of legal names, identification of family 
members, passwords, nicknames or aliases, income, age, employment, gender, time and 
dates of activities in the home, identification of visitors, acquaintances, and pets, 
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communication tracking, your daily schedule and habits, even what time you drink your 
coffee in the morning; as Rogers’ says, “the options are nearly limitless.” While data 
collection of personally identifiable information typically leaves users of convenience- 
based surveillance unperturbed, the exchange of privacy for efficiency is not a hard trade 
to make when data appears impersonal.  Yet, it is not hard to imagine the Orwellian 
implications and possibilities of home monitoring technologies.  The Rogers example is 
comparatively mild not least because it applies to a certain social class who arguably do 
not experience the ill effects of surveillance on a continuous basis.  Of greater concern is 
the way in which everyday encounters with surveillance acclimate the perception of data 
collection as neutral.16  The popular notion of “the surveillant assemblage” in surveillance 
studies tends toward this characterization. 
 
In their frequently-cited 2000 essay, Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson 
introduce the term “the surveillant assemblage” to describe the rhizomatic structure of 
contemporary surveillance.  Referencing Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of the 
“assemblage” and “rhizome,” they argue that surveillance functions as a convergence of 
discrete mechanisms that turn the body into flows of information.  Surveillance no longer 
watches over embodied subjects—it disassembles (deterritorializes) and reassembles 
(reterritorializes) the subject “into distinct ‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and 
targeted for intervention” (606).  Haggerty and Ericson reject panoptic metaphors of top- 
 
16 Both Magnet and Browne argue that representations of biometric technology in the media, 
particularly in television and film, familiarize the public with identification technology while also 
sensationalizing its capabilities (Magnet 147, Browne 120-121). 
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down surveillance that focus on the discipline of individual bodies.  Instead, they 
maintain that surveillance is a nebulous web of power and technology with no preferred 
targets.  “The surveillant assemblage,” for Haggerty and Ericson, is a mass of 
surveillance technologies which converge to simultaneously abstract information from 
the body.  In turn, the body becomes a continuous outflow of information that is 
disorganized and reorganized as data. 
 
Haggerty and Ericson contend that surveillance does not recognize individuals, nor 
does it seek to discipline or punish a body.  According to them, the surveillant assemblage 
is indiscriminate; it takes in a “limitless range of phenomena such as people, signs, 
chemicals, knowledge and institutions” as equal forces so that no one element has priority 
or privilege over another (“The Surveillant Assemblage” 608).  Although it is meticulous 
with its numerical measurements, quantifying everything at every turn, they claim that 
the surveillant assemblage collapses hierarchies.  The body is analyzed only as “pure 
information” before its effects are “directed toward a particular cyborg flesh/technology 
amalgamation” (614).  Flesh disappears into algorithmic control and the body is rendered 
into a series of datasets.  Therefore, Haggerty and Ericson assert that the surveillant 
assemblage “decorporealizes” the subject into “pure virtuality” (611).  Although the 
concept of a “data double” provides a useful way to understand how the subject is 
circulated and calculated in digital space, it is not coextensive with the operations of 
surveillance and control.  For example, questioning the common use of the term 
“surveillance assemblage,” Jasbir Puar asks: “Is the informational body, the data body 
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that precedes and follows us racial, or racist, and if so, how is this articulated within 
profiling?” (TA 175).  In short, how does the notion of a “data double” help us 
understand the practice of racial profiling? 
 
Haggerty and Ericson draw on John Fiske’s 1998 study of racial profiling to support 
their erroneous claim that surveillance hierarchies are being “levelled” (“The Surveillant 
Assemblage” 614).  In his essay on the racially differentiated surveillance of Black men 
in public space, Fiske argues that Black men in the US are webbed to institutional 
structures of racism and hyper-surveillance that seek to map the movement of Black 
bodies in public space.  Drawing on several case studies, Fiske demonstrates how Black 
men experience more CCTV and police surveillance on a day-to-day basis than white 
men.  Fiske then summarizes: “although surveillance is penetrating deeply throughout our 
society, its penetration is differential.  The lives of the white mainstream are still 
comparatively untouched by it.  But in Black America, its penetration is deep” (85).  In 
response, Haggerty and Ericson write: “while the targeting of surveillance is indeed 
differential, we take exception to the idea that the mainstream is ‘untouched’ by 
surveillance” (617).  They continue, “surveillance has become rhizomatic, it has 
transformed hierarchies of observation, and allows for the scrutiny of the powerful by 
both institutions and the general population” (617).  There are two observations to be 
made here.  First Haggerty and Ericson mischaracterize Fiske’s essay.  Fiske discusses 
the different degrees, effects, and frequency of surveillance of Black men compared to 
the white mainstream.  He does not argue that the mainstream is entirely untouched by 
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surveillance.  Haggerty and Ericson gloss over this crucial aspect of Fiske’s work by 
omitting from their response the crucial words: “comparatively” and “white” to describe 
the mainstream.  If we re-contextualize their response to Fiske might it be possible to 
read Haggerty and Ericson’s statement another way: while surveillance is indeed racially 
differential, we take exception to the idea that the white mainstream is comparatively 
untouched by surveillance?  Does our capacity to “scrutinize the powerful” level the 
social hierarchies embedded in racially motivated surveillance?  Why do Haggerty and 
Ericson resist acknowledging that surveillance is experienced in different degrees of 
intensity for different bodies?  If they acknowledge that surveillance is indeed 
“differential” then how is it not hierarchical?  In short, of what value is the concept of 
“the surveillant assemblage” if it does not account for racialized and racializing17 
practices of surveillance? 
Haggerty and Ericson argue that bodies are “abstracted” from their “territorial 
settings” and “separat[ed]… into a series of discrete flows” therefore “leveling the 
hierarchy of surveillance” (606).  This utopian vision of a non-hierarchical, or even a 
less-hierarchical, model of surveillance that simply records what it sees or counts without 
imposing bias is reminiscent of what Donna Haraway calls the “god trick.” The god trick 
proffers the possibility of a neutral and disembodied instrument of visualization that sees 
everything from nowhere.  The trick is that visualizing technologies are not objective; 
17 Browne uses the term “racializing surveillance” to define a “technology of social control 
where surveillance practices, policies, and performances concern the production of norms 
pertaining to race and exercise a ‘power to define what is in or out of place’” (16). 
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they are tied to histories of militarism, capitalism, colonialism, and heteropatriarchal 
control (189).  Haraway warns of the danger of being swept away by the promise of new 
“dazzling” technologies that promise to operate through neutral automation.  She asserts 
that technology and objectivity are mediated by patterns and webs of objectification and 
oppression that control who gets to see, who is seen, and who remains invisible.  She 
affirms that the only subjects who can envision a world without mediated vision are 
“those occupying the positions of dominators,” who are “self-identical, unmarked, 
disembodied, unmediated, transcendent, born again” (193), and we can add here from 
Haggerty and Ericson, “decorporealized” and “purely virtual.” 
Although it is doubtful that the biometric research industry is reading Haraway’s 
critical text on situated knowledges and partial perspectives, it is not fair perhaps to lay 
this charge against Haggerty and Ericson.  In their more recent work, they note that 
some populations of people experience disproportionate levels of scrutiny.  In the 
introduction to their anthology The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility, Haggerty 
and Ericson list racial profiling as one of the “political axis of surveillance” that 
combines the “historical legacies of racism” with the operational logics of surveillance 
systems (17).  However, they continue to hold on to the idea that “hierarchies of 
visibility are being levelled, as people from all social backgrounds are now under 
surveillance.  While surveillance has not eliminated social inequalities, certain groups no 
longer stand outside the practice of routine monitoring” (6).  The paradox in Haggerty 
and Ericson’s presentation of surveillance—that hierarchies are being levelled while 
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racially discriminatory practices continue—stems from the idea that everyone, regardless 
of race, class, gender, ability, citizenship status, social location, and sexuality is subject 
to a degree of advanced capitalist surveillance.18  While that might be true, the underlying 
assumption that we are all in this together—we are all under surveillance—proffers the 
illusion that “we”19  are all subject to the same nexus of surveillance and control. 
The inability to account for structural differences of surveillance and oppression is 
symptomatic of a mischaracterization of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
“assemblage.” Haggerty and Ericson define the surveillant assemblage as a 
“convergence” of “once discrete surveillance systems” (605).  For Deleuze and Guattari 
an assemblage is a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements that do not lose their 
specificity—they do not “converge”—they stay discrete.  The assemblage functions 
through the relations between elements.  These relations produce the capacity for an 
assemblage to act and be acted upon.  Foucault’s diagram of panopticism is also a 
surveillance assemblage.  It is composed of light, shadows, metal, human multiplicities, 
penal code, windows, bars, the architectural design of the prison.  The relation between 
elements produces the disciplinary effects of visibility.  The elements do not converge or 
collapse into each other; light does not merge into metal; they interact with one another.
18 Taking issue with Haggerty and Ericson, Sanjay Sharma and Jasbinder Nijjar argue that race 
(and I would add gender, sexuality, ability, class) cannot be divorced from algorithmic 
renderings of bodies as data because race is not only an “embodied phenomena” but also an 
epistemological doing intermeshed with material and ontological experiences of race and racism 
(77-78). 
19 I will expand on the politics of using “we” in the next chapter when I discuss the politics of 
location as defined by Adrienne Rich and also Rosi Braidotti. 
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This is an important distinction because it signals that when one relation between an 
element changes so does the entire assemblage.  If the bars were removed from a prison 
cell, for example, the element of confinement (produced through a relation; the relation 
of bars and the human multiplicity) would necessarily become different and change the 
prison assemblage’s function (to confine).  Foucault’s panoptic perspective, in chorus 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage, considers both the mechanism of 
surveillance as a whole and at the same time accounts for the specificities of its elements. 
Thomas Nail contends that the English translation of “assemblage” has created 
confusion regarding how Deleuze and Guattari understand the concept to function.  The 
original French word that Deleuze and Guattari use is “agencement,” which means “a 
construction, an arrangement, or a layout” (Nail 22).  “Assemblage” (in both its English 
and French definitions) means “‘the joining or union of two things’ or ‘a bringing or 
coming together’” (22).  The critical difference between the two terms is that 
“agencement” does not imply a unification of elements whereas “assemblage” tends 
toward this definition in his commonplace usage (22).  This distinction is of the utmost 
importance to Deleuze and Guattari who argue that within any given assemblage 
elements do not lose their specificity— they do not collapse into one another—they do 
not “converge” to make a whole, they arrange through their relationality.  As such, it is 
possible for an assemblage to have elements with structures without itself becoming a 
structure.  Although the assemblage is not constructed as a hierarchal arrangement, the 
relations between elements may be hierarchical insofar as the intensity of one is stronger 
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than the other, or elements may also belong to hierarchical structures as for example, the 
system of law and justice in the panoptic assemblage.  Similarly, one might find 
hierarchical relations between elements in historical, social, and political structures 
attached to various technologies in any given surveillance assemblage.  For Deleuze and 
Guattari everything is a multiplicity, and everything is an assemblage, but their 
philosophy does not discount the existence of social hierarchies.  The Deleuze and 
Guattari assemblage concept allows us to consider the unstable relation between elements 
that affect the systems and structures in our lives.  If these relations are unstable, then 
they are open to transformation—to intervene we must intervene at the site of 
relationality— which is to say we must explore the between of technologies, histories, 
bodies, data, and discourses of gender and race. 
The concept of surveillance as an assemblage opens possibilities for intervention at 
sites not normally seen.  The conceptual model of the assemblage allows us to get 
specific, local, and unpack the relations of power between discourse and material.  The 
assemblage is not an overarching schema.  When Haggerty and Ericson identify the 
surveillant assemblage as “multiple, unstable” and one that “lacks discernible boundaries 
or responsible governmental departments” they conclude that “the surveillant assemblage 
cannot be dismantled by prohibiting a particular unpalatable technology.  Nor can it be 
attacked by focusing criticism on a single bureaucracy or institution” (609); they miss 
precisely the critical aspect of an assemblage as a concept, which is that any change in 
relation between elements in the assemblage changes its capacity to act.  The prohibition 
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of a specific surveillance technology or practice, such as racial profiling, would 
necessarily change how the surveillant assemblage functions.  Haggerty and Ericson 
neither identify nor acknowledge the critical importance of the heterogeneity of elements 
of an assemblage.  Instead, they present a solid structure, or even a supra-structure of 
combined technologies: 
In the face of multiple connections across myriad technologies and practices, 
struggles against particular manifestations of surveillance, as important as they 
might be, are akin to efforts to keep the ocean’s tide back with a broom—a frantic 
focus on a particular unpalatable technology or practice while the general tide of 
surveillance washes over us all. (609) 
Haggerty and Ericson present a bleak outlook.  They do not offer a strategy of 
resistance and conclude their essay with the contention that anonymity no longer exists in 
society and thus the surveillant assemblage controls by producing “the disappearance of 
disappearance” (620).  Rather than getting washed away with the tide as it were, feminist 
and anti-racist scholarship on surveillance has taken up a more powerful “broom” than 
the one envisioned by Haggerty and Ericson.  As I will discuss next, feminist and anti- 
racist interventions critique surveillance studies by examining the relation between race 
and gender and biometric technology. 
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2.5 With Whose Blood were Biometrics Crafted? 
Vision is always a question of the power to see—and perhaps of the violence 
implicit in our visualizing practices.  With whose blood were my eyes crafted? 
-Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women
What does contemporary surveillance technology tell us about historical and social 
structures of racism, anti-black racism, sexism, classism, ableism, colonization, 
Islamophobia, transphobia, and homophobia?  How do identification technologies make 
certain bodies and communities of people vulnerable to heightened surveillance and 
increased control?  In what ways are social constructions of race and gender coded into 
biometric recognition software?  When technology fails what does its failure tell us 
about systemic and structural forms of discrimination?  Biometric surveillance is an 
element in the surveillance assemblage.  It includes body scanners, facial recognition 
software, finger printing, iris scanning, olfactory detection, voice activation, mapping 
bodily behaviours such as gait and facial expressions, measuring palm prints and DNA 
verification.  These technologies measure parts of the body and calibrate biological 
information for the purposes of identification and verification.  There are three different 
types of biometric recognition failure: 1) a false rejection rate: the failure to recognize a 
user as themselves; 2) a false acceptance rate: the recognition of someone other than the 
intended user is recognized; and 3) failure to enroll (the failure of a technology to enroll 
the user’s biometric data in the first place) (Magnet 22).  The consequences of 
recognition failure are many: extended wait times at airports, the inability to access 
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money from a bank machine, denial of entry to space, denial of mobility, identity theft, 
security breaches of personal information or private space, interrogation by authorities, or 
enrollment in a database as a possible security threat based on one’s initial potential to 
evade identification technology.  Some degree of failure is inevitable given that machines 
are not immune to error.  However, following Shoshana Magnet (2011) and Simone 
Browne (2015), I assert that the failure to recognize certain bodies is more than a 
processing hiccup or algorithmic glitch; it is programmed at the level of code. 
Biometrics are marketed as prejudice-free security technologies that remove the 
possibility of human bias and error in the identity recognition process.  For instance, the 
Canadian biometrics company, AcSys claims that their facial recognition software is 
“completely race independent—eliminating risk of racial profiling” (AcSys Biometrics 
Corp qtd in Magnet 24).  And industry researchers promise that “facial recognition 
systems do not focus on a person’s skin color…a typical system uses objectively 
measurable facial features such as the distance and angles between geometric points on 
the face” resulting in a more “human-free” technology that is “free from many human 
flaws” (Woodward et al. qtd in Magnet 24).  Recently these claims have been largely 
dispelled.  In April 2016, The Atlantic published a disparaging report on the racial bias 
of facial recognition titled “Facial-Recognition Software Might have a Racial Bias 
Problem.” The report contends that biometric technologies fail to recognize the faces of 
Black people more than any other racial group (Gravie and Frankle).  These claims are 
publicly supported by individual consumers who share their experiences of biometric 
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failure on social media.  For example, in August 2017, Chukwuemeka Afigbo uploaded a 
video to Twitter titled, “Racist Soap Dispenser?” followed by the caption, “If you have 
ever had a problem grasping the importance of diversity in tech and its impact on society, 
watch this video” (Afigbo).  The video begins with a white man waving his hand 
underneath an automatic soap dispenser.  The machine instantly recognizes the hand and 
dispenses the soap.  Next, a Black man with dark skin uses the same waving motion 
underneath the sensor but the machine does not register his hand.  He continues waving 
back and forth to no avail while someone in the background jokingly shouts out “too 
black!” (Afigbo).  To demonstrate that the dispenser failed because of his skin colour, the 
man places a white paper towel underneath the sensor, and presto out comes the soap. 
“Racist Soap Dispenser” is one video among many that demonstrate the inability of 
automated recognition technology to enroll Black skin. 
In another viral video uploaded to YouTube in 2009, entitled “HP Computers are 
Racist,” two co-workers, Desi Cryer and Wanda Zamen, demonstrate how Hewlett 
Packard’s web camera fails to track Black skin.  In the video, “white Wanda” is tracked 
effortlessly as we see the camera pan along with her movements.  However, when 
“Black Desi” enters the frame the camera stops moving and returns to a stationary 
position unable to detect his face—interestingly, this is a reversal of human-to-human 
racial profiling practices in which people of colour are readily tracked and made 
hypervisible.  Hewlett Packard released a statement in response that read: “the camera  
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might have difficulty ‘seeing’ contrast in conditions where there is insufficient foreground 
lighting” (Browne 161).  In other words, the technology was optimized for users with 
lighter skin. 
In her incisive study on the surveillance of blackness, Browne contends that 
experiences like Cryer’s with the HP camera tell us that “technology privileges 
whiteness, or at least lightness, in its use of lighting and in the ways in which certain 
bodies are lit and measured in the enrollment process” (113).  In a tongue-and-cheek 
response to HP’s statement, a different user on YouTube uploaded a video which showed 
the operation of a web camera on five different people with both dark and light skin 
tones.  HP’s camera appears to track everyone the same way, but the video ends on a 
satirical note: the user jokes, “if you have this camera or are planning on buying one just 
make sure you have a lot of lighting!” (Re: HP).  As Browne and Magnet both note, the 
inability for biometrics to “see” Black skin in low contrast lighting is an extension of the 
“culture of light” that Richard Dyer examines in his 1997 study on white-centricity in the 
history of photography.  Briefly, Dyer traces the history of film development and reveals 
that photography is premised on racially loaded associations between visibility, light, 
whiteness, purity, and knowledge in which the “undesirable evils of shadows” are 
associated with Blackness (Dyer 96, 125). 
The failure of certain bodies to enroll can be attributed to the practice of 
“prototypical whiteness,” which Browne defines as the privileging of whiteness or 
lightness in the development and design of biometric recognition technology (36).  The 
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use of white features and skin colour as prototypes to develop biometric technology 
inscribes racializing schemas in surveillance technology.  The schemas increase the 
fallibility rates for non-white users and, as we have seen, affects convenience-based 
recognition technology, such as automated soap dispensers.  Racialized schemas may 
incur more grave consequences such as restricted access to space and the mobility to 
cross borders.  In 2004 the United Kingdom introduced IRIS, a biometric recognition 
immigration system based on iris scans that would give travellers automated clearance at 
the border once their iris was verified.  The technology failed to recognize the iris images 
of people with dark skin (Magnet 29).20  Indeed, activists protesting the program 
discovered that the technology had a higher recognition rate for blue eyes (29).  In 
response to the failures of IRIS, the UK government stated that their technology was 
tested on a diverse population which, as Magnet points out, contradicts the industry’s 
claims that biometrics are supposedly “race-neutral” (29).  The program was 
decommissioned in 2013 and a new program was developed called the Biometric 
Residence Permit (BRP).  BRP is a mandatory permit for temporary residents and 
immigrants who apply to stay in the UK.  BRP contains a person’s fingerprint and 
photograph along with “soft biometric” data such as age, gender, immigration status, 
reason for visit or conditions of stay, and stipulations on whether a person can access 
public funds for health services.  What are the dangers when fingerprints do not register 
20 The justification given for this failure was that the technology had difficulty locating the iris 
against dark skin.  However, as Shoshana Magnet points out: “This response fails to explain why 
skin colour would make a difference, as the irises of all people are sounded by the white of the 
eye” (29). 
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at a security checkpoint, or irises do not enroll?  How does prototypical whiteness create 
the conditions for increased racial discrimination when one becomes a suspect based on 
the failure to enroll? 
Writing on the biopolitics of biometric technology, Joseph Pugliese argues that 
biometric failure can be traced back to an “infrastructural calibration to whiteness” (64).  
He argues that the inability for recognition technology to enroll Asian women’s 
fingerprints, for example, is a product of prototypical whiteness.  Pugliese asserts that it 
reproduces a racist logic through the language used to describe enrollment failure, for 
example, “Asian women’s fingerprints [are described] as “faint,” “lower quality,” or the 
result of “delicate skin” (64).  In actuality, the failure to enroll fingerprints is based on the 
inability to account for ridge variation which can be affected by race, age, and the 
deterioration of skin from using harsh cleaning chemicals that affect ridge characteristics 
(Browne 113).  Pugliese argues that racially-loaded language masks the infrastructural 
whiteness of surveillance technology and makes both prototypical whiteness and the non- 
white subject who fails to enroll invisible (64).  But, in this failure, the non-white subject 
is not wholly invisible, as Pugliese suggests; the failure of recognition becomes a point of 
hypervisibility in which the subject is subjected to additional scrutiny. 
A 2004 study, problematically entitled “Rapid Pose Estimation of Mongolian Faces 
Using Projective Geometry,” suggests that anthropometry is used to create algorithmic 
templates for race recognition.  Anthropometry is the practice of measuring the human 
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body to classify differences.  Anthropometry is historically linked to a discourse of 
scientific racism in which its subset practices of phrenology and craniology were used to 
measure the skulls of different races to determine intellectual capacity and criminality.  
In the eighteenth-century, anthropometry was used to measure and compare racial 
differences of sexuality.  At that time, the so-called “differences” between Black and 
white women’s genitalia were measured and compared to support racist ideas 
surrounding Black women’s sexuality (Somerville 1997).  Anthropometry is largely 
dismissed today as pseudoscience not least because of its archaic practices of craniology 
and phrenology, but also because the practice of measuring bodies against one another to 
determine racial difference suggests that race, gender, and sexuality are biologically 
based rather than socially constructed.  Despite these criticisms, Magnet reports that there 
has been a resurgence of anthropometry-based research in the study of biometric 
engineering.  For example, in their paper on “Mongolian” faces, Li Hau-Ming et al. state, 
“The difference of Race is obvious, and it is the central field of the research of 
anthropology, Anthropometry is a key technique to find out this difference” (Li et al. qtd 
in Magnet 39).  Racial difference is determined by the measurements of the size of the 
nose and the width between the eyes.  They conclude that “as a result of using the 
statistical information of the Mongolian Race’s feature, our method is suitable to be used 
in the north of China” (Li et al. qtd in Browne 113).  Browne argues that the 
contemporary use of anthropometry, such as that outlined in Hau-Ming et al.’s study, is a 
form of “digital epidermalization.” Browne defines digital epidermalization as the 
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practice of digitizing the body into code in ways that fracture the body from its 
humanness thereby making one into a racial Other (98). 
Biometric surveillance technology is part of contemporary surveillance 
assemblages.  These technologies are informed by social constructions of race and 
hierarchical practices of profiling.  As Browne demonstrates, prototypical whiteness and 
digital epidermalization are folded into the “surveillant assemblage” in ways that beg the 
question: are bodies ever really “abstracted” from their “territorial setting,” as Haggerty 
and Ericson suggest?  What does the process of “decorporealization” entail?  Are “data 
doubles” prototypically white?  Are they anthropometrically determined?  Are they 
encoded with cultural assumptions about race?  If not, does this mean that “the 
surveillant assemblage” is infrastructurally white? 
The title of this section, “with whose blood were biometrics crafted,” is not meant 
to imply that race, gender, sexuality, or identity can be located in blood.  It is meant to 
gesture toward the ways in which biometric technology participates in a colonial logic of 
identification—i.e. when identity is established and verified based on biological markers.  
In Canada, for example, the Indian Act reduces the legal Status of Native peoples to 
biological traits such as blood quantum.  Under the 1876 Act, Indian identity was verified 
by tracing the patrilineal heritage of a Native person to establish their blood descent. 
Although the current Act does not mention blood, the Status stipulations are clearly based 
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on blood lineage.21   In her dissertation, Beyond Blood: Rethinking Aboriginal Identity 
and Belonging, Pamela D. Palmater argues that blood quantum laws in Canada are a form 
of race classification that “perpetuates racist stereotypes about Aboriginal people based 
on a physical characteristic (blood), which is no less objectionable than had the 
characteristic been the height of [a person’s] cheekbones or the colour of their skin” 
(405).  Status laws create a situation of choice where “people are forced to take blood 
quantum/descent and status into account when considering their marital and/or parenting 
partners” (407).  The politics around blood quantum laws are gendered, complex, and 
contested.  Space does not permit for a full discussion here on the nuances of the Indian 
Act and its relation to blood quantum.  I want to suggest however that Status laws should 
be considered a form of biometric surveillance technology.  Although rarely mentioned 
in surveillance studies scholarship, Status stipulations operate through the same 
biometric logic of identification and enrollment: access to space and Status are 
21 Contemporary laws in Canada on Indian Status are intentionally complex.  Briefly, there are 
two types of status.  The first is 6(1) status which means that both a person’s parents have status. 
The second is 6(2) which indicates that only one parent has 6(1) status.  Both 6(1) and 6(2) have 
equal provisions.  However, if a person with 6(2) status has a child with someone with no status, 
whether they are Native or not, their child has lost status.  This is often called the “second 
generation cutoff.” Embedded in these laws is a history of gendered violence; historically, if a 
Native woman married a white man, she would lose status.  Though the law was amended in 
1985 to remove gender discriminatory provisions by inaugurating 6(1) and 6(2) status, those 
people whose status lineage is primarily maternal often meet the second-generation cutoff sooner 
and/or have difficulties claiming status.  In 2010-11 the Indian Act was amended again to address 
gender disparity, but imbalanced remained.  In 2016, after a Quebec Superior Court ruling found 
that the Indian Act violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, Bill S-3, an amendment 
to the Indian Act that eliminates gender-based inequalities in status registration, was introduced.  
In December 2017, Bill S-3 received royal assent.  In addition to the historical legacy of sexism, 
status laws in Canada are regularly criticized as an intergenerational surveillance system that 
tracks racial purity. 
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determined by verifying one’s identity.  Blood quantum laws, like “digital 
epidermalization,” do not extract information from the body; clearly, they impose 
notions of race, identity, and belonging onto the body. 
With respect to colonial signification of blood, OmiSoore Dryden contends that 
blood quantum practices in Canada, as well as other countries, “rely upon blood to 
produce knowledge about bodies, purity, lineage, and relatedness…[and] narrate the 
constitutive making of bodies and framings of belonging” (122).  Blood quantum laws 
are “used to construct white bodies, limit nation-state citizenship, and map borders of 
nationals through racialization (and othering) of specific bodies.  These bodies, 
perpetually excluded, are tethered to the nation and necessary for the nation’s 
construction” (123).  Dryden raises important questions on the relation between blood 
and surveillance: In what ways is the state using blood quantum and Status laws to 
surveil and track Indigenous peoples?  How does a legacy of blood quantum law 
support national security discourse on surveillance and terrorism?  In the next chapter, I 
discuss the surveillance of Indigenous peoples more thoroughly and argue that colonial 
surveillance is a contemporary mechanism of control that seeks to construct and 
authenticate Native identity in ways that support the heteropatriarchal undercurrents of 
the so-called war on terror. 
Thus far, I have presented examples of spatial arrangements of in-visibility and 
digital modulation to reveal their coexistence in the same surveillance assemblage.  The 
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quantification and calibration of bodies as data have been socially situated in similar 
ways as the politics of vision.  Briefly, Puar contends that the visual field is a racially 
contested terrain and “seeing” is not simply a biological mode of perception, but seeing is 
also an interpretation, signification, and a practice of “reading” bodies through social, 
political and historical lenses (183).  The digitization of bodies cannot be separated from 
those practices of “seeing” where legacies of racism and contemporary practices of 
discrimination are coded into recognition and control.  The field of data is an enfleshed 
terrain based on human assumptions of race and gender that shape the ways in which 
one’s biometric identity is enrolled or not enrolled.  The insidious and pervasive nature of 
networked surveillance perpetuated by corporate interests, does not eliminate the fact that 
individuals are visually tracked and identified through perceptual and panoptic systems 
that are completely unconcerned with “decorporealized data doubles.” Clearly, the 
concept of the assemblage as advanced by Deleuze and Guattari would not deny 
hierarchical practices of surveillance.  Indeed, their concept of assemblage would 
inherently acknowledge the relations of elements in a surveillance assemblage and would 
enable us to locate, expose and examine the effects of over-policing in Black 
communities, gendered forms of surveillance, or Islamophobic practices of terrorist 
profiling. 
Kelly Gates demonstrates in her study of facial recognition technology that 
technology is not used to profile terrorists based on “pure information.” Terrorist 
suspects are not abstracted from their body and territory and then rendered into a 
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digitized face, which is then objectively cross-listed against a list of known terrorists.  
Instead, the “face of terror” is socially constructed through a system of classification 
based on the image of a mythic racialized enemy (Gates101-2).  When bodies are 
converted into numerical code, individuals and groups are differentially sorted “according 
to calculated levels of privilege, access, and risk” (Gates 58).  Thus, while Haggerty and 
Ericson’s “data doubles” are cleared through a security checkpoint another person’s data 
double may be detained precisely because of the body and territory from which the 
double came.  If we accept that recognition technology is developed through a relation 
between ways of seeing and ways of coding, then it follows that failure occurs at the site 
between the analogue and digital.  This site of failure between visibility and modulation 
gives way to a third mechanism of control, which I call somatic suspension. 
2.6 Somatic Suspension 
It’s all about checkpoints…They lie in wait for you at key points.  You come to 
them, and they’re activated by your arrival.  You’re free to move, but every few 
steps there’s a checkpoint.  They’re everywhere, woven into the social landscape.  
To continue on your way you have to pass the checkpoint.  What’s being 
controlled is right of passage – access…When you pass the checkpoint you have 
to present something for detection, and when you do that something registers…Or 
something fails to register, and that’s what lets you pass, like at airport security or 
places where there’s video surveillance.  In either case what’s being controlled is 
passage across thresholds. 
-Brian Massumi, Politics of Affect
To successfully pass through a checkpoint one must smoothly oscillate between visibility 
and the digital field of modulation.  The body must be readable and recognizable, but also 
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malleable enough to be divided into code.  When the body fails to enroll in either the 
field of vision or the field of data a moment of suspension occurs in which the body is 
unable to cross a threshold.  When a body scanner at an airport is unable to verify the 
gender of a traveller for example, the body is suspended not only between departure and 
destination, but also between the categories of identification and indiscernibility: 
female/male and ? Innocent/suspect and ? Citizen/terrorist and ? 
In this section, I will briefly outline “somatic suspension” as a third mechanism of 
control.  This mechanism works by restricting certain bodies from crossing a threshold 
or checkpoint.  Like the previous two mechanisms discussed earlier—spatial 
arrangements of in-visibility and digital modulation—somatic suspension also controls 
through relations of movement.  The first mechanism controls by confining the body to 
spatial arrangements of in-visibility (i.e. the body is caught in the perpetual effects of 
regulatory norms) and the second operates by dispersing the body in digital space—the 
third mechanism controls by suspending the body between the two. 
When bodies fail to verify as a recognizable identity they are momentarily 
suspended from the rapid flow of information.  They glitch the system and cause a 
hiccup in automated control.  Somatic suspension is not constrained to high-tech forms 
of identification.  It can occur in low-tech or no-tech instances, for example: when trans 
bodies are barred access to public bathrooms, the quotidian flow of movement in public 
space is disrupted.  These specific instances, that unexpectedly actualize at the site of 
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error, disruption, or failure characterize a mechanism of control: the suspension and 
restriction of the body’s movements.  Nonetheless, I also argue that during somatic 
suspension there exists the potentiality for resistance.  But first, I want to explore somatic 
suspension as a form of capture and control that is effectuated by the relation and tension 
between panoptic visibility and digital modulation. 
The careful choreography of travelling through airport security checkpoints: 
Wait in line, don’t fidget, don’t look nervous, divert your eyes from the agent 
walking through aisles of travellers, or smile reassuringly with an expression 
that says, “I have nothing to hide.” Boarding pass out, passport in hand, liquids 
in plastic bags, shoes off, one item per tray, do not forget to remove your 
jewelry, empty your pockets.  Wait until you are waved on, enter the body 
scanner, face this way, hands up—freeze (literally assume the posture of 
submission), wait for clearance… cleared?  You pass the threshold.  Pulled 
aside?  The next steps will require some unchoreographed improvisation— the 
security agent will take the lead. 
The passenger’s skillful performance of airport choreography demonstrates to an 
audience of travellers the individual’s willingness and ability to submit to surveillance.  
Rachel Hall contends that submission to security scanners neutralize the politics of 
surveillance by supporting the notion that security screening is objective and impersonal 
(132).  Alternatively, refusing to enter the body scanner results in a secondary staged 
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public performance in which a human inspects the traveller.  Hall argues that this 
either/or situation, body scanner or agent pat-down, creates a “charged distinction 
between machine and human” in which innocent citizens are parsed from deviant or 
suspect travellers based on vision versus touch (131).  Those who submit to the body 
scanner and who are willing to make themselves transparent are depicted as “good 
citizens” while those who “opt out” and choose a pat-down inspection are rendered 
opaque and considered suspicious with something to hide.  Hall contends that the 
division created by airport security screening technology promotes a discourse of 
terrorism that establishes a fundamental difference between the innocent servile 
Westerner who submits to the machine and the guilty deviant non-Westerner who (since 
pulled aside and pat down by a security agent whether by choice or not) would rather be 
touched (131). 
 
The body scanner is a prime example of an instance of panoptic spatial 
arrangements of in-visibility performed by the machine and not the human.  The security 
machine sees all, and, like the guard tower, individuals regulate their behaviour around 
the spectacle of the scanner, patiently waiting for the approval of its inevitable gaze. 
However, before arriving at the body scanner travellers are already under surveillance: 
everyone’s actions are watched, documents checked, luggage screened, such that the 
machine does not abstract “pure information” from bodies to be objectively calculated 
and evaluated so much as it verifies what has already been seen.  Take for example the 
ways in which airport security scanners operate through a gender binary system.  Before 
a traveller enters the scanner, the security agent must select from a pink female button or  
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a blue male button.  The button that is selected is not based on the traveller’s preference, 
passport, or other identification documents, but on the agent’s subjective perception of 
the traveller’s gender.  According to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) website, “When you enter the imaging portal, the TSA officer presses a button 
designating a gender (male/female) based on how you present yourself.  The machine 
has software that looks at the anatomy of men and women differently… if a pat-down is 
performed, it will be conducted by an officer of the same gender as you present 
yourself” (TSA).22  Together, the body scanner and agent create a moment of somatic 
suspension. 
In their examination of the relationship between body scanners at airports and 
visibility, Gloria González Fuster, Rocco Bellanova, and Raphaël Gellert argue that 
security scanners perform a new type of surveillance beyond panopticism.  Hastily 
critiquing panopticism, they argue that invisibility, as an integral and structural element in 
the operations of power, is undermined in panoptic theories.  As a corrective, they 
propose the concept of “dis-appearance,” which “refers to the process whereby a visible 
element becomes invisible, or an invisible element becomes visible.  It assumes that 
invisibility does not mean irrelevancy: the disappeared element might, indeed, still be 
active and productive despite its newly acquired invisibility” (515).  However, for 
Foucault, invisibility is not irrelevant nor is it inactive: the guard tower in the panopticon 
22 On the Canadian border security (CATSA) website it notes that trans travellers may request a 
male or female agent to perform a pat-down or a “split-search” may be requested in which a man 
and woman pat-down the traveller.  They also state that travellers can request pat-downs in a 
private room with a witness of their choice (“Trans Passengers”). 
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schema is opaque, and the prisoner is illuminated by light and each depend on the other 
to actualize a relation of power.  The invisibility of the guard and the visibility of the 
prisoner are required to automate discipline.  What is also important to note is that the 
guard, if we are to believe that there is one in the tower, is subject to discipline herself 
through the requirement that she remain invisible.  Recall Bentham’s elaborate design of 
the interior of the guard tower with its partitions and passages that the guard must 
maneuver to travel from one observation window to the next to avoid being detected by 
the presence of her shadow.  The guard’s movements are disciplined by (the threat of) 
light and visibility; the guard tower is its own prison cell that disciplines the guard by 
mandating invisibility.  The panopticon is not restricted to the few watching the many. 
The many also watch the few.23  Visibility and invisibility are of the same order, they 
belong to the same diagram of power and continuously flow into one another.  Fuster et 
al. maintain however, that “dis-appearance” is entirely different than the relation between 
in-visibility. 
Returning to the security scanner, Fuster et al. argue that the introduction of 
millimeter wave (MMW) scanners in airports ushered in a new form of surveillance.  
Prior to 2013, North American airports used backscatter x-ray scanners (full body 
23 The notion that panopticism included synoptic power (the many watching the few) is evident in 
Bentham’s panopticon-shaped school where children observe the teacher and in his notion of the 
constitutional-Panopticon in which society watches those who govern.  As Maša Galič et al. 
point out, these aspects of Bentham’s panopticon are largely absent from surveillance studies 
scholarship that tend to focus on Foucault’s analysis of the prison (11-15). 
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scanners) to produce clear and detailed images of the traveller’s organic body (fig. 1).  
The images rendered by the backscatter x-ray scanner are akin to a negative photograph; 
they clearly outline the shape and features of the body not unlike being able to see- 
through someone’s clothing.  Due to privacy and health concerns full body Backscatter 
x- ray scanners were removed from airports and MMW “security scanners” were
introduced.  MMW scanners do not use radiation waves and cannot produce an image of 
a naked body.  Instead, a rough and generic outline of a body appears on screen (fig. 2). 
Fig. 1: Full body X-ray Image from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 
Inorganic and metal materials appear as ambiguous shapes on the generic body outline.  
Fuster et al. argue that security scanners produce a mode of surveillance that uniquely 
renders the body out of view: “the scrutinized bodies… disappear into [a] new… system 
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now able to transform individuals into subjects of surveillance not by making them more 
visible, but by translating them into anonymous objects: non-gendered silhouettes” (516, 
emphasis added).  They reason that the security scanner “vanishes” the subject (and 
gender) by turning the fleshy material body into a nondescript digital image.24  What 
interests Fuster et al. is that the disappeared subject remains present and can be forced to 
Fig.2: Artist illustration of L3 ProVision ATD’s gendered security scanner screen implemented in 
North American airports in 2013.  Currently, the technology is used internationally.  Image courtesy 
of Phoebe Lim, 2015. 
24 Fig. 2 illustrates that unlike body scanners that use penetrative X-rays to see through clothing to 
reveal suspicious objects, MMV scanners detect objects by using an algorithm that measures the 
body’s shape against a default template.  As Merav Amir and Hagar Kotef explain this template is 
defined by “certain predetermined definitions of the human body, as base-line” (243).  In other 
words, the MMV scanner calculates, configures, and constitutes “safe travellers” based on gender 
and ableist norms. 
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reappear if authorities deem necessary.  The fluctuation between appearance and 
disappearance, they argue, cannot be accounted for in panoptic theories of surveillance or 
the dyad of in/visibility.  They conclude that the space between exposure and 
concealment, or between disappearance and appearance, may indicate a productive site of 
resistance for subjects to escape visualizing forms of control. 
Fuster et al. claim that dis-appearance “allows for the study of the ways in which 
control can be forced upon dynamic and changing entities, without the need to fix them 
into definitive beings” (517).  But in the case of the security scanner, it is precisely the 
fixing of the body that underpins the technology.  The subject must adhere to a preset 
series of bodily markers or take the risk of being marked as a threat.  There is no room 
for ambiguity; the traveller’s body must always remain discernible to the machine.  The 
body scanner works through intensities of in-visibility, cloaking some parts of the 
subject, such as the materiality of the body, while exposing others, such as gender.  The 
subject never “vanishes” from view as Fuster et al. claim.  To pass through the security 
checkpoint, one must be visually recognizable as either male or female, not only to the 
TSA agent but to the machine as well.  Even if the TSA agent selects the correct gender 
with which the traveller identifies (assuming the gender is either male or female and not 
non-binary or gender variant), the machine may flag body parts that do not comply with 
the machine’s preprogrammed template of a cisgender or non-intersex male or female 
body.  “Non- compliance” has resulted in extra surveillance of trans travellers who wear 
genital prosthetics or chest binders.  It is important to note here that the concept of dis- 
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appearance does not account for the ways in which trans subjects become more visible 
via scanner screens rather than disappearing from view.25  In addition to this failure to 
dis-appear, Fuster et al. seem to forget that the traveller never fully escapes the field of 
visibility.  While the individual may be able to temporarily “disappear” via the body 
scanner screen (depending on one’s gender), the traveller is still, and at the same time, 
subjected to the gaze of airport security personnel, fellow travellers, CCTV cameras, 
and potentially biometric surveillance such as facial, iris, and fingerprint recognition 
technologies. 
Instead of making the body dis-appear, I suggest that airport security scanners 
suspend the body.  The body is captured by the scanner and divided into verifiable 
chunks of data which are then reassembled in ways that either permit or restrict one’s 
movement beyond the security checkpoint.  Apprehended while crossing a threshold, the 
body suspended is subject to increased scrutinization through the imposition of identity 
and identification.  Helpful here is Massumi’s notion of the “grid of identification.” The 
identity grid is an overcoded organization of the body that slices the body into various 
identity categories: “The grid is a proliferating series of exclusive disjunctive synthesis 
25 In 2015, for example, the CBC reported that transgender traveller Shadi Petosky was detained 
by TSA agents because the security scanner detected an “anomaly.” While detained Petosky was 
interrogated about her gender (in)visibility (see https://www.cbc.ca/news/trending/transgender- 
orlando-airport-shadi-petosky-scanner-anomaly-1.3239208). Following media reports on 
Petosky’s experience, the TSA issued a statement that “TSA officers may no longer use the term 
‘anomaly’” (TSA 2017).  However, no actual changes were made in the security scanning 
procedure; instead, “anomaly” was replaced with the word “alarm” (Amir and Kotef 244). 
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adding up to a system of value judgment…some bodies are what they are and are good; 
others are not what they seem to be and are bad” (UG 76, 110).  Subjects are positioned 
on the grid by inhabiting one side of each category: either female or male, gay or straight, 
transgender or cisgender, non-white or white, able-bodied or disabled.  Although 
categories overlap, and a body can be positioned in several places on the grid at once, all 
positions are predetermined.  The grid of identification precedes the body and simply pins 
the subject as a point within each category (Parables 2).  This positioning of the subject 
is a useful way to understand the different sites and social locations one occupies but 
Massumi argues that it constrains the body’s movements between points on the grid.  In 
his words, positionality gridlocks movement “by subtracting movement from the picture.  
This catches the body in a cultural freeze frame” (3).  On the grid of identification there is 
no unknown or undetermined place: “There is ‘displacement,’ but no transformation.  It is 
as if the body simply leaps from one definition to the next” (3). 
Somatic suspension is both an activation and effect of the identity grid.  Through 
the combination of technical and social apparatuses, analogue and digital, panoptic in- 
visibility and digital modulation, the body’s flow is suspended between escape and total 
categorization.  For the trans traveller flagged by the security scanner, the body is held 
up, delayed, detained by systems of categorization that seek to securitize identity by 
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“securitizing gender”26  on the grid.  When the security scanner is unable to recognize 
gender, there is a concerted effort to locate, position, quantify, code and decode the 
body—an effort that activates the grid but also reveals its inherent instability. 
The grid of identification takes as its referent point white-male-cisgender- 
heterosexual-able-bodiedness.  All other positions are measured against this category.  
When the body cannot be verified against this prototype, it is both released from and 
suspended by the grid.  But suspension is not the same thing as being stopped.  Being 
stopped is being held between two points.  The former assumes that the body was 
already moving toward one point or another and was simply interrupted.  Differently, 
suspension occurs through the cluster and confusion of all points mixing and dispersing 
at once—a moment when there is more than an either/or option (cisgender or 
transgender), there is a possibility for and, and, and— woman and man and trans and 
straight and queer and cis—everything all at once.  It is not gridlock but grid overload.  
Somatic suspension is painful because it reveals a potential passage out of the grid but 
forcibly holds the body between two superficial points, which I explain below. 
Sara Ahmed writes about the “phenomenology of being stopped” as a technology of 
racism that renders one “out of place.” Recounting her experience of being stopped at the 
border because of her Pakistani last name, she contends that the action of being stopped is 
26 This term comes from Paisley Currah and Tara Mulqueen. They define “securitizing gender” 
as the process whereby gender is “operationalized” by TSA programs to manage the risk of and 
acquire information on trans bodies (19). 
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like becoming a stranger to oneself (141).  The strange-self drags behind the body and 
one is always waiting for it to catch up or clear a checkpoint; the strangeness of being 
stopped slows the body down as it anticipates future stops (141).  Here, I would like to 
add to Ahmed’s experience of being stopped with my own experience of being suspended 
at the border also because of my Pakistani last name.  I have been routinely pulled aside 
for additional screening, luggage checks and pat-downs.  Like Ahmed, I am multi- 
racial— white and Pakistani.  Although I pass for white daily, airport security personnel 
are keen to my Muslim last name.  I am pulled aside—not stopped but suspended 
between wait and go.  Unlike, Ahmed’s characterization of being stopped, during 
moments of somatic suspension, the body, as I experience it, does not drag, it accelerates.  
Something has happened, I am hurled off course.  I must be repositioned on the grid of 
identification before passing the threshold, but in the between time, while the grid is 
being calculated and sorted out, I am caught in a no-body zone that is at the same time a 
could-be-a-body zone.  The identification has not been made; I move between categories.  
As Ahmed says, being detained at a security checkpoint is a stressful event, especially 
when it is caused by a failure of being (safely) located on the grid of identification. 
Being suspended is an outer body experience that is at the same time intensely embodied.  
The body is stressed with elevated cortisol.  Suspension is a moment of intense affect; 
there is no stillness.  Nothing has ceased, ended, or been cut off, as Ahmed characterizes 
of being stopped (139).  On the contrary, when the body is suspended everything is 
doubled, multiplied, effectuated. 
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Somatic suspension is an affective state of control.  The body is “absorbed in the 
encounter and we already understand, in the very fiber of our being, what is at stake, and 
where things might be tending toward.  The feeling of the transitional encounter is not 
‘raw’ feeling.  It is imbued with an immediate understanding of what is under way, what 
might be coming—and what we are becoming” (Massumi Politics of Affect 94).  This 
moment of “thinking-feeling,” as Massumi calls it, does not belong to one subject (the 
traveller pulled aside) nor is it caused by an object (the body scanner), “it pertains more 
directly to the event, what passes in-between objects and subjects, than to the objects or 
subjects per se” (94).  Body scanner, TSA agents, fellow travellers, CCTV cameras, 
facial recognition technology, metal detector wands, data, visibility, the gaze, modulation 
are all “co-implicated in the event, as immediate dimensions of the event” (95).  All 
elements are “synchronously but asymmetrically” involved in the suspension of the body.  
Somatic suspension comes up between the middle of things while bringing them into a 
new relation.  Which is to say, somatic suspension is “transindividual”—the event affects 
agent, traveller, travellers waiting in line.  Although suspension targets one body and 
interrupts its movement from point A to point B, from checkpoint to flight gate—from 
one threshold to another—the interruption enfolds in a field of differentially suspended 
bodies.  Multiple bodies are absorbed in the event of somatic suspension, each attuning to 
the encounter in a different way (95).  The TSA agent is suspended, onlookers are 
suspended, the traveller next in line is suspended.  Somatic suspension is a collective 
mechanism of control. 
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Suspension is an event when things could go any which way.  Because an event 
unfolds on the fly, its outcome cannot be completely determined (Massumi Politics of 
Affect 96).  Although certain bodies are suspended more frequently than others, the 
techniques used to determine passage or detention are situational in nature.  For example, 
the TSA agent evaluates the affected body, gauging its expression of being affected—is 
the body nervous, sweating, twitching, shaking, avoiding eye contact?  A nervous 
Muslim man pulled over at a security checkpoint is assessed differently than a distressed 
pregnant woman, unless, of course, she is Muslim—then they both occupy the position of 
“could- be-terrorist”.27  In either case, affective response is measured against the grid of 
identification.  Since affects are unpredictable—we do not know what a body can do— 
then so too are the effects of controlling mechanisms.  Somatic suspension makes bodies 
vulnerable and at the same time reveals the vulnerability of its own controlling 
mechanism.  That is, the vulnerability of the identity grid and its inability to fix 
meaning—of gender, for example—leads to the opening of a site of resistance.  There is a 
possibility for something unexpected to happen in the realm of being affected by norms 
that allows the body to “break with the mechanical patterns of repetition, deviating from, 
resignifying and sometimes quite emphatically breaking those citational chains of gender 
normativity, making room for new forms of gendered life” (Butler “Rethinking” 18). 
Somatic suspension exposes the cracks and fissures in identity grids—you are identified 
27 In 2008, Home Land Security released a document stating that women wearing burqas and 
who appeared pregnant should be considered security threats.  The premise was that women 
could be using pregnant prosthetics to conceal a bomb.  The document targets Muslim women.  
(See Magnet and Mason 2014). 
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as that which cannot quite be identified.  The failure to identify enacts a mode of control 
and at the same time it generates the potential to become otherwise. 
 
 
2.7 Resistance 
 
Concealment and hyper-visibility are vexed strategies of political resistance.  Not only do 
they begin from the assumption that a body can choose to be either visible or invisible, 
but they are unable to address the affective dimensions of somatic control.  Writing on the 
surveillance of trans bodies post-9/11, Toby Beauchamp examines the ways in which 
trans subjects are made to appear through medical monitoring on the one hand and 
disappear by passing as cisgender on the other hand.  He contends that “Medical 
surveillance [of trans bodies] focuses first on individuals’ legibility as transgender, and 
then, following medical intervention, on their ability to conceal any trans status of gender 
deviance” (357, emphasis original).  The interplay between concealment and exposure 
links trans identity to a notion of secrecy: trans status becomes something that is (or 
should be) hidden but will be eventually discovered (359).  It is in this context that trans 
travellers are associated with the figure of the terrorist-in-disguise.  Both bodies are 
marked as “deceptive” and “treacherous” and subject to heightened forms of surveillance 
that make concealment or hyper-visibility as strategies of resistance undesirable or even 
unattainable (359).  To avoid scrutiny, the “could-be-terrorist” body, whether trans or 
Muslim (or both) or a “Muslim-look-alike,” must “go stealth” to blend in as a “Trusted 
2: Surveillance assemblages 88 
Traveller”28  who is characterized as white, male, cisgender, heterosexual, 
English- speaking, able-bodied.  Blending becomes a strategy of survival and 
safety. 
However, Beauchamp reports that The National Transgender Advocacy Coalition 
(NTAC) recommends for trans travellers that they openly disclose their trans status to 
avoid being “caught” and perceived as an untrustworthy body with something to hide (in 
other words to avoid being mistaken as a terrorist).  Beauchamp argues that NTAC’s 
advice to reveal one’s trans status as a strategic form of visibility “is couched in terms of 
distinguishing between the good, safe transgender traveler and the dangerous, deviant 
terrorist in…disguise” (362).  That is, implicit in NTAC’s statement is the desire to 
separate the “good” white trans travellers from “bad” racialized travellers.  As 
Beauchamp argues, the suggestion for trans bodies to become strategically visible erases 
the ways in which “going stealth” may have never been possible. 
The argument of who has access to invisibility or visibility runs deep in queer, 
feminist, and anti-racist theorizing on resistance strategies.  Strategic visibility is seated 
in a framework of recognition politics that seek to reverse the relations of power that 
erase and invisiblize certain bodies.  As an activist strategy of power reversal, visibility 
politics re-claims space and identity to effect social change.  Strategic visibility is often 
expressed as a direct form of action that gets the attention of the public, government, and 
28 “Trusted Traveller” is CATSA’s term for “low-risk travellers,” which they define as someone 
who has undergone “extensive background checks.” Those who carry a biometric NEXUS pass 
are automatically considered trusted travellers. 
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media, and provides visual-based evidence of social injustice.  The high visibility of a 
population of people or political issue that is achieved through public demonstration has 
the unique capacity to ignite new political alliances and mobilize large numbers of people 
who were previously forced to “go stealth.” Increasing one’s visibility then, is a critical 
aspect for many whose oppression and suffering are sidelined and blanketed by various 
forms of control.  However, as Beauchamp asserts, visibility is a fraught strategy of 
resistance given that control also operates by rendering certain bodies hyper-visible.  
How can we think resistance otherwise?  Are there potentials for new strategies of 
resistance to sexual surveillance? 
 
An effective strategy of resistance must begin by conceiving of power as an 
assemblage of forces that shift and adapt with every localized change.  Spatial 
arrangements of in-visibility, digital modulation, and somatic suspension are three 
overlapping mechanisms of control and capture.  Each mechanism works by controlling 
movement; confinement, dispersion, and suspension.  These techniques of control 
function in relation to one another in assemblages of surveillance.  If control is an 
assemblage of forces, then this is equally true of resistance.  Therefore, to imagine 
resistance we must also imagine it as an assemblage of strategies, ideas, forces, and 
affects. 
 
In their book What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari refer to an assemblage as 
a “fragmentary whole” (16).  Unlike a unity, the elements and pieces of an assemblage 
can be added or subtracted without destroying the entire assemblage.  For example, the 
human can be defined as a unity.  The body is made up of different organs that function 
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together to create a unified system—each organ relies on the other to function.  A heart 
requires a body to beat, the brain requires the heart and lungs, and so on.  None of these 
elements can be subtracted or reorganized without destroying the body.  In this way, the 
body precedes its organs—the human body is the unity that brings the organs together to 
function in a specific and preconfigured way; the relation between elements is interior. 
On the other hand, an assemblage is a body without organs (BwO).  Like a machine, an 
assemblage functions through an aggregation of elements.  The constellation and 
clustering of elements generates and is generated by flows of desire—Deleuze and 
Guattari’s term for a positive and productive material flow of force—that makes the 
assemblage function.  For example, the human can also be defined as an assemblage.  
We are composed of numerous never-ending connections, interactions, organizations and 
disorganizations, such as genetics, anatomy, memories, actions, relations with other 
bodies.  These relations do not precede the human but produce its capacities and actions; 
the relations between elements is therefore exterior.  A body with organs is defined by 
the inextricable internal co-dependence of its elements; a body without organs is defined 
by indeterminate external relations between elements.  Therefore, elements of the human 
(such as memories and relationships) can be rearranged or subtracted from a BwO 
without destroying the human assemblage as a whole. 
 
“Assemblage” as a concept enables us to move away from the idea that things such 
as surveillance, resistance, and even concepts exist prior to their relations.  From this 
view, a model of surveillance cannot be created ahead of its circumstance.  Likewise, if 
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we envision a strategy of resistance and then apply it to a situation it is only capable of 
resembling a form of resistance that already exists because it is formulated from 
something that already happened.  But a strategy of resistance produced out of 
circumstance—produced from the conditions that make it necessary—will emerge 
something new.  Haggerty and Ericson create the concept of the “surveillant assemblage” 
ahead of its circumstance rather than examining the specific relations between 
technologies and bodies.  Instead of asking what is surveillance, like Haggerty and 
Ericson do, or asking what is resistance, we need to ask what does surveillance do?  
What is resistance capable of?  What forces compose and decompose assemblages of 
surveillance and assemblages of resistance?  In what follows, I examine the relations 
between in-visibility, digital modulation, and somatic suspension within the anti-Dakota 
Access Pipeline movement at Standing Rock Sioux Reservation.  Uncovering the 
overlapping and specific relations of heteropatriarchal settler colonialism and 
surveillance, I propose a queer politics of imperceptibility as a new weapon of resistance. 
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Imperceptibility: Toward a New Politics of Resistance 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Police brutality at Standing Rock Sioux Reservation on Nov. 20, 2016.  Photo courtesy of Avery 
Leigh White, 2016. 
 
 
 
On November 20th, 2016, three hundred people were injured and twenty-six hospitalized 
after law enforcement officers fired a barrage of weapons at a group of unarmed activists 
protesting the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) near Standing Rock Sioux reservation in 
North Dakota.  The Standing Rock Medic and Healer Council reported that injuries 
included broken or fractured bones caused by projectiles, internal bleeding from rubber 
bullets, and hypothermia as a result of being soaked by water cannons in below-freezing 
temperatures (“11/21/2016”).  Prior to that cold and violent November night, 
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unbeknownst to the public, the anti-DAPL (NoDAPL) protestors—who call themselves 
water protectors—were subject to an extensive surveillance operation run by a private 
security firm called TigerSwan (TigerSwan).  TigerSwan was hired by the pipeline’s 
parent company Energy Transfer Partners and colluded with police in several States to 
conduct surveillance on protestors and to securitize the pipeline construction site (Brown 
et al.).  Over a hundred internal documents leaked to The Intercept by a TigerSwan 
contractor reveal that the security firm's intel contained false and exaggerated information 
on protestors which law enforcement used to justify the attack, dubbed by water 
protectors as the “Battle of Backwater Bridge.”29
TigerSwan’s surveillance operation, what they refer to as “aggressive intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield,” used “military-style counterterrorism measures” to track, 
identify, and classify protestors (Brown et al.).  This is perhaps not surprising 
considering that TigerSwan originated as a private contractor for the US Military and 
Department of Defense to fight the so-called war on terror and employ ex-military and 
former special forces members as consultants and security agents.  According to the 
29 The assault against water protectors began when protectors attempted to move two burned-out 
trucks that were left on the Backwater Bridge from an earlier conflict in October.  Protectors were 
concerned that the blockade prevented emergency response vehicles from reaching the 
Reservation.  Law enforcement characterized the incident as a “very aggressive” and forceful 
“riot” in which protectors were attempting to “breach” the Bridge by lighting “dozens of fires” 
(Hawkins).  According to water protectors on the ground, however, the fires were built to keep 
protectors warm.  After the Battle, police set up concrete barriers on the bridge denying citizens 
access to the public roadway.  The Sheriff’s Department reports that the Bridge was closed due to 
concerns around its structural integrity (Hawkins). 
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leaked documents, TigerSwan’s expansive security detail included aerial surveillance, 
radio eavesdropping, monitoring social media accounts, and collecting identifying 
information on individual protestors (Brown et al.).  The security firm kept track of 
protesters by creating a database that included photographs, names, and license plate 
numbers as well as a “persons of interest” list (Brown et al.).  The documents further 
reveal that TigerSwan placed undercover agents in protest camps to exploit intergroup 
conflict between Native and non-Native allies in a concerted effort to undermine the 
NoDAPL movement (Porter 3).  As one document reads: “Exploitation of ongoing native 
verses non-native rifts, and tribal rifts between peaceful and violent elements is critical in 
our effort to delegitimize the anti-DAPL movement” (Brown et al.).  Notably, throughout 
the internal reports, TigerSwan’s Chief Security Officer, John Porter, cites sexual activity 
as a primary source of conflict between protestors.  For instance, one report reads: 
“Native American women have departed the camps and have returned to the reservation 
to protect their children… due to the presence of… sexual deviance” (Porter 2-3).  
Despite listing “sexual deviance” as a cause for concern, TigerSwan does not qualify 
what “deviant” sexual activity entails, how to address it, or why it presents a security 
concern for the pipeline company, only that it should be exploited in the media to 
“delegitimize” the Indigenous-led protest. 
 
TigerSwan’s reference to “deviant” sexuality within the NoDAPL movement is part 
of a larger colonial discourse that constructs Native sexuality as a threat to settler society. 
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In her seminal book Conquest, Native Studies scholar Andrea Smith30  argues that the 
characterization of Indigenous sexuality as “savage” has been a powerful tool to justify 
Native conquest and genocide.  Writing in a North American context, Smith explains that 
not all Native societies were necessarily structured through heteropatriarchy.  Indeed, she 
contends that non-heteronormative beliefs of sexuality, complex structures of kinship, 
and multiple gender identities in Native societies posed a threat to European settlers 
(178).  These non-heteronormative relationships made visible a different way of life not 
structured through a gender binary system and thus undermined gender inequality 
prevalent in European society.  To preserve gender hierarchy and social domination as 
the seemingly natural order of civilized society, the colonizers deemed non- 
heteronormative Native sexuality and non-hierarchical societal structures “savage” and in 
need of discipline.  As such, Smith argues that instilling heteronormative gender values in 
Native culture became a necessary process of colonization (“Not-seeing” 26). 
Heteropatriarchy was enforced through gender normalizing policies, patriarchal religious 
indoctrination in residential schools, and inflicting sexual violence on Native peoples, 
including mass rapes during genocide (26). 
Contemporary colonial heteropatriarchy continues through a structure of 
recognition.  As Frantz Fanon contends in Black Skin, White Masks, when colonial rule is 
no longer enforced by direct violence it is maintained through the production of  
30 I discuss the controversy surrounding Andrea Smith’s ancestry and her contributions to Native 
scholarship as they relate to my argument on identity and recognition on page 109, note 38.
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“colonized subjects” who are defined by the colonial imaginary in ways that ensure its 
continued domination (Coulthard 16).  Not surprisingly, then, within a structure of 
recognition, colonized subjects are defined in ways that reestablish historical narratives 
of Indigenous identity as “sexually savage,” as I will demonstrate below.  The imposition 
of a pre-given Indigenous identity reduces the potential for colonized subjects to redefine 
their experience.  They are forced to “establish an indigenous presence in a non- 
indigenous world” (Mudrooroo qtd in Bignall “Dismantling the Face” 393).  In the realm 
of recognition politics subjects must perform a pre-established identity to achieve State 
acknowledgment, which consequently limits the possibility of creating new 
configurations of Indigeneity and social organization between the colonized and 
colonizer (398).  As Simone Bignall contends: “When everything must conform in 
advance to a regime of signification already given, then there is no room for creative 
divergence in the productive process” (399).  However, she reminds that within any 
given discourse interruptions are possible, there are “possible ‘passages’ between 
regimes of signs, enabling movements of destratification or the mixing and translation of 
established regimes of signification” (400).  This chapter aims to find those passages and 
sites of interruption to the regime of recognition. 
I begin the chapter with a discussion of the surveillance at Standing Rock to situate 
my critique of recognition politics within a discourse of heteropatriarchal settler 
colonialism.  I argue that contemporary surveillance functions through a discourse of 
recognition politics to exercise control over sexualized and colonized subjects.  Despite 
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offering quantitative political gains for some minoritarian groups, when recognition 
politics is taken as a primary or sole mode of activism, I argue that it works with rather 
than against contemporary structures of colonial domination.  This claim is largely 
informed by Glen Coulthard’s important text Red Skin, White Masks.  Coulthard argues 
that a politics of recognition, in its current neoliberal form, reproduces colonial, 
patriarchal, and racist configurations of power that mar the possibility for peaceful 
coexistence between Indigenous peoples and settler subjects (3).  Following Coulthard, 
this chapter commits to the argument that recognition politics, along with visibility-based 
activism, is a vexed political strategy because it operates within the pre-established limits 
of the State apparatus.31
In the first half of the chapter, I demonstrate how recognition politics serves to 
31 While I will make a distinction between “rigid” and “supple” forms of recognition in the next 
chapter, here I argue against recognition politics as Charles Taylor defines it in his influential 
1994 essay.  He writes: 
The demand for recognition…is given urgency by the supposed links between 
recognition and identity, where this latter term designates something like a person’s 
understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human 
being.  The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often 
by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a con- 
fining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.  Nonrecognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a 
false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. (25) 
Against Taylor, I want to consider how sites and practices beyond recognition can be politically 
powerful rather than result in dehumanization.  Undoubtedly, there have been transformations 
and alterations to recognition politics since the publication of Taylor’s article (which I will 
discuss later in the chapter); however, the definition he lays out continues to be in operation both 
within feminist scholarship and in political practices.  For a sustained critique of Taylor’s essay 
and the limitations of recognition politics for Indigenous peoples see Coulthard, “Subjects of 
Empire” pp. 440-450.
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reaffirm the authoritative status of the State by requiring minor subjects to conform to a 
recognizable and coherent identity.  Further, I argue that a theory of recognition is 
premised on a subject/object binary that limits the capacity to envision modes of activism 
beyond a paradigm of recognition.  Despite making these claims, I acknowledge that 
recognition politics structure the lives of minor subjects in important ways.  However, I 
maintain that a commitment to recognition is dangerous in a society of increasing 
surveillance that exhorts recognition and identification in order to control sexualized and 
colonized subjects.  I turn to the NoDAPL movement as a case study to ask: how does 
the State capitalize on recognition politics in ways that facilitate increasing sexual 
surveillance and control?  And, how can we do activism in ways that subvert State 
colonial and patriarchal capture? 
In the second half of the chapter, I propose a “queer politics of imperceptibility” as 
an alternative theoretical model to think-feel-do activism in ways that exceed the limits of 
recognition.  I consider three different perspectives on imperceptibility: Elizabeth Grosz’s 
“politics of imperceptibility,” Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “becoming- 
imperceptible,” and Braidotti’s “ethics of becoming-imperceptible.” Despite their notable 
differences, the three perspectives are often conflated in the small body of literature on 
feminism and imperceptibility.32 As a reparative to this conflation, I flesh out the 
differences between the above authors’ approaches to imperceptibility and, in the 
32 See Nirta 2018; Minissale 2015; Blas 2014; Žukauskaite 2013; Simpkins 2012; Sharp 2009. 
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process develop a new framework of queer imperceptibility.  This framework departs 
from Grosz’s politics of imperceptibility and folds in Braidotti’s ethics with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of becoming-imperceptible.  Lastly, I emphasis the necessity of an 
alliance between a theory of imperceptibility and a politics of location, which, as I will 
demonstrate, need not capitulate to a structure of identity based on subject/object, 
visible/invisible, master/slave, self/other dichotomies— so long as it remains immanent 
to a politics of becoming (Braidotti 2011). 
3.1 Sexual Surveillance at Standing Rock 
In her essay “Not-Seeing: State Surveillance, Settler Colonialism, and Gendered 
Violence,” Andrea Smith argues that contemporary settler colonialism operates through 
ways of seeing and not-seeing whereby sexual violence within Native communities is 
made hyper-visible while colonial violence is obscured from view.  For example, Smith 
contends that media reports of gendered violence on Native reserves do not address the 
ways in which State policies, environmental racism, poverty, and colonization contribute 
to community violence and trauma (25-26).  Instead, Indigenous sexuality is represented 
as inherently deviant and the socio-material effects of settler colonialism are hidden from 
view.  Likewise, reports of sexual assaults on Native women by TigerSwan security, law 
enforcement officers, and DAPL workers were largely ignored in the media while an 
attempted assault by a Native man on a Native woman was sensationalized in several 
mainstream media sources including in The Rolling Stone and The Huffington Post. 
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What is more, The Rolling Stone criticizes water protectors for downplaying rape by 
handling the incident through tribal mediation rather than police intervention.33 As Smith 
avers, obscuring from view positive and diverse representations of Indigenous sexuality 
and highlighting inter-communal sexual violence instead, buttresses heteropatriarchal 
colonialism as the natural order of modern civilization (27).  By the same token, 
TigerSwan enacts surveillance strategies of in-visibility by spotlighting “sexual 
deviance” while rendering invisible the colonial antecedents of the DAPL construction 
and capitalist-State occupation of Native land. 
However, unlike the panoptic surveillance of settlement that sought to discipline 
and regulate Indigenous sexuality, TigerSwan’s surveillance aims to represent and 
perpetuate colonialist narratives of Indigenous sexuality as deviant to undermine the 
NoDAPL movement and preempt future dissent.  Moreover, TigerSwan attempts to 
reterritorialize the political potential of the NoDAPL movement by recoding water 
protectors as terrorists.  For example, throughout their internal documents TigerSwan 
refers to water protectors as “jihadi terrorists,” and the movement as “an ideologically 
driven insurgency with a strong religious component” that “generally followed the 
jihadist insurgency model while active [and to] expect the individuals who fought for and 
supported it to follow a post-insurgency model after its collapse” (Porter qtd in Brown 
33 Although the story of Standing Rock in The Rolling Stone is written in support of the NoDAPL 
movement, the author’s choice of words and tone used to describe the incident intimates that 
Native sovereignty and self-governance risk dismissing serious crimes (Elbein). 
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et al.).  Echoing Jasbir Puar, who contends that the terrorist body must first appear 
“perversely sexualized in order to materialize as the terrorist in the first place” (TA 38), I 
turn now to her analysis of homonationalism to examine how TigerSwan uses sexual 
deviance to authenticate the NoDAPL movement as an act of terrorism. 
In her book Terrorist Assemblages, Puar argues that the convergence of 
homonormativity with nationalism, what she terms as “homonationalism,” is an 
assemblage of normativizing forces that produce a de-radicalized and de-politicized 
American LGBT population.  The apparatus of homonationalism and its accompanying 
rhetoric: “you are either with us or against us,” intertwine racialized notions of sexuality 
with the rhetoric of national belonging (38).  Puar describes homonationalism as a 
process by which the “acceptance” and “tolerance” of LGBT people act as a “barometer” 
to evaluate the sovereignty of a nation state and legitimate the exceptionalism of the U.S. 
Empire (16).  She contends that within a homonationalist paradigm, the liberal inclusion 
of gays and lesbians, and to a lesser extent bi, trans, and gender non-conforming people, 
produce and regulate the sexual other as white and the racial other as straight (30).  In 
Puar’s words: “The narrative of progress for gay rights is built on the backs of racialized 
others whose progress is yet to arrive” (“Homonationalism Gone Viral”).  Different than 
gay racism, homonationalism produces a certain kind of racism that is imbricated in the 
homonormative fantasy of queer liberalism and national belonging.  One way that gays 
and lesbians are folded into national belonging, she argues, is through the collective 
vilification of the Muslim terrorist as both sexually perverse and repressed (TA 21). For 
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example, Puar discusses the public’s reaction to the photographs from Abu Ghraib that 
depict the sexual torture of Muslim men by American soldiers.  Puar asks: why are these 
images especially “disgusting” to the American public and what makes them more (or 
even equally) deplorable than images of “conventional torture” practices?  (80).  Puar 
answers that the American public’s reaction reveals the ways in which the racial other is 
constructed as always already straight and sexually repressed.  The Abu Ghraib images 
emasculate and effeminize the Muslim-terrorist by turning him into a “fag.” According to 
a homonationalist logic, becoming a “fag” is perceived as the ultimate form of shame for 
the Muslim man (43).  Thus, the Muslim-terrorist is constructed by the west as 
simultaneously homophobic— and thus not as advanced (exceptional) as the west— and 
sexually repressed, deviant, and perversely homosexual— and thus not as free 
(exceptional) as the west. 
The feminization of racialized male bodies is a colonial tactic of control that 
attempts to secure the settler exceptionalism of Western society.  For example, Chris 
Finley contends that “queering” Native men’s sexuality is instrumental to the 
colonization of Native land.  She explains that sexual colonization is supported by U.S. 
laws that stipulate when a Native woman gives birth to a child who has a white father the 
child automatically becomes a white inheritor of the land (36).  Historically, 
miscegenation has been used as a colonial tool to erase Indigeneity into whiteness and 
disappear Native peoples from the land.  For this law to work as a settlement strategy, 
Finley points out that Native women must be conceived of as both heterosexual and 
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desiring of the white male colonizer (36).34   The sexual availability of Native women to 
colonists requires the erasure of Native men’s sexual desirability.  Therefore, 
demonizing and “queering” Native men ensures their sexual unavailability to the 
heterosexualized Native woman (36).  Of course, another way in which the 
(hetero)sexuality of Native men is erased is through genocide.  Finley concludes that 
representations of Native men’s sexuality as “deviant” remain crucial to the elimination 
of Native  peoples. 
Characterizing Native men’s sexuality as deviant secures the post-colonial 
imaginary through what could be called “settler exceptionalism.” Settler exceptionalism 
defines the way in which settler colonial attitudes toward gender and sexuality are 
supplanted onto Native peoples not just through colonization and genocide, as Scott 
Morgensen (2010) suggests with his concept of “settler homonationalism,” but more 
specifically, through the construction of Native men as sexually “deviant” and white 
settlers as (sexually) exceptional.  The focus on Native men’s sexuality, I argue, enables 
the State to proximate Indigenous peoples with the figure of the Muslim terrorist.  For 
example, TigerSwan makes a point to implicate Native men as “sexually deviant” in 
their reports; recall the Statement: “Native American women have departed the camps 
and have returned to the reservation to protect their children…” (Porter 3, emphasis 
added).  Here, Native women are not portrayed as non-deviant and heteronormative, but 
34 The appropriation and romanticization of Matoaka’s (Pocahontas) life story by Disney 
serves as a prime example of how Native women are represented in settler society as 
heterosexual and desiring of white men. 
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also in need of protection from Native men’s volatile sexuality.  Like the Muslim-
terrorist then, Native men are presented as perverse in order to bifurcate the colonial 
State from sexually “backwards” nations.  TigerSwan’s use of the term “deviance” is 
significant.  In addition to its colonial legacy, “deviance” pictures the Native man as non- 
heteronormative and savage which separates him from the “good gay citizen” who is 
figured as white, homonormative, and patriotic.  Defining Native men as sexually 
deviant conjoins them with the figure of the sexually perverse and repressed Muslim 
terrorist who poses a threat to the sexual modernity of the nation State.35  The sexual 
surveillance and representation of Native men as sexually deviant is not a mechanism of 
disciplinary power that seeks to instill heteronormative values to assimilate Indigenous 
peoples in the heteropatriarchal settler order.  Instead, as I argue below, TigerSwan 
draws on the colonial narrative of sexual deviance to modulate Indigenous identity in 
ways that support the war on terror. 
Thus far, I have argued that TigerSwan’s surveillance reports on sexual deviance 
strategically align Indigenous water protectors with the Muslim-terrorist figure in an 
effort to authenticate the NoDAPL movement as an act of terrorism.  I turn now to the 
media’s reports on the leaked documents to examine how popular non-Native activist 
news outlets (DemocracyNow.org, Unicornriot.ninja, EcoWatch.com, and 
Aljazeera.com) unwittingly perpetuate settler colonial frameworks of Indigenous identity 
35 By ‘nation State’ I am referring to both the material and immaterial aspects that make up the 
colonial imaginary of State territory. 
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by leaving the figure of the “jihadi terrorist” unquestioned.36 Although these activist 
media rightly condemn TigerSwan for conflating Indigenous protestors with terrorists, 
they uncritically juxtapose Native peoples and Muslim “could-be-terrorists” in ways that 
ignore the two groups’ mutually contentious relationship to the settler colonial State.  
The bracketing of Islamophobia from settler colonialism begs the following questions: 
How are both identities constructed through settler colonialism and how does placing 
them in opposition to one another ensure the normalization of the settler State?  In what 
ways are Native identity and Indigenous politics assimilated into white liberalism and a 
national discourse on terrorism through the contrast between “good” and “bad” racialized 
bodies?  And, to echo Morgensen, “What might ‘terrorists,’ figured as foreign, have to do 
with ‘savages,’ figured as domestic, when the State identifies objects of colonial or 
imperial control?” (107).  Perhaps it is unfair to expect activist media to take on these 
complex questions.  Still, presenting the jihadi figure as a stable and knowable identity 
rather than one that is socially constructed and in political flux, warrants further 
investigation into the ways in which “allied” independent media organizations 
insidiously rope Indigenous peoples into a colonial framework of national belonging. 
To elaborate, in an effort to extract water protectors from a jihadist identity, activist 
36 For specific news articles see Chow; Barat; “Private Mercenary Firm”; “TigerSwan DAPL 
Intel”.  My critique of their media reports on the NoDAPL movement does not intend to 
undermine the importance of alternative journalism at Standing Rock.  These media 
organizations also support water protectors and provide an outlet for them to share their 
experiences of police brutality with the public. 
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journalism on the leaked documents reproduce the colonial narrative of the “good 
Indian.” Drawing on Robert F. Berkhofer Jr. author of The White Man’s Indian, Sandy 
Marie Anglas Grande argues that cultural representations of Indigenous peoples vacillate 
between “noble” and “ignoble savage” depending on the needs of the settler State (309).  
For instance, the typification of the “ecologically noble savage,” she claims, is deployed 
by non-Native activists to mount a critique of the overconsumption and ecological 
destruction of western society (313).  More specifically, she contends that 
environmentalists deploy stereotypical images of Indigenous peoples as “eco-gurus,” who 
“possess great insights to nature’s wisdom” because they are “less corrupted by the 
practices and prejudices of civilization” (313).  Although this stereotype is arguably more 
positive than the “sexually deviant Native terrorist,” Grande maintains that an 
oversimplified image of Indigenous peoples as “good Indians” who are immersed in 
nature erases the dynamic and varied subjectivities of Indigenous peoples.37  Further, the 
37 Dolleen Manning offers an important critique on the ways in which Native peoples are 
characterized as “noble savages” within western philosophy.  She argues that Deleuze and 
Guattari appropriate Anishinaabe philosophy and traditional knowledge and also link the notion 
of “becoming-animal” with “primitive societies” in ways that dehumanize the Indigenous subject 
(188).  In her words, “For Indigenous peoples, becoming-imperceptible and becoming-dispersed 
(aspects of becoming-animal) are by no means to be desired, since these processes are associated 
with colonial violence and its institutionalization….Becoming-animal negates both individual 
subjectivity and collective political agency” (188).  Deleuze and Guattari do tread dangerous 
territory, especially in their discussion of faciality where they give a romanticized account of a 
“primitive society” that exits prior to Christian colonialism, but “becoming-imperceptible,” as I 
understand it, does not mean becoming invisible.  Becoming-imperceptible is a becoming with 
others that dissolves a destructive sense of individualism.  Whether this notion has been 
appropriated from Indigenous culture I cannot answer, but I would say that collective political 
agency is at the heart of their pragmatic philosophy, which I will attempt to demonstrate in the 
following chapters.
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stereotype secures settler superiority by associating Indigeneity with primitive culture and 
savagery, which maintains the proper distance necessary between “Indians and whites” to 
establish white superiority and settler domination (312). 
Similarly, activist media reports perpetuate the image of the “noble savage” by 
contrasting Indigenous peoples with Muslim “could-be-terrorists”.  This knee-jerk 
division cultivates an image of Indigenous peoples as inherently unthreatening and non- 
violent, who do not share anything in common with the “jihadi” figure thereby blanketing 
how the settler State categorizes both groups as a threat to national security (for an 
example, see Chow).  Such representations leave the State’s heteropatriarchal colonial 
domination intact by linking ascriptions of savagery to sexual deviance without 
questioning the imperialist construction of the Muslim-terrorist.  Ultimately, the noble 
savage stereotype is perpetuated to pit domestic water protectors against foreign terrorists 
and present Indigenous peoples as good citizens who advocate for water protection 
without threatening the settler colonial and homonationalist State, its war against terror, 
and vilification of Muslim men.  Lastly, the discursive separation of Indigenous peoples 
from a notion of terror masks the relationship Indigenous peoples have with terrorism, in 
that they too have been terrorized. 
I want to restate that I am not attempting to engage in an essentialist argument on 
whether or not activist media, or TigerSwan for that matter, portray Indigenous identity 
correctly or not; rather, I aim to point to the ways in which these reports shift the 
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discussion of the NoDAPL movement from issues around water protection to a debate on 
Indigenous identity and how that identity should or should not be characterized. 
Speaking to this point, Chase Iron Eyes, the Lakota People’s Law Project attorney and 
water protector, who is severely targeted by TigerSwan and at present faces several years 
in prison for his involvement in the pipeline resistance, is asked how he feels about being 
compared to jihadists during an interview with The Intercept.  He responds by asking 
why water protectors are being compared to Muslim terrorists and not white supremacist 
terrorist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.  He continues that there is a clear effort on 
behalf of the media to create a divide between the “law-abiding, law upholding white 
citizens of North Dakota versus and against unruly and unlawful Native Americans,” a 
racial dynamic, he explains, that was created by violating Native peoples and American 
citizen’s constitutional rights (“Chase Iron Eyes”).  He further States that through the 
marriage of corporate interests with the State, TigerSwan brought “a theatre of war” to 
Native land and American soil in which Indigenous water protectors are perceived as 
terrorists (“Chase Iron Eyes”).  Tellingly, his response on the association between 
Muslim-terrorists and Indigenous water protectors focuses on the collusion between the 
corporation and government to create a “theatre of war,” in which racialized activist 
groups are characterized as enemies of the State.  He argues that TigerSwan’s 
propaganda campaign to link water protectors with terrorists usurps a discussion of the 
ways in which such collusions put everyone’s constitutional rights at risk. 
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To reiterate, my issue with the media reports on the leaked documents is threefold: 
first, the circulation and repetition of the narrative of “water protectors as jihadists” not 
only breathes life into this idea as it becomes repeated, retweeted, and shared on social 
media by activist media outlets, but also it plays into the hands of settler colonial efforts 
to assimilate Native peoples into a discourse of national security in which Natives are 
regarded as part of a national campaign to fight terrorism. Second, the media reports on 
TigerSwan's leaks simply leave “jihadi,” as an identity, unquestioned along with the 
relationship between State racism, profiling practices, and settler colonialism.  Finally, 
framing Indigenous identity as either the “ignoble” or “noble savage” detracts from the 
larger issue at hand, which is water security—an issue that disproportionately affects 
Native peoples in North America. 
As Andrea Smith and others have argued, establishing a Native identity, either 
through status enrolment or cultural representation, continues to enact violence on Native 
peoples and communities by drawing boundaries around who qualifies as Native and who 
does not.38  For this reason, the process of identification is deep-seated in colonial 
38 Andrea Smith’s Native status has been called into question on several occasions.  Although I 
do not wish to rehash the debate here, it is important to note in the context of our current
discussion on identity politics.  Although Smith denies the allegations, a group of Indigenous 
women academics wrote an open letter accusing Smith of capitalizing on a false Indigenous 
identity to receive academic grants, faculty positions, and so on.  Other Indigenous scholars 
respond that Smith’s blood quantum and enrollment status should not be the determining factors 
of one’s Native identity.  Despite the fraught controversy surrounding Smith’s ancestry, and as 
other Indigenous scholars affirm, her academic contributions to the field of Native feminist 
scholarship continue to hold value (see Womack, Craig.  “Statement from Craig Womack,” 4 
July 2015.  https://againstpoliticsofdisposability.wordpress.com. Accessed 10 October 2018). 
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frameworks of recognition that leave the State’s authority unquestioned.  TigerSwan 
seeks to undermine the NoDAPL movement by exploiting colonial narratives of sexual 
deviance and present the movement as a threat to the Nation by making links between 
water-protection and Islamic-terrorism.  At the same time, the media ignites identity 
politics to “save” water protectors from being portrayed as a “terrorist” threat to the 
settler colonial State. 
What is at stake now that the pipeline has been reinstated by the Trump 
Administration which is arguably the fulfilment of settler colonialism par excellence?  
How do activist journalists who focus on the mischaracterization of water protectors as 
jihadi terrorists detract attention away from the colonial State’s ecoterrorism and the 
global issue of water security?  The importance of TigerSwan’s leaked documents and 
activist media’s social critique of them should not be underestimated—both provide 
invaluable resources that can be used to the advantage of water protectors in the wake of 
the Standing Rock protest and for future NoDAPL actions.  However, non-Native activist 
allies need to be careful that they do not perpetuate colonial narratives of Indigenous 
peoples in ways that uphold settler colonialism. 
3.2 The Regime of Recognition 
In his book Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, Glen 
Coulthard challenges the prevailing argument that a politics of recognition can 
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adequately transform the oppressive colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples 
and the State.  He argues that recognition in its current neoliberal form, rather than 
providing sovereignty, reinstates the colonial, racist, and patriarchal State power that 
Indigenous peoples seek to transcend.  Tracking several historical moments of both 
successful and unsuccessful land claim settlements, economic development initiatives, 
and self-government agreements, Coulthard contends that colonial rule has transitioned 
from a “more-or-less unconcealed structure of domination to a mode of colonial 
governmentality that works through the limited freedoms afforded by State recognition 
and accommodation…” (15-16).  A politics of recognition conceals existing colonialism 
through mechanisms of recognition that enact structural violence. 
Advancing Frantz Fanon’s argument on the violence of State recognition developed 
in The Wretched of the Earth, Coulthard argues that colonial rule no longer operates 
solely—or even predominately—through direct and physical forms of coercive violence.  
Instead, he argues that contemporary colonial violence functions through a discourse of 
recognition and reconciliation that link subjectivity to the notion of an “authentic” 
identity.  The notion of an authentic identity, Andrea Smith avers, is one that can tell the 
“truth” of itself, which, she asserts, requires one to be the object of another’s discovery 
(“Queer Theory and Native Studies” 42).  Moreover, she contends that even though 
Native peoples are asked to prove their authenticity to the State, they must always retain 
a level of inauthenticity so that the settler colonial State remains superior (42).  In other 
words, a politics of recognition requires that Indigenous people be recognizable to and  
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compatible with settler frameworks of Indigenous identity.  This structure of recognition 
ensures that colonized subjects adopt the behaviours, thoughts, and desires of the 
colonial State (Coulthard 16).  Rather than challenging the authority of the settler 
colonial State, recognition commits Indigenous people to practices and subject positions 
that ensure their continued colonization. 
Despite taking great care to outline the many ways that recognition and 
reconciliation politics reproduce heteropatriarchal and settler colonial structures, 
Coulthard maintains that we need not dismiss a framework of recognition altogether.  He 
argues that Indigenous theory and activism should “approach our engagements with the 
settler-State legal apparatus with a degree of critical self-reflection, skepticism, and 
caution that has to date been largely absent in our efforts” (179).  To do this, he proposes 
a “resurgent politics of recognition” premised on the resurgence of traditional knowledge 
and the creation of new cultural practices that can address contemporary formations of 
colonial power (24).  He identifies five theses that guide his call for a resurgent politics of 
recognition: recognizing the necessity of non-reactionary direct action, creating 
Indigenous economies that challenge settler colonial capitalism, giving attention to the 
urban dispossession of Indigenous peoples as well as those on reserves, addressing 
gender justice as an integral aspect of decolonization, and, lastly, imagining a politics 
beyond State recognition (165-179).  Taking up Coulthard’s last suggestion, I turn now to 
Elizabeth Grosz’s “politics of imperceptibility,” which she proposes as an alternative 
postcolonial feminist framework that goes beyond recognition. 
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In her 2002 essay, “A Politics of Imperceptibility,” Grosz draws on Nietzsche’s 
delineation of active and reactive force to formulate imperceptibility as a theory that 
privileges actions over identity, pragmatics over representation, inhuman over human, 
and chaos over discourse.  She contends that at its heart, a politics of imperceptibility is 
an effort to “displace the centrality of will and consciousness” in favour of “inhuman 
forces, forces that are both living and non-living, macroscopic and microscopic, above 
and below the human” (470).  She delineates the subject as a multiplicity of force that 
can never be fully controlled or named.  These forces that compose the subject exist 
outside39 the human and have their own intentionalities, agency, and affects.  Thus, for 
Grosz, a politics of imperceptibility cannot help but go beyond all modes of 
intersubjective recognition because it is a politics that goes beyond the human.  
Ultimately, Grosz’s theory of imperceptibility aims to investigate agency and freedom in 
ways that de-center the human. 
Grosz’s essay is written as a direct response to Drucilla Cornell and Sara Murphy’s 
article “Anti-racism, Multiculturalism, and an Ethics of Identification.” Using their essay 
as a springboard, she argues that feminist postcolonial theory unnecessarily weds itself to 
a paradigm of recognition.  She urges feminists to leave behind identity and recognition 
politics and turn instead to a theory of the political that considers the role of vital forces 
39 For Grosz, “the outside” is not a demarcated space; rather, it is that which is beyond 
comprehension and discourse, that which the subject can only access through imperceptible 
material interactions (Becoming Undone 176). 
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in the formation of the subject.  Like Coulthard, Grosz critiques the Hegelian 
master/slave dialectic that structures recognition through the acknowledgement of a 
socially dominant other.  She contends that a hierarchical mode of intersubjective 
address constrains the autonomy of the subject; given that subjectivity depends on the 
acknowledgment of an authoritative figure then this figure also has the power to 
annihilate or de-form the subject through non-recognition.  Thus, Grosz states that 
recognition is an opening up of oneself to the violence of recognition.40
Unlike Grosz, Cornell and Murphy argue that subjectivity is constituted through 
social and institutional relationships and that freedom is therefore relational.  However, 
like Grosz, they acknowledge that Hegel’s dialectical model of recognition presents a 
danger for minor subjects precisely for the same reasons that Grosz outlines.  What 
Cornell and Murphy propose instead is an “ethics of identification” in which recognition 
is decoupled from the notion of an authentic, fixed, and stable self.  Their main concern 
is that the struggle for recognition is often considered as the struggle for a “pre-political” 
40 Both Grosz and Coulthard narrow their critique of Hegelian recognition to the master/slave 
dialectic in The Phenomenology of the Spirit.  Coulthard reads Hegel through the lenses of 
Fanon and Marx to argue that rather than offering a model of freedom and liberation (through 
contradiction and resolution) Hegel’s theory does not translate to contemporary colonial contexts 
because the master (State) does not need the “tools of the slave” to survive.  Thus, the slave is 
not liberated from the master’s recognition.  Grosz rehearses a similar argument against 
recognition politics.  However, she seems to be less critical of Hegelian dialectics.  For example, 
she notes that Hegel supports her claim that the subject is not one who is recognized but one who 
acts and makes things in the world.  She writes: “this argument was even Hegel’s way out of the 
impasse of the ruses of recognition…For Hegel, it is only the slave who develops an identity, 
eventually, without self-delusion, because it is only through labor, through making, that one also 
makes oneself” (Becoming Undone 218-9n9). 
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subject whose already constituted identity is at stake (Cornell and Murphy 421).  They 
argue that a politics of recognition need not conform to a pre-given and fixed cultural 
identity (443).  Instead, they assert that there is potential for minor cultures to create new 
and imaginative identities, a claim that strikes a chord with Coulthard’s call for a 
resurgent politics of recognition. 
Grosz’s main issue with Cornell and Murphy is their commitment to frame identity 
politics within a structure of recognition.  She asks of them: if minority subjects have the 
capacity to shape their own identifications beyond the recognition of a majority other 
“then why is recognition necessary and what does it confer?” and “why are identity and 
the struggle around identity the rallying cry for politics?” (“A Politics of 
Imperceptibility” 468).  Confounded or not, Grosz does not directly engage with these 
questions in her essay.  Instead, she concludes that a desire for recognition is “the 
emptiness of a solipsistic existence,” and a “desperate dependence on the other for the 
stability of one’s being” (468).  However, these questions that she poses warrant further 
investigation within the context of anti-colonial politics and struggles (which she also 
does not address in her essay).  Before I propose “going beyond” recognition, it is crucial 
to understand why recognition remains a stronghold for feminist postcolonial theory and 
practice.  It is important to note that Grosz’s primary issue is not with the category of the 
subject as that which operates separate and distinct from objects.  Rather, her problem is 
with the conceptual mode of recognition because, according to her, it precludes 
entertaining a Nietzschean theory of force as that which forms the subject instead.  What 
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I am suggesting is that Grosz, like Cornell and Murphy, is concerned with the 
constitution of the subject, rather than its dissolution, which, as we shall see in the 
following section of the chapter, is crucial to the concept of imperceptibility. 
Although Grosz’s paper set in motion my thinking on the potential of a political 
practice based on imperceptibility there are three theoretical points at which we depart, 
which I will develop throughout the chapter.  First, whereas Grosz opposes any form of 
recognition as a viable framework for feminist and postcolonial theories of subjectivity, I 
suggest a non-oppositional theory of imperceptibility.  Second, although I agree with 
Grosz that a Hegelian theory of recognition limits new ways of conceiving of political 
transformation, the primary problem with recognition, as I understand it, is not that 
subjectivity requires acknowledgment from an authoritative figure— although this is 
certainly a problem— but, that recognition reproduces a subject/object distinction again 
and again to theorize political autonomy.  Last, my endeavour to formulate a politics of 
imperceptibility comes out of necessity.  Which is to say, I do not wish to apply a theory 
of imperceptibility to explain activism and social transformation (or the subject).  
Instead, I use the concept imperceptibility as a tool to create new concepts (the line of 
pure resistance, queer imperceptibility, and the queer autonomous zone) and develop 
these concepts in relation to the events I consider.  Thus, my articulation of 
imperceptibility is inseparable from the context in which it is discussed.  This is not to 
say that a politics of imperceptibility cannot be considered more broadly, but it 
acknowledges that a concept changes from circumstance to circumstance.  That is, a 
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concept (if it is to be useful) cannot come a priori to the event that effectuates its 
necessity.  A concept cannot precede the conditions of its emergence (Deleuze and 
Guattari WP 15-17).  In contrast, Grosz presents a politics of imperceptibility ahead of its 
circumstance.  In other words, she does not tell us what it can do.  In an ironic twist, she 
only tells us what imperceptibility cannot do, which is that it cannot be understood 
through a paradigm of recognition.  Alternatively, I aim to situate a politics of 
imperceptibility in relation to the conditions of its production to highlight its use for 
activism and politics.  Despite my disagreements with Grosz, my response below is not 
meant to be pedantic; I only seek to clarify our differences.  My three contentions with 
Grosz’s essay are: first, the either/or approach taken; second is the subject/object 
distinction, and, third is the abstraction of a socially situated body from a theory of 
imperceptibility. 
 
3.2.1 Either/or 
 
While Grosz’s rendering of the subject as “the backdrop to a play of forces” offers a 
significant rupture to the paradigm of recognition, she makes an unnecessary delineation 
between Cornell and Murphy’s reformulation of recognition politics and her theory of 
Nietzschean force.  Although she acknowledges that Cornell and Murphy are critical of 
Hegel’s master/slave dialectic she insists that their “project needs to be located within 
thus framework,” which enables her to argue for the necessity of an alternative theory 
that considers the subject as “the multiplicity of active and reactive forces” (“A Politics 
of Imperceptibility” 468).  Unfortunately, her refusal to engage with Cornell and  
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Murphy’s politics of recognition—as they formulate it and situate it in the context of 
black cultural identity—is, as I see it, a missed opportunity to present a more robust 
and perhaps more convincing argument for a politics of imperceptibility.  Rather than 
building a bridge between postcolonial theories of recognition and imperceptibility, 
Grosz is determined to split them.  The division she hopes to establish between herself 
and Cornell and Murphy not only isolatez a branch of feminism (which is arguably the 
very branch she intends to convince), but it is a division that does not necessarily exist. 
For example, Cornell and Murphy agree with Grosz that recognition politics needs 
to displace the notion of an “authentic” identity.  They argue that even though incipient 
identities must be conferred by the State, the State does not have to be the arbitrator of 
identity.  For Cornell and Murphy, the “work of cultural politics” enables the subject to 
disengage from the notion of a pre-given identity, and in turn reconstitute more dignified 
images of minor culture that bolsters one’s sense of self and agency in the world. 
Turning to Stuart Hall, they reason that a collective cultural identity enables a group of 
displaced peoples to share historical experiences and cultural codes that provide them 
with a “frame of reference and meaning beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of 
our actual history” (Hall qtd in Cornell and Murphy 439).  What Cornell and Murphy 
advocate then, is a framework that displaces the notion of an authentic identity by 
questioning and destabilizing the conditions under which identification takes place. 
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Both Grosz’s essay and Cornell and Murphy’s essay are concerned with the 
constitution of the subject.  For example, Grosz contends that the subject is formed 
through inhuman forces while Cornell and Murphy argue that the subject is constituted 
through relational modes of creativity.  Is it possible to bridge Cornell and Murphy’s 
“ethics of identification” with Grosz’s theory of imperceptibility?  Grosz tells us that she 
wants to examine “the alignment of forces that constitute that ‘identity’ and ‘position,’ 
that stratification that stabilizes itself as a place and an identity” (“A Politics of 
Imperceptibility” 471).  Almost as a continuation of Grosz’s examination, Cornell and 
Murphy want to propose a new model of recognition that goes against the stabilization of 
identity.  To do this, they look to “the work of cultural politics” and how it builds 
creative cultural alliances through art, music, and literature, and enables subjects to 
create subversive modes of identification (436).  These identifications, Cornell and 
Murphy suggest, challenge the notion of an authentic self.  Is Cornell and Murphy’s 
proposition for an “ethics of identification”—a subversive practice of creative 
engagement with modes of identification—so different from Grosz’s polemic for a 
politics of imperceptibility?  Do both essays not contend that subjectivity is produced 
through a “process of self-marking that constitutes oneself in the very model of that 
which oppresses and opposes the subject,” as Grosz states when she describes the role of 
force (471)?  What I am suggesting is that the “inhuman forces” that Grosz wants to 
focus on instead of recognition and identity politics operate within and around the 
“ethics of identification” that Cornell and Murphy propose.  There is, I think, “an 
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alignment of forces” (Grosz 471) between art and politics and temporary creative modes 
of identification that can both contribute to a subversive mode of self-styling and 
decenter the subject.  Said another way, is it not plausible that an “ethics of 
identification,” in which minor cultures create new and imaginative identities, is an 
actualization of the virtual potential of what Grosz characterizes as the “ever-realigning 
relations of intensity” (469)?  Although I appreciate Grosz’s effort to introduce a new 
image of thought beyond the arguably exhausted topic of recognition politics, I also 
think that there is value in mapping the relations between new conceptual frameworks 
and earlier feminist thought.  Put another way, might it prove more useful to build an 
alliance with feminist theories by reading imperceptibility into or alongside them—or, 
better yet, between them?  Which is not to say that new concepts should be used to 
reflect on old ones, only that an alliance can activate their becoming. 
Instead of foreclosing the potential for a politics between intersubjective address 
and what Grosz describes as inhuman force, I maintain that a politics of imperceptibility 
should open the door to recognition to develop a more expansive and inclusive practice 
of a politics of force.41  In the context of Grosz’s essay, this might entail asking: what 
imperceptible forces and relations emerge during the creative cultural work that Cornell 
41 That said, I take heed with Grosz’s assertion that it is important to deploy new and radical 
concepts rather than reformulating those that are invested in a certain philosophical lineage, 
such as recognition (463).  Nevertheless, I have taken the risk of invoking the language of 
recognition and identification throughout the chapter in order to consider its limitations and 
possibilities within the framework of imperceptibility. 
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and Murphy discuss, and how do these relations affect the production of subjectivity?  
Regrettably, rather than reading a theory of imperceptibility with Cornell and Murphy’s 
ethics of identification, Grosz tells us that “we have a theoretical choice: we either 
ascribe to a theory of the subject that strives to have its identity affirmed through 
relations… with other subjects… or we ascribe to a theory of the impersonal… the 
opposite of identity politics, a politics of acts, not identities” (“A Politics of 
Imperceptibility” 470). Is this either/or approach necessary?42  Are feminist theories of 
identity, like Cornell and Murphy’s, that are explicitly anti-essentialist and mindful of the 
hierarchies embedded within a model of recognition, completely useless?  Could a 
politics of recognition not also be imbued with imperceptible forces that “act through 
subjects, objects, material and social worlds without distinction, producing ever- 
realigning relations of intensity or force” (Grosz 469)? 
3.2.2 Subject/object distinction 
Grosz explicitly critiques a subject/object distinction at the outset, but then, nearing the 
end of her paper, she delineates force as that which acts on subjects and exists “above 
and below the human” (“A Politics of Imperceptibility” 470).  This contradicts her 
earlier statement that subjects should not be conceived of as a causality.  To draw 
attention to the existence of inhuman forces that operate outside the human, in this 
42 Keith Ansell-Pearson also takes issue with Grosz’s claim that feminist theory needs to make a 
conceptual choice between “humanist” and “anti-humanist” philosophies of the subject (See, 
“Deleuze and New Materialism”). 
3: Imperceptibility 122 
instance, she divorces force from the subject rather than proposing the inseparability of 
the two.  I think this is symptomatic of her attempt to proffer a politics of 
imperceptibility as a reparative to Cornell and Murphy who propose a theory of political 
practice.  Which is to say that, in her essay, Grosz uses the concept of force as an 
explanatory tool.  She introduces “imperceptibility” to describe and determine the 
subject without telling us how a theory of imperceptibility enriches the lived experience 
of subjects.  The “politics” of Grosz's “politics of imperceptibility” are unclear.  In all 
fairness to Grosz, her essay on imperceptibility is relatively short and should not be 
taken as representative of the vast amount of work on “forces” that she has done 
elsewhere.  Nonetheless, I look at this essay in isolation given that it is often referenced 
apart from her other work in feminist engagements with a politics of imperceptibility. 
Ultimately, I argue that the political stakes of adopting Grosz’s theory of imperceptibility 
is that it short circuits an understanding of the subject as a multiplicity of elements, 
which can include both inhuman force and intersubjective address. 
3.2.3 The abstraction of the socially situated body 
A theory of imperceptibility must engage with a politics of location, rather than avoid it, 
if it is to be taken seriously as a new concept for postcolonial feminism.  Cornell and 
Murphy clearly argue that identification and recognition have social and political value 
for minoritarian subjects.  The authors assert that while recognition has a hierarchical 
structure that harbours within it the risk of non-recognition, minority cultures who face 
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unbearable levels of political and symbolic violence often must draw on the 
representational reserve of recognition and identity to sustain their dignity in dire 
circumstances (Cornell and Murphy 440).  They explain: “exactly what dignity demands 
in different contexts cannot be theoretically determined in advance, since it is linked 
with the recognition of our freedom to shape an identity and to make ethical sense of 
them” (441-2, emphasis added).  What Cornell and Murphy point to here is that 
recognition politics undeniably structures the lived experiences of minor subjects and 
cultures by denying or granting them access to economic resources, medical care, social 
services, political and social representation, personal safety, and, as we saw earlier, water 
security for Indigenous peoples. 
While I am not suggesting that Grosz refutes the importance or existence of these 
concerns, the problem, and it is a serious one for feminist theorists and philosophers who 
attempt to challenge an image of thought based on representation and recognition, is that 
she does not take care to affirm the value of recognition politics as they are practiced nor 
does she reflect on how the two frameworks may converge in politically and 
theoretically fruitful ways. In a strange move that runs contra to Grosz’s philosophical 
allegiance to Nietzsche, she formulates a politics of imperceptibility by negating 
feminist recognition theories.  To be fair, her negation of recognition stems from a 
necessary critique of the Hegelian dialectic, with which I agree.  However, her critique 
of the master-slave dialectic in response to Cornell and Murphy, I think, misses the point 
of postcolonial feminist engagements with Hegel (or recognition more generally) which 
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is, as Coulthard avers, to theorize subjectivity and recognition beyond relations of 
domination and inequality (Red Skin 29)—precisely because postcolonial subjects are 
always already subjected to a violent regime of recognition.  Grosz’s critique of 
recognition through Cornell and Murphy portrays the authors as simply refusing to 
acknowledge the oppressive dimension of seeking recognition from an authority figure.  
What Cornell and Murphy are attempting to salvage from Hegel is the potential for a 
mutually dignifying encounter over and above the one that already structures the lives of 
colonized subjects.  Cornell and Murphy remain faithful to a politics of recognition, but 
only insofar as it is one of mutual dignity and respect between the colonized and State. 
Whether or not this is possible remains to be seen. 
Even though Grosz argues that the subject and politics are the result of 
undetermined and unconstrained forces that “constitute an inhuman, sub-human field, a 
field of ‘particles’ or elements of force which are only provisionally or temporarily 
grouped together in the form of entities and actions” (“A Politics of Imperceptibility” 
469, emphasis added), she puzzlingly presents recognition as a predetermined and fixed 
political strategy. Admittedly, a hierarchical model of recognition is limited in its 
potential to de-center the subject.  Nonetheless, there is an effort from feminist and 
postcolonial theories to reformulate the dialectical model by privileging the affective 
dimensions of intersubjective address. 
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In Witnessing: Beyond Recognition, Kelly Oliver challenges the conventional 
boundaries of recognition by proposing a model of subjectivity based on a “practice of 
witnessing” that goes “beyond recognition.” Oliver argues that a theory of recognition 
articulated through a dichotomy of self/other, or subject/object, alienates the self by 
dehumanizing those that are around us (by conceiving of them as others).  Instead, she 
argues that subjectivity needs to be thought of as an interpersonal relationship based on 
mutual respect and love.  For Oliver, witnessing de-centers “the self.” Therefore, 
witnessing is not an attempt to recognize sameness or difference between self and other; 
instead, it acknowledges degrees of oppression that exist between subjects.  Therefore, 
rather than bestowing subjectivity, identity, and agency onto another, witnessing requires 
acknowledging the inarticulate experience of oppression not by trying to comprehend it, 
but by responding to what is only unknowable through, what Oliver characterizes as, a 
loving encounter (217-19).  She amends the Hegelian framework to privilege force and 
affect as that which constitutes the subject by defining this loving encounter not in terms 
of a subjective emotion but as an intensive energy and “social electricity” that cultivates 
subjectivity in our responsiveness to its force (196-7).  Although Oliver stays within the 
limits of intersubjective address, she gestures toward an imperceptible force that aids in 
the constitution of this address. 
In a different vein of thought, Coulthard provides a compelling argument for a 
politics of resentment instead of recognition.  He argues that reconciliation belongs to a 
framework of recognition in which Indigenous peoples must behave and represent 
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themselves in ways that are deemed acceptable by the State.  He explains that at 
reconciliatory events and ceremonies Indigenous peoples are expected to act grateful, 
humble, and demonstrate a willingness to move past any anger, hurt, and resentment they 
have for the settler State.  Individuals are expected to forgive (and forget) structural 
violence by “overcoming” the legacy of colonial genocide (Red Skin 109).  The colonized 
subject who refuses reconciliation is portrayed as angry, revengeful, and incapable of 
forgiveness (109).  Instead of internalizing negative emotions in violent and self- 
destructive ways, Coulthard entertains the idea that negative affects can be harnessed as a 
political tool to effect change.  Combining Nietzsche’s notion of active and reactive force 
with Fanon’s views on negative emotion, Coulthard contends: “In the context of 
internalized colonialism, then, it would appear that the emergence of reactive emotions 
like anger and resentment can indicate a breakdown of colonial subjection and thus open 
up the possibility of developing alternative subjectivities and anticolonial practices” 
(115).43   He proposes a politics of resentment as a point of rupture from the 
internalization of colonization and positions anger as a powerful tool that can be used to 
mobilize social and political transformation. Coulthard’s politics of resentment via Fanon 
signals an affective turn for a theory of recognition.  The force of anger provides a 
43 Briefly, Fanon argues that internalized colonialism can turn into revengeful hate and violence. 
This, he suggests, can crystalize as a moment of decolonization and liberation from the colonists’ 
stronghold.  Although Fanon considers the transformative potentials of negative emotions and 
violence, he does not advocate violence.  Indeed, he contends that violence and reactive emotions 
cannot sustain revolution alone.  Instead, he understands the emergence of these internalized 
emotions to be a productive moment in which the colonized subjects affirm themselves in a new 
direction.  See Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 1-62.
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necessary rupture to the colonial constraints of recognition.  It disrupts and unsettles the 
dialectical exchange by breaking from the anticipated (and enforced) identity of “the 
forgiving Indian.” Therefore, a politics of resentment does not concede to a colonial 
imaginary of Indigenous peoples and politics. 
What both Oliver and Coulthard demonstrate is that an either/or (recognition or 
affects/forces) approach to feminist and postcolonial politics is not necessary.  Although 
the two authors lean toward a model of recognition, and I go in the other direction 
toward imperceptibility, it is important to emphasize that arguing for one feminist 
politics at the expense of another severely limits our capacity to engage with the 
complexity of not just the subject but of social transformation as well.  Nonetheless, 
Grosz does not want to reimagine a politics of recognition, even if it considers affect and 
force.  Instead, she claims that any theory structured through a model of recognition 
remains for feminism “fundamentally servile” (“A Politics of Imperceptibility” 471). 
To address situated differences and oppression without falling into the trap of 
essentialist identity politics, we need a theory that works between feminist perspectives 
that are often placed at odds with one another.  This is precisely Braidotti’s project in the 
second edition of her book Nomadic Subjects.  She argues for a feminist theory that 
destabilizes identity and the unitary subject.  She also acknowledges the importance of 
establishing a coherent position from which to speak.  In Braidotti’s words: 
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The self being a sort of network of interrelated points, the question then becomes: 
by what sort of interconnections, sidesteps, and lines of escape can one produce 
feminist knowledge without fixing into a new normativity?  This form of 
consciousness combines features that are usually perceived as opposing, namely, to 
have a sense of identity that rests not on fixity, but on contingency.  The nomadic 
consciousness combines coherence with mobility.  It aims to rethink the unity of 
the subject, without reference to humanistic beliefs, without dualistic oppositions, 
instead linking body and mind in a new set of intensive and often transitive 
transitions. (64)
The question at stake for my project then, and the one I will attempt to answer throughout 
the remainder of the project is: how can we combine coherency with mobility and craft a 
politics of imperceptibility that also acknowledges the politics of location?  And 
following this question, I ask: what would a nomadic politics look like in the context of 
resistance to sexual surveillance?  How would it take shape in practice?  Braidotti warns 
that practicing “nomadic feminism,” is not easy or painless.  Indeed, she argues that it 
requires a creative openness to “zigzag” between intergenerational, transnational politics, 
social positions, and theoretical perspectives, and to confront their contradictions (17).  
The nomadic subject is not of the either/or ilk, she is and, and, and.  Although I will 
return to Braidotti’s nomadic feminism later in the chapter, I introduce her perspective 
now to draw attention to the ways in which a politics of imperceptibility can go beyond 
the limitations of a master/slave dialectic and notion of authenticity to theorize the 
subject without also having to deny the importance of recognition and identity in certain
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political contexts.  To sum up, the real crux of the problem with a politics of recognition 
is its fixation on the dualism of “subject” and “object,” not only because it tends to 
reinforce a hierarchical model of intersubjectivity, but also because it limits the capacity 
for new patterns of thought to emerge in the space between things.  Like the space 
between the embodied experience of colonized peoples and a theory of the 
imperceptible.  In what follows, I will address the questions that Grosz leaves 
unanswered: how does a politics of imperceptibility facilitate the “realignment of 
forces?” How does a politics of imperceptibility benefit colonized peoples?  How does it 
work?  What does it do? 
3.3 Becoming-imperceptible 
Becoming-imperceptible is the event for which there is no immediate 
representation, because it rests on the disappearance of the individuated self. 
-Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman
I begin this section with the quote above to first illustrate the difficulty of the task at 
hand, which is to render the imperceptible—both as a concept and as it occurs as a 
practice—into a system of representation, and secondly to emphasize that becoming- 
imperceptible is not a theory of the subject or of subjectivity.  The imperceptible is an 
event that can never be fully apprehended into a structure of knowledge.  Therefore, 
the approach I take below is both necessarily rigorous and creative.  Rigorous because 
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I unpack several of Deleuze and Guattari's, and Deleuze and Claire Parnet's, complex and 
shifting concepts, and creative because I bend and transform those concepts as the need 
arises.  Although Deleuze and Guattari provide a robust toolbox of concepts, I weave 
together the events at Standing Rock and the notion of “becoming” to create a framework 
of imperceptibility that necessitates the inclusion of a new concept, which I formulate as 
the “line of pure resistance.”  I introduce the line of pure resistance as a line of 
sustainability for a politics of imperceptibility.  As I demonstrate below, the line of pure 
resistance enables us to produce a feminist framework of imperceptibility to think-feel-do 
activism differently. 
To begin, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept “becoming” as a movement 
between multiplicities.  A multiplicity is a complex entanglement that does not reference 
any prior unity, nor does it have a center point of unification.  A multiplicity originates 
from a twisting or swirling of elements that when folded together form varying degrees of 
relation.44   Everything is a multiplicity, including ourselves.  Elsewhere, Deleuze refers to 
a multiplicity as a structure, but it is not a structure made up of various binary points and 
positions.45  A multiplicity is in constant flux, folding and unfolding in duration and 
time.46   Importantly, a multiplicity is not a multiplicity of something.  It has no given 
44 Likewise, what defines an element (in a multiplicity) is not its intrinsic characteristics, but its 
dimensions, that is how it forms and acts in relation with other elements. 
45 See Deleuze, DR 183. 
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essence or prior identity; rather, it is substantive (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 8).  Which is 
to say, a multiplicity is not the same thing as the multiple of one.  It is relational in nature 
and heterogeneous in kind.  As I gestured earlier, it is crucial to consider protest as a 
multiplicity rather than as a duplication of one opposing ideology.  Indeed, the nature of 
a protest is to dissolve the notion of the One.  Moreover, if a multiplicity is not reducible 
to its composing elements, as Deleuze and Guattari assert (33), then neither is a protest 
divisible to its independent elements, such as individual participants or a single action.  If 
a multiplicity is instead defined by its variable dimensions or “directions in motion” (21), 
then it follows that a protest is also defined by its variations or virtual potentials and the 
ways in which they actualize political change.  Deleuze and Parnet elaborate: 
It is not the elements or the sets which define the multiplicity.  What defines it is 
the AND, as something which has its place between the elements or between 
sets…And, even if there are only two [elements] there is an AND between the two, 
which is neither the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but 
which constitutes the multiplicity. (34) 
In other words, the ANDs are the variable dimensions, directions in motion, the virtual 
dimensions of a multiplicity.  When a multiplicity’s ANDs (relations) change so does the 
46 Deleuze draws on Henri Bergson’s notion of duration to define a non-linear temporality that is 
not spatially divided into past, present, and future. 
3: Imperceptibility 132 
multiplicity’s capacity to act: “a multiplicity is continuously transforming itself into a 
string of other multiplicities” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 249).  The importance of the 
concept multiplicity is that it allows us to think beyond the One/many dyad and the 
dialectical oppositions that follow from it (Deleuze DR 182).  A protest is not the many 
against the One; it is more nuanced.  A protest which is reduced to a generalized logic of 
opposites (colonized versus the State) glosses over the specificities of a protest’s 
conditions.  The abstract binary of the many against the One curtails a protest’s 
“concreteness.”  The concept of multiplicity enables us to consider protest as a 
dynamism of difference.  In addition to identifying protest as a difference in degree we 
can alsoexplore its differences in kind.  The former type of difference is concerned with 
question of measurement: What is the protest about?  Who does it oppose?  What 
happened?  Whereas the latter asks unmeasurable questions: How does the protest work?  
When and where do its potentials actualize?  What can a protest do? 
There are then two types of multiplicities: those defined by differences in degree 
and those defined by differences in kind.  This crucial distinction between 
multiplicities informs many of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts upon which I will draw 
in the remainder of this study.  These concepts warrant further investigation in order to 
understand the concept of becoming-imperceptible and to show how becomings move 
between multiplicities as I suggested earlier.  Deleuze and Guattari make the distinction as 
follows: 
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we distinguish between arborescent multiplicities and rhizomatic multiplicities.  
Between macro- and micromultiplicities.  On the one hand, multiplicities that are 
extensive, divisible, and molar; unifiable, totalizable, organizable; conscious and 
preconscious— and on the other hand, libidinal, unconscious, molecular, 
intensive multiplicities composed of particles that do not divide without 
changing nature. (ATP 33) 
The State is a Majority formation and is a molar apparatus— a quantitative multiplicity 
because its elements are distinct and perceptible; politicians, laws, population, currency, 
all of which can be quantified.  A protest is minor with molecular movements that are 
qualitative in kind.  It is constituted by the intensive difference between elements and 
their imperceptible relations, which cannot be counted or adequately identified.  The 
relations between protestors, for instance, cannot be quantified.  The primary difference 
between the two, is that a quantitative multiplicity is discontinuous and can be divided 
without effecting a change in its nature while a qualitative multiplicity is continuous and 
thus any change to its number of dimensions will necessarily affect its nature.  A bag of 
marbles is a quantitative multiplicity: if you remove a few marbles it is still a bag of 
marbles.  Temperature is a qualitative multiplicity: if the number of degrees changes so 
does its feeling.  How does a distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
multiplicities apply to our current study of the NoDAPL movement?  We can define 
TigerSwan as a quantitative multiplicity.  Its surveillance operations, security agents, and 
military ideologies can be counted and measured.  Any increase or decrease of its 
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elements, such as more or less agents, weapons, or land occupation, affects its force or 
capacity to act, but its nature, which is to exercise control over protestors, remains 
constant despite these quantitative changes.  On the other hand, protest is a qualitative 
multiplicity.  As new elements are folded in, or previous dimensions increase or 
decrease in number, such as alliances between Native and non-Native activists, peaceful 
demonstrations, or practices of community healing, the protest also changes in capacity. 
But unlike TigerSwan, so too does its nature change.  Its “directions of motion” expand 
their distance; the protest folds in new elements, policy advocacy and environmental 
protection and honouring tradition and creating community and causing awareness and 
decolonization and, and, and. Whatever the change is, it is effectuated at the level of 
imperceptibility.  Which is to say that it cannot be measured. 
Although I have mapped their differences, I want to underline that quantitative and 
qualitative multiplicities do not exist in dual opposition nor is one defined against the 
other.  This is of the utmost importance to understand, because to think of them in 
opposition “would be no better than the dualism between the One and the multiple” 
(Deleuze and Guattari ATP 34).  Both types of multiplicity coexist within the same 
assemblage.  They are corded together by their umbilical AND; TigerSwan AND the 
NoDAPL movement.  Quantitative AND qualitative multiplicities interpenetrate and 
condition one another.  For example, a protest has elements of surveillance and 
surveillance has elements of protest.  During a demonstration, protestors often practice 
intergroup surveillance to keep track of each for safety purposes; and, when surveillance 
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technology fails or glitches, it enacts a subversion of its own system.  I will return to the 
notion of glitch as an act of protest in the next chapter.  What is critical to grasp here is 
that the two types of multiplicity, quantitative and qualitative exist as two articulations of 
the same assemblage.  The point that there are qualitative multiplicities within 
quantitative ones and vice versa will become particularly salient later in the chapter when 
I argue that a politics of imperceptibility must center on a politics of location.  As I will 
argue, there is no opposition between these two political and theoretical endeavours, but 
only a difference in kind.  The concept of multiplicity is significant because it gives us a 
tool that allows us to explore the relationship between things in the NoDAPL movement, 
such as TigerSwan and protest actions.  At the same time, it enables us to explore the 
function of each as their own intensive singularity.  I have explained how a becoming 
moves between (quantitative and qualitative multiplicities).  Now I want to explore what 
a becoming is—or rather what it does. 
It should come as no surprise that becoming is also a multiplicity.  This is because 
becoming is not an imitation of something (the One) nor is it a transformation from this 
to that (the one to the many); becoming is the dynamism of change itself.  It is a line of 
movement with no end goal or state.  Because of this, becoming can be defined as a 
politics of difference.  It moves molar formations that stagnate ways of thinking and 
being to an encounter with molecular intensities.  Becomings are radicalized flows of 
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desire that generate multiplicities and new capacities to act.47   Becoming is a becoming- 
different not from something, but with and between things.  As such, becomings are 
qualitative in kind.  Deleuze and Guattari elaborate:
A becoming is not a correspondence between relation.  But neither is it a 
resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification… To become is not to 
progress or regress along a series…Becoming produces nothing other than 
itself…This is the point to clarify: that a becoming lacks a subject distinct from 
itself…It concerns alliance. (ATP 237-8, emphasis added) 
In becomings then, there are no “subjects” that exist outside and distinct from “objects;” 
becomings throw off balance the subject/object dichotomy.  This point is crucial to 
understand the political potential that the concept of becoming offers.  It is also 
important to understand that practices of becomings are relational in that becoming is a 
process of change and movement within an assemblage.  Becoming describes how 
“discrete” elements of an assemblage change and how they deterritorialize in relation to 
other elements.  For example, the NoDAPL assemblage is made of the following 
“discrete” elements: protestors, land, direct-action, peaceful ceremony, community 
practice, colonial history, water, construction machinery, police dogs, rubber bullets,  
47 Deleuze and Guattari define desire as a productive and positive force, unlike the psychoanalytic 
tradition that defines desire as lack. 
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TigerSwan, law enforcement, and the media, to name just a few of its elements.48  When 
one of the elements becomes, it enters into the territory of another element changing its 
composition and bringing about a new temporary alliance— that is, a new multiplicity 
with a new function within the same assemblage.  An example of this process might be 
illustrated in the becoming-water protector of protestors.  These protesters are drawn into 
the territory of water-ceremony-land through affinity rather than organizational purpose.  
Becoming- water protector, therefore, is a deterritorialization of the protester in which the 
constituent elements of protest— opposition to the government, corporation, police—
meet new properties of relation—relation with water, land, tradition.  In this example, 
becoming- water protector does not mean that the protestor has become better or reached 
a higher moral ground— but that the protestor becoming-water protector has a different 
orientation within the NoDAPL assemblage, and this orientation confounds the 
distinction between “subject” and “object.” 
Every becoming, including water protector-becomings, creates a line of flight.  A 
line of flight is the elusive and transformative potential of a becoming that evades 
reterritorialization.  For example, in water protector-becomings new lines of connection 
are made between multiplicities (land—protest—water—bodies—tradition—) that, when 
in alliance, release new capacities for them to act and be acted upon.  For example, when 
48 Although I have defined these properties as “discrete,” they should also be regarded as 
multiplicities.  They are discrete in kind because they each exist as heterogeneous elements 
within an assemblage.  An assemblage does not collapse the difference of its elements— which 
is to say that it is a unity that is reducible to its parts. 
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a protestor is deterritorialized a line of flight surfaces and radicalizes new capacities to act 
that contributes not only to the becoming of the protestor but also to the becoming of the 
NoDAPL movement.  Becoming-water protector makes new tendrils within the NoDAPL 
rhizome before reterritorialization occurs (the deterritorialized protester is 
reterritorialized as a terrorist by TigerSwan, or noble savage and patriotic citizen by 
activist media).  Becoming, then, is a generative intensity, a block of energy of a 
particular time and space that affects more new ways of be(com)ing. 
It must be emphasized that becomings are multilayered overlapping intensities that 
cannot and should not be parsed out from one another.  All becomings exist on what 
Deleuze and Guattari call, “a plane of immanence,” which is a virtual plane with no 
organizing structure or predetermined form.  A plane of immanence is only “relations of 
movement and rest, speed and slowness… molecules and particles of all kinds” (ATP 
266).  A plane of immanence is free from what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the 
“gigantic memory” of the Majority, which can otherwise be understood as the 
phallogocentric order of signification (293).  Deleuze and Guattari argue that “white 
man” is the “molar entity par excellence” (291).  Therefore, to break from molarity (the 
phallogocentric system of signification) requires first becoming-woman.  Becoming- 
woman does not refer to one actually becoming a woman.  It is a movement away from 
the rigid binary of man/woman.  The concept is not about a material being but woman as 
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a figure that is minor to a patriarchal system.49   Deleuze and Guattari assert that Man (as 
a figure of the Majority) is designated as the central point within the distribution of power 
in all binary oppositions including, male/female, adult/child, white/non-white, 
rational/animal.  To escape the confines, dangers, and violence of these hierarchal 
dualisms one must break from molar perception and perceive differently.  Becoming- 
woman then is a line of flight out of all structuring dualisms insofar as Man continues to 
serve as “the principal term of opposition” around which the entire system is organized. 
(292).  That is, Man not only serves as the privileged position within the gender binary, 
he is a dualism-making machine that produces opposition and negation at every point. 
Therefore, becoming-woman is a deterritorialization not only from the gender 
binary system, but the entire system of signification given that Man is the central point to 
which all other binaries are tied (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 293).  If becoming departs 
from major dualisms than it must start with the departure from Man.  Hence, becoming- 
woman is a mode of becoming-other to the standardizing grids of gender and sexuality.  
Importantly, Deleuze and Guattari are not suggesting that women have a priori access to 
becoming; there is no subject of becoming.  Women must also become-woman (277). 
Man is the apparatus of capture and control, and becoming-woman is an affective 
movement that passes through oppositions— becoming woman is the “no-man’s land” 
49 It should be noted, however, that feminist scholars including Braidotti have critiqued Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman for collapsing the differences between men and 
women into a single subjectivity that enters into a becoming under the same circumstances.  As 
Braidotti argues, this ignores the specific historical struggles of woman (NS 258). 
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(293), or, better still, the “No-(wo)man’s lands” (Braidotti NS 47).  Becoming-woman 
does not make a line from Man to woman; it takes a different direction altogether 
rendering these starting points indiscernible (Deleuze and Guattari 298).  Again, 
becoming-woman is a deterritorialization of representation, language, and molar 
structures— what Deleuze and Guattari call “the law of arborescence”—that constrains 
multiplicities to their quantitative state. 
All becomings connect on a plane of immanence but they have different thresholds. 
A threshold is what Deleuze and Guattari define as “a zone of proximity” between two 
multiplicities.  It is a zone where the elements of different multiplicities pass through one 
another.  This is a site of connection and interpenetration which could be conceived of as 
the AND that changes a multiplicity’s nature.  A threshold is a door, a potential for 
transformation, and this potential is imperceptible because it has yet to be actualized into 
our subjective awareness.  For example, peaceful protest is one threshold of becoming- 
water protector.  In the event that a protestor enacts a peaceful demonstration she passes 
through a threshold where indeterminate potentials are unleashed.  Nonetheless, because 
becoming-water protector is situated within the context of the NoDAPL assemblage it 
reaches a defined limit.  Despite passing a threshold, if the body becoming-water 
protector is to remain elemental to the NoDAPL assemblage the body-in-becoming must 
be reterritorialized within it. 
Massumi contends that becomings have two types of thresholds: 
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[A threshold is] a relative limit above which a thing ceases to be itself but gets a 
new lease on life in a different mode; and an absolute limit below which no thing 
can go but upon which all things tread.  A threshold leading across the synapses 
toward a new being, and a foundation of non-being. (UG 36) 
Water protector-becomings then, reach a relative limit, but they do not abandon the 
NoDAPL assemblage; they reterritorialize within it and present the assemblage within 
something new—new affects and intensive energies.  For example, water protector- 
becomings transform the NoDAPL movement from one characterized as a protest against 
State-capitalism to a peaceful endeavour to protect clean water.  The second limit that 
Massumi identifies is the “absolute limit.” This limit is the point at which an assemblage 
breaks down and ceases to exist as such.  Once a becoming passes its absolute threshold 
it turns into pure chaos—in other words, imperceptibility (58). 
Becoming-imperceptible is the final act of all becomings.  Which is not to say that 
becomings exist on a teleological trajectory toward imperceptibility as a “goal.” Recall 
that becomings have no end goal or state, only that becoming-imperceptible is a 
becoming that passes through the final threshold that all others encounter as their limit.  
But what is the absolute limit or final threshold that becomings must pass through? 
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Deleuze and Guattari tell us that they must move out of arborescent50  perception.  They 
elaborate that in becomings-imperceptible: 
Perception will no longer reside in the relation between a subject and an object, but 
rather at the limit of that relation, in the period associated with the subject and 
object.  Perception will confront its own limit; it will be in the midst of things 
throughout its own proximity, as the presence of one haecceity in another, the 
prehension of one by the other or the passage from one to the other: Look only at 
the movements.  (ATP 282) 
In other words, in becoming-imperceptible there is no distinction between subjects and 
objects, self and other, human and nonhuman.  Becoming-imperceptible is the ultimate 
“evacuation of the self”—what Braidotti describes in the opening quote to this section as 
the “disappearance of the individuated self” (The Posthuman 137).  The only thing that 
exists is virtual potential, multiplicities of difference— ANDs into infinity. 
Deleuze and Guattari define becoming-imperceptible as a “zone of indiscernibility” 
and “impersonality” in which becoming is “becoming everybody/everything (tout le 
monde), to world (faire monde), to make a world (faire un monde)” (ATP 280).  As an 
example of a becoming-imperceptible Deleuze and Guattari turn to the camouflage fish: 
50 As noted in chapter one, the term “arborescent” is Deleuze and Guattari’s counterpoint to the 
rhizome.  Arborescence is a structure of thought that is tree-like, self-contained and closed.  It is a 
linear land representational logic that correlates with molar systems of signification. 
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“This fish is crisscrossed by abstract lines that resemble nothing, that do not even follow 
its organic divisions but thus disorganized, disarticulated, it worlds with the lines of a 
rock, sand, and plants, becoming imperceptible” (280).  To be sure, the fish is not simply 
imitating its surroundings to disappear; it “conjugates” with other lines (sand, rocks, and 
so on) to make a world in which everything is a becoming: fish, rock, sand, plant.  What 
is becoming imperceptible in this example is not so much the fish but the environment. 
Fish, sand, rock, and plant disappear only insofar as their lines of demarcation dissolve 
into one another.  It is only by becoming together that they make a zone of 
indiscernibility.  Becoming-imperceptible is always a collective endeavour; the 
clandestine fish evades perceptive capture only insofar as it asignifies, disarticulates, and 
cuts through the molar lines of individuation. 
On the NoDAPL wavelength, water protector-becomings are subject to 
reterritorialization, as I argued above.  But, be that as it may, they also engender a line of 
flight that effectuates a change to the NoDAPL assemblage.  Before I map this line, it is 
necessary to first define two additional lines that coexist and intermingle with a line of 
flight.  According to Deleuze and Guattari, the first line is a molar line that forms rigid 
segmentations in an assemblage by regulating flows of desire and power.  It does this by 
ordering, dividing, and creating predetermined social hierarchies.  That is, molar lines are 
arborescent machines that churn out binaries of social classes, races, sexes, man-woman, 
private-public and so on, to stabilize an assemblage and give it some consistency (ATP 
128). 
3: Imperceptibility 144 
The second line is the molecular line of supple segmentations that form thresholds 
and constitute “blocs of becoming” within an assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 
130).  They are the cracks of an assemblage that operate as lines of deterritorialization.  
However, molecular lines of deterritorialization are compromised by their relative status 
to the molar line of reterritorialization.  Take for example, water protector-becomings. 
TigerSwan is a molar line within the NoDAPL assemblage that reterritorializes water 
protector-becomings by forcing them into an overcoded regime of classification so that 
protestors become not water protectors but sexually deviant terrorists.  Although 
molecular lines function as deterritorializations, they reterritorialize on the molar line.  In 
some cases, they can make deeper grooves in rigid segmentations.  As Deleuze and 
Guattari contend there is an ambiguity to the molecular line; it could go either way, 
“ready to tip to one side or the other” (205). 
The third line is the line of flight that ruptures the cycle of territorialization.  A line 
of flight is virtual; it passes molar and molecular thresholds “towards a destination which 
is unknown, not foreseeable, not pre-existent” (Deleuze and Parnet 125).  A line of flight 
is an “absolute deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 282).  It is not bound by 
molar or molecular lines, nor is it produced by them.  A line of flight does not follow 
molar or molecular lines, it comes first (204).  It is primary because it is virtual—it 
effectuates the molar and molecular line.  Which is to say, the line of flight “comes up 
through the middle” (293).  Still, these three lines are not separable; they are immanent 
to one another.  Deleuze and Guattari assert that they intertwine and turn into one 
another: 
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“It is not easy to sort them out.  No one of them is transcendent; each is at work 
within the others.  Immanence everywhere” (205).  Accordingly, in water protector-
becomings the line of flight that blasts apart molar segmentation is not easy to map. 
Nonetheless, in terms of the NoDAPL movement a line of flight can be discerned 
on the threshold of peaceful protest.  On November 2, 2016, a water ceremony performed 
at Standing Rock Sioux reservation emerged as a line of flight that not only transformed 
the NoDAPL assemblage but also traversed a line to becoming-imperceptible.  For days, 
law enforcement and TigerSwan were stationed atop Turtle Hill (also referred to as Turtle 
Island), a sacred burial ground for the Sioux Tribe.  The ceremony was intended as a 
peaceful prayer for the Sioux's ancestors whose unmarked graves were desecrated by law 
enforcement and TigerSwan’s occupation of the sacred land.  Water protectors built a 
makeshift bridge so that elders could cross the Cantapeta Creek which runs between the 
protectors’ camp and Turtle Hill.  However, law enforcement, acting on behalf of The 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, who were considered the legal owners of the ancestral 
lands,51  descended the Hill to arrest water protectors who attempted to cross the bridge.  
The water protectors complied and did not make further attempts to come ashore, but 
they stood their ground in the neutral waters of the creek.  Unprovoked, law enforcement 
fired rubber bullets and tear gas at the unarmed activists who formed a line of solidarity, 
51 The ancestral lands were accorded to the Sioux Tribe by the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868 but 
the Tribe ceded the land eleven years later under the threat of starvation.  In 1980 the US 
Supreme Court declared the new treaty unjust and ordered the government to financially 
compensate the Tribe rather than return the land to them (Akhtar). 
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standing waist-deep, arm-in-arm in the freezing water.  At the same time, the water 
ceremony was underway on the banks of the Oceti Sakowin Camp.  Eventually the 
ceremony spilled into the creek itself as water protectors paddled in their canoes to join 
those standing in the water as well as to ensure their safety and transport the injured back 
to camp.  The ceremony included singing, dancing, drum beating, repairing the bridge 
that law enforcement eventually destroyed, canoeing in the creek, performing smoke 
ceremonies on shore and in boats or rafts, and providing medical care for those who were 
pepper sprayed or wounded from rubber bullets.  All these activities were performed by 
elders, children, adults, comprised of Native and non-Native protestors.  The ceremony 
was a becoming-water of protest and a becoming-protest of water, a worlding of protest.  
Water, activist bodies, tear gas sprayed into the water, police dogs that drank from the 
creek, prayers for clean water— all conjugated together.  Like the camouflage fish, the 
ceremony conjugated “with other lines, other pieces, [to] make a world that can overlay 
the first one, like a transparency” (Deleuze and Guattari 280).  The world that was made 
was a clandestine strengthening of the NoDAPL movement. 
3.4 A Line of Pure Resistance 
Although the water ceremony at Cantapeta Creek was certainly visible to the State and 
its agents, as was the increased energy and political momentum of water protectors 
thereafter, there was another “line” that remained imperceptible.  This is the line that I 
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identify as the “line of pure resistance.”52   I define this line as the capacity to world at a 
moment’s notice by effectuating a multiplicity of molecular lines into new becomings.  A 
line of pure resistance is not something that can be anticipated or predetermined.  As I 
formulate it, it is an event that occurs during a state of emergency, i.e. when law 
enforcement unexpectedly unleashes violence against water protectors during a peaceful 
water ceremony.  It is a line of becoming that doubles as a lifeline.  It emerges when a 
becoming is accelerated at a rate that is impossible to sustain, when becoming becomes a 
matter of life or death.  When life is bare life.53  A line of pure resistance unfolds as a 
mechanism of defense and an act of sustainability to slow down a line of flight from 
turning into a line of destruction. 
To be exact, the line of flight made during the water ceremony was supported by 
the line of pure resistance.  Protestors becoming-water protectors unexpectedly met the 
militarized police and their excessive force during what was intended to be a peaceful 
ceremony—with a smooth line of flight.  What prevented protestors from retaliating 
against the police with violence?  Or, more importantly, what stopped water protectors 
from retreating from the creek to avoid being a target of violence?  What stopped the 
52 I use the term “pure” to indicate the line’s virtual quality, which I discuss below.  This is in 
accordance with Deleuze’s terminology (i.e. “pure difference,” “pure affects,” “pure 
immanence”).  I want to be clear that I do not mean “pure” as in “uncontaminated,” nor am I 
referring to settler colonial usages of the term “pure blood.” 
53 Bare life is a term from Giorgio Agamben.  The term refers to a body that is outside the law or 
denied basic human rights; a “life exposed to death” (Agamben 88). 
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ceremony’s line of flight from being reterritorialized by the molar force of law 
enforcement?  The line of pure resistance.  In what follows, I develop the concept of the 
“line of pure resistance” as an addition to Deleuze and Guattari’s repertoire of becoming.  
The line of pure resistance, as I will demonstrate below, is a line effectuated by the 
turning of a line of flight into, what Deleuze and Guattari call, a line of destruction. 
First, it is worth reviewing how the molar and molecular lines function in an 
assemblage.  The “molar line” is rigid and composed of predetermined social 
stratifications and segments.  Not unlike an established life path, movement on the molar 
line follows a pre-given course: family-school-job-family-retirement (Deleuze and Parnet 
124).  The molar line is constructed by binary machines, Universal Man, dualisms.  Thus, 
it reterritorializes.  The “molecular line” is also segmentary but supple.  This line is made 
up of fluxes and thresholds that change the rhythm of movement across the segments of 
the molar line (126).  The molecular line is the line of becomings and of 
deterritorialization.  Not always but sometimes there is a third line between the molecular 
and molar lines.  This is the “line of flight” that “carries us away” across rigid segments 
and across the thresholds of the molecular line (126).  The line of flight has a destination 
unknown, undetermined, imperceptible.  It is creative potential and absolute 
deterritorialization.  All three of these lines are entangled.  There is, however, another trio 
of entangled lines that Deleuze and Guattari do not identify: the line of flight, destruction, 
and resistance.  The line of destruction is not part of an assemblage proper but is instead 
that which seeks to destroy it but as we shall see the three lines—flight, destruction, 
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resistance—have a different function from the molar and molecular in the becoming of an 
assemblage. 
Deleuze and Guattari define the line of destruction as a line of flight that has broken 
free from the limits imposed by molar forms of segmentarity but fails to connect with the 
conditions necessary for creative production (Patton 292).  In the absence of making this 
connection, a line of flight turns instead into a line of abolition.  Deleuze and Guattari 
turn to the drug addict as an example.  They explain that while drugs may be the agent of 
becoming-imperceptible since they enable molecular modes of perception, the flight line 
of drugs—euphoria, altered consciousness, shifting patterns of thought, the overflow of 
emotion, that some drugs facilitate— is constantly reterritorialized in the most rigid 
fashion: in addiction, drug deals, withdrawal, the slow decay of the body (ATP 284). 
These inescapable molar segmentations suspend the becoming that drugs create and 
thereby turn a line of flight into a line of destruction.  In other words, drugs are not 
sustainable.  Worse still, a drug addict may follow a line of flight—by chasing a high, 
for example— into a black hole of death.  For Deleuze and Guattari, a “black hole” is 
where lines of flight coil and collapse into each other: a bad trip, paranoia, unsustainable 
hallucinations, delusions, death (285).  Black holes can annihilate becomings and 
destroy the line of flight.  As Deleuze and Parnet explicate: 
it is the supple lines themselves which produce or encounter their own dangers, a 
threshold crossed too quickly, an intensity become dangerous because it could not 
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be tolerated.  You have not taken enough precautions.  This is the ‘black hole’ 
phenomenon: a supple line rushes into a black hole from which it will not be able 
to extricate itself. (138) 
However, Deleuze and Guattari also assert that it is possible for a line to find its 
way out of a black hole.  But the line that reemerges will be even more rigid and harsh.  
This molar line will work passionately and feverishly to create more rigid segmentations 
(ATP 138).  For the drug user, the line of destruction that reemerges is the line of 
addiction, repeating destruction over and over again.  Nonetheless, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, drugs are not a priori bad.  They can change “the general conditions of space 
and time perception so that nonusers can succeed in passing through the holes in the 
world and following the lines of flight at the very place where means other than drugs 
become necessary” (286).  Indeed, works of art, music, and poems that were made on a 
line of destruction can wrest free for others creative lines that are not destruction; we 
could call this the becoming-drug of art: “music is a drug.” To clarify, a line of flight 
risks turning into a line of destruction when facing the black hole of drug abuse.  The line 
of destruction, however, does not become a line of pure resistance.  The line of pure 
resistance, as I propose it, plays an intervening role between the turning of the two.  
What is the line of pure resistance for the drug addict?  It could be many things: detox, 
support, love, connecting with other lines of flight beyond the drug assemblage. 
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At first, it would appear that the line of resistance would belong to the molecular 
line of potential and becomings and destruction to the molar line of reterritorialization, 
but it is more complicated.  This is because the line of destruction, as we have seen, is 
also a line of flight, but it is one that has taken “the path of greatest regression” (Deleuze 
and Guattari ATP 205).  It is a line of flight that has taken a wrong turn and is stuck 
reconstructing rigid segments.  A line of destruction emerges when two lines of flight 
meet, and one blocks the other.  Deleuze and Guattari aver: “it is quite possible that one 
group or individual's line of flight may not work to the benefit of another group or 
individual; it may on the contrary block it, plug it, throw it even deeper into rigid 
segmentarity” (205).  For example, the water ceremony was a line of flight that 
encountered the black hole of law enforcement and in turn, threatened the destruction of 
the ceremony.  Deleuze and Parnet ask the question: How can we outmaneuver a line of 
flight turning into a line of destruction?  (143).  One answer is with the line of pure 
resistance.  This line is the imperceptible fourth line born out of the friction of the flight 
line turning into a line of destruction. 
The line of resistance is “pure” because it is virtual.  Claire Colebrook describes 
the virtual as tendencies of “unpursued paths and potentialities that are not actualized” 
and offer for us a micropolitics of forces that “we can transform…into a truly new 
future” (Understanding xxx). However, the virtual is not something we can perceive.  It 
is only something we can intuit.  Nevertheless, the virtual is still active; it is not 
something waiting to be actualized for us to perceive; becomings are virtual.  The virtual 
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is a political potential that exceeds actual ideologies and systems of knowledge that we 
have produced thus far.  The concept of the virtual acknowledges that there are 
imperceptible dimensions to the process of thinking-feeling-doing that exist beyond the 
subject, such as the imperceptible relations between a body and its environment.  The 
question that nags at us is how do we actualize virtual power we cannot perceive?  
Echoing Deleuze, Colebrook asks: “can thinking grasp the forces or differences that 
precede and produced it?  …This would consider the ways in which our image of the 
‘human’ is formed from events that lie outside human decision” (xxxix).  Indeed, how 
do we glimpse virtual potential that has yet to be actualized? 
Intuiting the virtual is not as paradoxical as it first may seem.  The virtual is as real 
as the actual.  They are two sides of the same coin; they fold into one another to create 
all possible realities.  The actual in the here and now relays back to the virtual.  The 
common example given to describe this relationship is a memory.  A memory is not an 
actual object, but it is real.  Memory, although virtual, contains within it images of actual 
objects.  Complicating the relationship further, a memory can be actualized into form. 
For instance, an artist paints a memory and renders the memory into an actual object.  
However, the painting (actual) relates back to the memory (virtual): the artist paints the 
sky indigo blue and, in the process, alters the memory image of a grey sky (virtual).  In 
this way, the actual never breaks from the virtual.  Another example is dream analysis.  
The image of a dream changes and shifts as it is actualized into language.  When 
recalling a dream, the analysand may invent or add bits and pieces of information to give 
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the dream meaning—and in doing so, actualizes the virtual.  Yet, there is still a sense of 
something forgotten, an element of a dream missed and that something remains virtual.  
This is all to say that the actual does not represent the virtual.  Virtual and actual, 
memory and painting, dream and interpretation flatten together. 
The line of pure resistance is not representational, nor can it be determined in 
advance.  You cannot plan for a line of pure resistance.  It is both generated by and 
generative of affective forces.  The line of pure resistance resonates with Foucault’s 
delineation of power and resistance.  Foucault affirms that, “Where there is power, there 
is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power” (HS 95).  Power and resistance, like the virtual and 
actual, are also two sides of the same coin.  Indeed, power and resistance are both virtual 
and actual at the same time.  Continuing further, Foucault contends that, “[resistances] 
are irregular in fashion: the points, knots, or focuses … spread over time and space at 
varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming 
certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behavior” (96, 
emphasis added).  In the same fashion, a line of pure resistance inflames the body and the 
body inflamed also affects and inflames the line.  In this way, a line of pure resistance 
does not have a demarcated beginning or end, nor is there a linear story to explain its 
emergence.  We can only explore its conditions and the potentials that were actualized. 
Accepting this proposition requires that we forego the representational question that is 
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stuck asking: what is a line of pure resistance, so that we can ask what is at stake: what 
can a line of pure resistance do? 
Resistance lines inflame the supple molecular lines to sustain a becoming that has 
happened too-soon and too-forcefully for the assemblage to endure.  In the instance of 
the protestors becoming-water protectors the thin line between flight and destruction— 
was encountered – between peaceful protest and violence.  Suspended in the freezing 
cold, shaking in the creek waters, bleeding and bruised from rubber bullets, eyes burning 
from pepper spray, anger-fear-frustration-despair resonating and pulsating through the 
bodies, and yet the ceremony endured.  The protestor becoming-water protector 
persisted.  The line of pure resistance transformed these painful lines of destruction into 
lines of determination—this is not to say that water protectors were not determined prior 
to the ceremony but that the line of pure resistance which emerged affirmed and 
strengthened the molecular line of determination.  Water protectors had to world54  at a 
moment’s notice to sustain the cold, violence, and fear and transform pain into positive 
affect.  The line of pure resistance was a worlding of water with protest and protest with 
54 I use the word “world” as a verb in accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s assertation that 
becoming-imperceptible is a “Becoming everybody/everything (tout le monde) is to world (faire 
monde), to make a world (faire un monde)” (ATP 280, emphasis added).  They further explain 
“becoming-everybody/everything, making the world a becoming, is to world, to make a world or 
worlds, in other words, to find one's proximities and zones of indiscernibility” (280).  Following 
Deleuze and Guattari, I use the term “worlding” to signal a creative, productive, and collective 
force that connects bodies (human and non-human), and in the process decenters the notion of an 
individual subjectivity. 
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water.  In this worlding a zone of resistance was actualized at Cantapeta Creek—a zone that 
slowed down the ceremony’s line of flight from hurling into violent or passive destruction. 
However, a line of pure resistance can have a violent characteristic.  In some 
contexts, violence is the only (life)line left to avoid being hurled toward death, 
dehumanization, or total destruction.  A violent line of resistance is a line of desperation.  
But it turns desperation into a weapon of sustainability against that which is attempting to 
destroy it.  Nonetheless, as Fanon argues, violence is not sustainable as a revolutionary 
force (The Wretched of the Earth 51-52).  What follows from a line of violence is 
doomed to spiral into life-denying negation.  Not unlike the drug user’s addiction that 
“locks the subject up in a black hole of inner fragmentation” (Braidotti “How to Endure 
Intensity” 194), violence forecloses thresholds to becoming.  It must be emphasized that 
regardless of its characteristic, a line of pure resistance is always affirmative because it 
engenders the potential to act in the face of total de-stratification (becoming- 
imperceptible) or re-segmentation (destruction).  A line of pure resistance wrests the 
body free from the hold of somatic suspension. 
A line of pure resistance sustains a becoming by widening molecular lines and, in 
doing so, creates a zone that temporarily stabilizes a becoming’s line of flight.  For 
example, the line of pure resistance at the ceremony widened the molecular lines of 
resilience, strength, perseverance, and determination, and this widening stabilized the 
becomings of prayer, community, and peaceful demonstration.  Furthermore, the line of 
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pure resistance at the creek was felt before it was actualized.  Water protector Angie 
Spencer shares in an interview with The Young Turks, the physical and psychological 
warfare against women-identified water protectors: “our true power comes through 
peaceful prayer and water ceremony…We have no choice but to [act] on a higher 
vibration” (“Female Water Protectors Brutalized”).  A vibration that was generated and 
sustained by the line of pure resistance.  A vibration that reverberated beyond Standing 
Rock.  Just a few days after the water ceremony, or what the media simply called “a 
clash between protestors and police,” international support for the movement increased 
and November 15th, 2016 was declared #NoDAPL National Day of Action.  The Day of 
Action resulted in two-hundred and fifty actions of solidarity across forty-two States in 
the U.S.; water protectors and allies participated in marches, sit-ins, rallies, social 
awareness campaigns on social media, performance art demonstrations, smoke, fire, and 
water ceremonies all of which serve to strengthen the molecular lines of the NoDAPL 
assemblage and engender new becomings within the movement. 
It should be noted that the line of pure resistance is different from Deleuze and 
Guattari's concept of the “refrain.” The refrain is the reintroduction of arborescent 
territory, the repetition of molar images and signs that enables an assemblage to hold 
itself together.  Although a line of pure resistance also holds an assemblage together it is 
not arborescent, it is a rhizomatic intensity.  It zigzags between molecular lines 
effectuating their expansion.  Recall Deleuze and Guattari's contention that molecular 
lines are ambiguous in that they could tip over to reterritorialization or stay 
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deterritorialized as a line of flight.  The line of pure resistance expands molecular lines 
making them a little less ambiguous, giving them more weight, to tip the scales in favour 
of (new) lines of flight.  A line of pure resistance is a becoming's resistance to 
stratification and resegementation in the face of abolition.  How the line of resistance will 
be actualized cannot be determined in advance.  No one can know how to stop a line of 
flight before it meets destruction.  Pure resistance happens in the moment.  It is a short 
intense line with a fleeting potential to act.  It occurs between a becoming and a black 
hole.  All of this may seem a bit abstract, but there are three political points to be made: 
1) the line of pure resistance is a sustainable line that enables bodies-in-becoming to
endure the threat of falling into a black hole or turning into a line of destruction; 2) the 
line of pure resistance worlds, which is to say that it is relational; 3) the line of pure 
resistance can be actualized as a zone of autonomy and escape. 
Deleuze and Guattari turn to the camouflage fish to exemplify becoming- 
imperceptible as noted above.  I turn now to the hagfish to explicate the line of pure 
resistance.  The hagfish secretes coils of slime when it is threatened.  The coils unfold, 
expand, and thread together as they combine with cold seawater, creating a strong slimy 
mass capable of clogging the gills of a nearby predator.  The porosity and density of the 
slime is determined by a heterogeneous network, made up of mucin, silk-like threads, and 
protein, whose size depend on how big the hagfish’s glands swell as it senses a predator 
in its environment (Lim et al. 702). The slime defence mechanism is so effective in 
warding off predators that the fish often continues feeding on its prey while under attack. 
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What does the sliming activity of the hagfish tell us about the line of pure resistance?  
Like the slime of a hagfish, the line of pure resistance is produced in combination with 
the affordances of its environment.  For example, just as the hagfish conjugates with the 
seawater to release slime and to slow down its line of flight from becoming a line of 
destruction—that is becoming-another fish’s prey—a protest assemblage conjugates with 
its environment to produce a line of pure resistance that slows down its becoming-violent 
or becoming-defeated.  Like the gill-clogging slime that releases from the fish enabling it 
to escape a predator, a line of pure resistance drags down the line of flight before it is 
swallowed by a black hole.  The line of pure resistance, like the fish’s slime, is a 
mechanism of escape that serves to sustain the assemblage’s affirmative becoming.  The 
slime is not a metaphor: it is the hagfish’s line of pure resistance. 
As the example of the hagfish illustrates, the line of pure resistance is secondary; it 
is produced out of circumstance—from the confrontation between a black hole and a 
becoming.  My hypothesis is that a line of pure resistance can be produced when the line 
of flight is turning toward a line of destruction.  This hypothesis breaks from Deleuze 
and Guattari’s claim that “There is no doubt that an assemblage never contains a causal 
infrastructure” (ATP 283).  They aver that the line of flight is formed in connection with 
“general causalities of another nature, but it is in no way explained by them” (283). 
While a line of pure resistance’s causal relationship cannot be determined in advance it is 
effectuated by (be)coming proximate to a black hole of death and destruction.  However, 
just as Foucault states of the relation between resistance and power, this does not mean 
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that the line of pure resistance “is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat” 
(Foucault HS 96).  It is a virtual, active, and affirmative line that does not connect to a 
plane of organization.55  Only when the line of pure resistance has been actualized, as 
with the NoDAPL Day of Action (or in the case of the Hagfish’s slime, as a bulletproof 
vest for the US Military56 ), that the line is reterritorialized and stratified into a molar 
plane of organization, signification, and segmentation. Most importantly, a line of pure 
resistance is not a resistance against a becoming nor is it a reterritorialization.  It is a 
virtual resistance57  to a becoming’s complete annihilation.  It resists a black hole by 
creating the potential for new zones of autonomy. 
3.5 Queer Imperceptibility and The Politics of Location 
In this section, I wish to bring the threads of the chapter together by queering a politics of 
imperceptibility.  Earlier, I discussed Grosz’s approach to imperceptibility and my 
departure from her theoretical trajectory.  Briefly, where Grosz proposes a politics of 
imperceptibility as a feminist theoretical model to consider the role of inhuman force in 
55 In the next chapter, I discuss the plane of organization at length and explore how a line of pure 
resistance—or more exactly how an assemblage that has a line of pure resistance—has the 
potential to “mutate” black holes and lines of destruction. 
56 The US Military is attempting to replicate the Hagfish’s slime to create ballistic armour for the 
Navy, which is a process that scientists call “biomimicry”—which we can conceive of as a black 
hole of the hagfish’s becoming. 
57 Although the hagfish’s slime is not virtual as such it nonetheless involves virtual and 
imperceptible forces insofar as it requires an indeterminate conjugation with the environment to 
materialize. 
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the subject’s constitution, I propose a politics that turns away from questions regarding 
subject-formation to consider instead the relation between things, both human and 
nonhuman, perceptible and imperceptible, and how they affect a body’s autonomy and 
political mobility.  This approach to politics seeks to bring into focus the interrelatedness 
of becoming and how it affirms a body’s potential to act in the world.  What interests me 
is not how the subject is constituted, but what relations enable one to decenter the subject 
in a political practice—that is, how does one become-imperceptible.  What capacities do 
different bodies have to act in the world, but also to become-of and as-the world?  In 
short, how does one world? 
Necessarily, these questions require conceiving of the subject as “embedded and 
embodied” (Braidotti 2011).  After all, how else would we be able to explore what a body 
can do?  Moreover, if, as Deleuze explains, the body is a composition of relations that are 
inseparable from affects and “what a body can do corresponds to the nature and limits of 
its capacity to be affected” (Expressionism in Philosophy 218), then finding out what a 
body can do requires first finding out its specific and situated relations and the affective 
capacities therein.  Which is another way of asking: what is the starting point of a 
becoming?  (Braidotti 2011); how does subjectivity materialize through affective 
assemblages?  (Puar 2012); what are the politics of location?  (Rich 1984); what are the 
patterns of interference and intensity that make a body?  (Massumi 2002); what are your 
lines, thresholds, and black holes?  (Deleuze and Parnet 1987); from what position do 
you speak?  (Crenshaw 1991).  That is, where are you situated?  A queer politics of 
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imperceptibility considers these questions of location together not to ask how the subject 
is formed but to ask: for whom is a politics of imperceptibility? 
Earlier, I outlined my three points of departure from Grosz’s essay.  To recap, 
they are: her distinction between subject/object, the abstraction of the socially situated 
body, and her either/or approach.  In this section, I would like to offer three different 
lines that queer a politics of imperceptibility.  They are: 1) detaching from 
subject/object; 2) a politics of location; and, 3) a movement of thought premised on and, 
and, and. These breaks from Grosz are not meant to be corrective or prescriptive, nor 
should they be thought of as oppositional, lest we fall into a black hole of either/or.  
Finally, although I have attempted to signal each below, all three of these breaks 
necessarily overlap. 
3.5.1 Detaching from the subject/object distinction 
A queer approach to imperceptibility does not presume that “we,” as feminists, come to a 
theory and political practice of imperceptibility from the same starting point.  The term 
queer indicates plurality, a multiplicity of locations, non-specificity and at the same time 
it holds a tangential relationship to sexuality and the sexual subject.58 Borrowing from 
Puar, queer can be understood as “an affective conglomeration that recognizes other 
58 I use the word tangential to draw attention to the ways in which “queer” has become a popular 
(and an academically fashionable) term to signify any sort of deviation from a norm.  “Queering” 
is commonly used to signify a reparative reading of a topic to include gay or lesbian identity, but 
often this is done without troubling the stability of those categories.  In contrast, I define “queer” 
as a relation between things—a movement— that zigzags between the virtual imperceptibility of 
sexuality (which I discussed in chapter one) and the actual event of sex and desire. 
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contingencies of belonging (melding, fusing, viscosity, bouncing) that might not fall so 
easily into … identity politics” (TA 211).  Queer is also a becoming; it is a continuous 
movement that does not get stuck on one meaning, identity, or subject position.  “Queer” 
changes from context to context.  Thus, to queer a theory of imperceptibility is not only a 
matter of questioning its framework or making it different, but to enter it into a 
becoming, to see what other potentials it can activate.  If we agree that “there is no 
entity, no identity, no queer subject or subject to queer” (211), then it follows that a 
queer politics of imperceptibility is highly suspect of a theory that revolves around a 
static and stable subject.  Although, Grosz asserts that the subject is always in motion 
and transformation because it is composed of imperceptible forces, she does not discuss 
the varying and complex relations that different subjects have with forces.  She implies 
that all subjects begin from the same starting point and thus have the same relation and 
access to thinking of themselves and others as imperceptible.59
A queer approach to imperceptibility acknowledges that while there is no such 
thing as a unitary subject, identity, or entity, one’s relation to imperceptibility, force, and 
59 For example, Grosz claims that “Instead of a politics of recognition, in which subjugated 
groups and minorities strive for a validated and affirmed place in public life, feminist and 
postcolonial politics should, I believe, now consider the affirmation of a politics of 
imperceptibility, leaving its traces and effects everywhere, but never being able to be identified 
with a person or an organization” (“A Politics of Imperceptibility” 471). Again, the problem I 
have with this line of reasoning is that there needs to be a politics of location if imperceptibility is 
to be practiced as a politics.  If a politics of imperceptibility can never be identified with a 
person or organization, how does it begin?  How do we locate and acknowledge it?  How do we 
foster the intensive potentials of becomings for political change? 
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inhuman action depends on the body’s material relations, social situations, and lived 
realities.  Thus, when Grosz asks, “Can we reconceive politics without identity…And if 
so, why do we still need the residual concept of recognition?” (“A Politics of 
Imperceptibility” 468), a queer politics of imperceptibility replies: “Who is we?” (Rich 
231).  Queering imperceptibility intervenes in the middle of the no-subject/static-subject 
binary by centering location without re-centering the subject.  This challenging task 
requires attuning to differences in kind.  That is, queer imperceptibility highlights the 
subject as a composite of different intensive patterns, starting points, thresholds, 
intersectional positions, and cyborg crossings, but does not hold the subject fixed to these 
points or understand them to be central to political transformation.  Thus, “we” can 
detach from “the subject,” as it is understood in its molar form without risking the erasure 
of embodied experiences and material relations.  In addition, centering a politics of 
location in a theory of imperceptibility holds us as feminist theorists accountable to the 
parameters we set around ideas related to ourselves and others by asking who benefits and 
who is excluded from a framework of knowledge and to what degree.  All this is to say 
that a queer approach to imperceptibility combines the subjectless process of becoming 
with an acknowledgement that becomings must start from somewhere (Braidotti 2011). 
3.5.2 A politics of location 
This queer approach to imperceptibility, that takes both location and becoming into 
account, is indebted to Braidotti’s nomadic feminist philosophy.  Braidotti crafts an 
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intricate and careful figuring of the subject as one who is embedded in both molar and 
molecular segmentations with the capacity to cross molar thresholds.  In her words: 
“Politically, nomadic thought is the expression of a nonunitary vision of the subject, 
defined by motion in a complex manner that is densely material.  It invites us to rethink 
the structures and boundaries of the self by tackling the deeper conceptual roots of issues 
of identity” (NT 3).  She insists that a nomadic subject is not a theory of individualism 
nor does it subscribe to identity politics; she explains the latter as an “ego-indexed habit 
of fixing and capitalizing one’s selfhood” (4).  Rather, the nomadic subject is a process 
of subjectivity that is multilayered, socially mediated, and emerges in relation with others 
(4).  Which is to say that the nomadic subject is both socially situated and transitory and 
circulates within and without the Majority (49). 
Braidotti draws on Adrienne Rich’s theory of a politics of location to argue that the 
body-in-becoming must start from somewhere specific, and thus a theory of becoming 
must account for the body’s “grounded and accountable location” while at the same time 
acknowledging that “the process of becoming is a time bomb placed at the very heart of 
the social and symbolic system that has welded together … subjectivity” (NT 31). 
A politics of location is a tool that enables us to map the coordinates and locate the 
ticking time bomb of intensive social energy that is waiting to explode into a multiplicity 
of becomings.  Nomadic feminism uses these coordinates to navigate and chart different 
social locations in order to understand different flows of becoming.  However, as 
Braidotti makes clear, mapping the nomadic subject is not an easy endeavour.
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Not only is the subject non-unitary by nature, it is continuously being split and 
modulated by advanced capitalism, surveillance, and systems of control.  As Braidotti 
explains, advanced capitalism places the subject in contradictory positions, forcing one 
to inhabit several irreconcilable positions at once, whether that is to “get ahead in the 
game” or just to sustain a life.  Thus, nomadic theory acknowledges the inherent 
contradictions of the subject and of our thinking about the subject. 
Likewise, queer imperceptibility is not opposed to contradiction.  It is necessarily a 
framework with shortcomings because it not a totalizing theory.  In accordance with 
Deleuze and Parnet, “There is no general prescription.  We have done with all globalizing 
concepts…What is interesting about [molecular] concepts… is that they only have value 
in their variables, and in the maximum of variables which they allow.  We are not for 
concepts as big as hollow teeth, THE law, THE master, THE rebel” (144).  A queer 
politics of imperceptibility is a conceptual model that has theoretical blind spots but 
welcomes these blind spots as its virtual potentialities—as potential lines of pure 
resistance that support new ways of thinking.  In developing this model, I have attempted 
to imagine the political potentials of activism in ways that are useful and creative rather 
than exhaustive or punctilious.  The latter exercise would limit the project’s lines of 
flight.  Previously I departed from Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual apparatus not as a 
critique but to investigate further how becoming-imperceptible happens and does not 
happen in the NoDAPL movement.  I suggested that there is a line of pure resistance that 
carves out an intermediary zone between a line of flight and its connection to a line of 
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becoming-imperceptible.  Thus, another line of resistance that can be figured is a politics
of location as a line that sustains the politics of imperceptibility. 
3.5.3 And, and, and 
Accordingly, the second way in which I queer imperceptibility is to acknowledge the 
productive tension between feminist epistemic frames of recognition and a philosophy of 
the imperceptible.  Puar grapples with a similar tension.  She considers the relationship 
between intersectional feminism and assemblage theory.  Kimberlé Crenshaw’s theory of 
intersectionality maintains that subjects occupy multiple identity categories, but 
oppression needs to be considered at the site of their intersection.  Puar contends that 
feminist theories of subjectivity are bifurcated along two lines: the first is 
intersectionality, which takes the subject as its primary object of analysis, and the second 
is assemblage theory that decenters the subject by emphasizing its tenuous movement 
and changing configuration.  Contrasting Crenshaw’s framework of intersectionality 
with feminist posthuman perspectives that align with a Deleuzian philosophy, she argues 
that feminist theory should not choose one over the other given that both conceive of 
identity not as an essence but an event.  Drawing on Crenshaw’s analogy of 
intersectionality as a crash at a four way stop, she concludes that: “Identity is an 
encounter, an event, an accident, in fact.  Identities are multi-causal, multidirectional, 
liminal; traces aren’t always self-evident” (“I would rather be a cyborg” 59).  Hence, 
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Puar finds value in both approaches to the subject and argues for a new “roadmap” that 
enables feminism to chart the intertwining and intermingling ways in which 
intersectionality and assemblage theory overlap.  For Puar, this means combining a 
theory of signification with a theory interested in the subject’s materialization (57). 
In a different but related vein, Braidotti argues that minor subjects may “first need 
to go through a phase of ‘identity politics’—of claiming a fixed location” before entering 
into a becoming; every becoming requires a starting point (NT 42).  Highlighting this 
certitude, Braidotti’s nomadic feminism seeks to locate the differences in starting 
positions to “mark different qualitative levels of relation” (42).  Thus, nomadic 
philosophy understands that no two becomings (-woman, -water protector, etc.) are the 
same; they vary greatly depending on the place from which one starts (42).  Therefore, a 
politics of location is crucial for nomadic feminism.  It enables us to consider the 
complicated and complex differences between subjects.  To be clear, these acts of 
identification, for both Braidotti’s nomadic feminism and for a queer politics of 
imperceptibility, are not investments in essentialized notions of identity, but tools and 
weapons that help stage the non-unitary subject in the political arena. 
Taking pause, I want to quickly trouble the tendency in feminist scholarship to 
place Grosz’s essay on imperceptibility alongside Braidotti’s 2006 essay, “The Ethics of 
Becoming-Imperceptible.” Problematically, the two essays are lumped together as an 
example of a singular feminist theory of imperceptibility.  Yet, Grosz and Braidotti’s 
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perspectives are quite different.  As I have argued, a universal subject, albeit one that is 
composed of movement and forces, appears in Grosz’s essay.  On the other hand, 
Braidotti explicitly places an emphasis on the varying relations between subjects and 
their environments and how those differences impact the sustainability (and possibility) 
of becoming-imperceptible, which is evidenced in her claim that: “[t]o find out about 
thresholds, we must experiment, which means always, necessarily, relationally or in 
encounters with others ” and “ What bodies are capable of doing or not, is biologically, 
physically, psychically, historically, sexually and emotionally specific, that is partial” 
(137, 140, emphasis added). A politics of location, thus, answers “the subject-in- 
becoming’s “all-important question… ‘What’s the point?’” (149, emphasis original). 
Indeed, a queer politics of imperceptibility also aims to answer this question by handling 
a theory of becoming-imperceptible with care.  Like Braidotti’s nomadic philosophy of 
the subject and her ethics of imperceptibility, I also seek to create a project of 
accountability to those subjects often missing or lost in the fold of philosophy and 
critical theory. 
Without the resistant line of a politics of location a theory of imperceptibility risks 
becoming a line of destruction; that is, falling into the black hole of universalisms, 
generalizations, or even esoterica.  As Deleuze and Guattari so rightly point out: 
Every undertaking of destratification… [for example, creating a new concept] must 
therefore observe concrete rules of extreme caution: a too-sudden destratification 
may be suicidal, or turn cancerous.  In other words, it will sometimes end in chaos, 
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the void and destruction, and sometimes lock us back into the strata, which become 
more rigid still, losing their degrees of diversity, differentiation, and mobility.  
(ATP 503) 
What I am suggesting is that a politics of location is the line of caution that asks: What is 
at stake when a theory of imperceptibility asks minor subjects to become unrecognizable 
and work toward a future that does not envision them?  This question gets to the heart of 
the ethical and philosophical dilemma of my project: how can one become-imperceptible 
if they were never perceptible to begin with?  This predicament is particularly poignant 
for Indigenous peoples and water protectors whose dehumanization, displacement, and 
dispossession remains largely invisible and unrecognized by majority culture.  As 
Braidotti emphasizes, a subject cannot give up what they never had nor, can they dispose 
of what they never controlled to begin with (NT 42).  Thus, reclaiming and rebuilding 
Indigenous identity that has been erased, appropriated and violently caricaturized through 
colonial structures is a critical component for many Indigenous movements, as I will 
illustrate in the next section.  Celebrating an Indigenous identity by becoming more 
perceptible and visible is for many, a necessary practice of healing and medicine needed 
to sustain a life.  A politics that brashly turns its back on identity and recognition without 
considering these complexities is, it would seem to me, another form of rigid 
segmentation.  Thus, I argue that a nomadic flirtation with identity is a necessary line of 
pure resistance in some circumstances.  It is an act of endurance, a period of rest and 
stasis before one can follow a line of flight.  In this way, identity need not be held in 
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opposition to imperceptibility so long as identity is conceived of as a contingent process, 
a temporary line of resistance, a rest-stop on the highway of becoming.  In this 
configuration, identity is a tenuous self-styling (Braidotti NS 65).  Queer imperceptibility 
embraces the political potentials of moving between the contradictory coordinates of 
identity and imperceptibility. 
The subject of queer imperceptibility that will appear in the remainder of this 
project, is a combination of Braidotti’s nomadic subject and Foucault’s notion of 
“subjectivication.”  Explicated by Deleuze, Foucault’s notion of subjectivation is “a 
mode of existence [that] cannot be confused with a subject, unless it is to dismiss the 
latter from all interiority and even from all identity…It is an intensive mode and not a 
personal subject” (Deleuze qtd in Kaufman 235).60  My use of “location,” “identity,” and 
“subjectivity” reference the activation of the body’s styles and intensities that are 
produced in affective relations. In this way, the subject henceforth is “like a change of 
atmosphere, a kind of event, an electric or magnetic field… an ensemble of intensities” 
(Deleuze qtd in Kaufman 236).61   Identity and recognition politics, as I encounter them 
60 In the next chapter, I discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “subjectification,” which, 
different from “subjectivication” is a as molar process of subjection that works against 
becomings.  In Andrew Murphie’s articulation subjectification “implies a thoroughly stratified 
or captured position.  One’s subjectivity is aligned with the Major—one’s flows [are] contained 
within its antiproductive manoeuvring.  The second, subjectivication, implies subjective 
operations which, although operating within social machines, use the processes of these social 
machines to form lines of escape from them” (1315, emphasis added). 
61 This quote comes from Deleuze’s characterization of Foucault.  He states that Foucault is not 
so much a person as he is an ensemble of intensities (Kaufman 236). 
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here, can be figured as intensities within an assemblage rather than acts of obedience to 
molar signification.  This is the distinction I wish to make between the colonial project of 
recognition I critiqued earlier.  Namely, that we can conceive of recognition as a strategic 
and affective rendering of resistance, rather than as a structure of acknowledgment. 
What does all this mean for our study of contemporary sexual surveillance? 
Foucault contends that discipline works on individuals within a field of visuality through 
mechanisms of identification and Deleuze argues that control creates dividuals within 
relations of modulation through a process of territorialization.  However, recall that 
Deleuze makes it clear that control societies have not replaced disciplinary ones.  In this 
regard, queer imperceptibility is a tool flexible enough to be used on both registers: 
discipline and control; in-visibility and modulation; recognition and imperceptibility; 
molar and minor.  As I illustrated previously, it is possible to consider becomings as they 
are specifically located.  Within a framework of queer imperceptibility, we can examine 
TigerSwan’s sexual surveillance within the NoDAPL movement, water-protector 
becomings, lines of flight, and affective zones of pure resistance.  For example, Two- 
Spirit Nation at Standing Rock created a zone of resistance in the face of the black hole 
of heteropatriarchal settler colonialism (Fig 2.1).62  Two-Spirit Nation made a zone based 
62 The term “Two-Spirit” is multivalent.  It was created in the 1990s to challenge the pejorative 
anthropological term Berdashe that was used by settlers to describe queer-Native sexuality.  The 
term Two-Spirit also seeks to challenge internalized heterosexist and homophobic views within 
Indigenous communities by emphasizing the importance of spiritual and tribal roles related to 
gender differences (Driskill 72-3). 
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on affinity over identity that focused on acts rather than recognition.  That is, although 
increased queer visibility in the NoDAPL movement, and in Indigenous culture more 
broadly, was an important goal for Two-Spirit Nation, their primary action was to 
become a leading force in the movement by providing spiritual guidance, healthcare, and 
safe space.  Two-Spirit Nation also had a strong presence on the frontlines.  Two-Spirit 
Nation thus laboured to sustain the movement’s lines of flight by building a zone of 
proximity and resistance for queer-Native water protectors and allies.  Two-Spirit Nation 
is a line of pure resistance insofar as it generates an affective force that sustains political 
momentum.  As Two-Spirit Nation demonstrates, recognition politics, including the 
fight for land recognition within the NoDAPL movement, does not have to be subtracted 
from a theory of imperceptibility.  Instead, a politics of recognition may operate in 
relation to the movement’s becomings and water protector-becomings. 
Fig. 4: Two-Spirit Nation at Oceti Sakowin Camp, Standing Rock.  Photo courtesy of Avery Leigh 
White, 2016 
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3.6 The Body-in-Becoming 
A politics of imperceptibility cannot be consciously activated.  There are imperceptible 
becomings already underway within political movements.  The point of a politics based 
on imperceptibility is not to refute the critical role of recognition and identity, as they 
manifest in subjects’ lives, but to broaden their molecular cracks.  It is a voyage through 
the middle of a politics of location and a politics of imperceptibility that follows Deleuze 
and Guattari assertion that we must start from somewhere: 
Starting from the forms one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the 
functions one fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between which one 
establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest 
to what one is becoming, and through which one becomes…This principle of 
proximity or approximation is entirely particular and reintroduces no apology 
whatsoever. It indicates as rigorously as possible a zone of proximity…Becoming 
is to emit particles that take on certain relations of movement and rest because 
they enter a particular zone of proximity. (ATP 272-3) 
Queer imperceptibility is a sort of long-distance vision that values not yet seen relations 
and affects rather than magnifying near-sighted dichotomies and negations.  Said another 
way, it is neither an overcoded politics nor complete destratification.  A queer politics of 
imperceptibility is the flow between a politics of location and becoming-imperceptible.  It 
is not about building a framework to think of the subject in terms of force, but rather 
activating imperceptible zones we already cross through.  If recognition is folded into a 
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politics of queer imperceptibility it is only done so to recognize “the constructive roles 
played by complex affective encounters” and how they “set limits to the kinds of 
transformation a body can be made to endure during the course of its encounters” 
(Bignall “Dismantling the Face” 408).  Ultimately, the model of imperceptibility takes 
the “subject” as a multiplicity of flows, intensities, and affects that has different lines, 
thresholds, and relations. 
A queer politics of imperceptibility locates resistance in the body-in-becoming.  
The political subject is a field of affective intensities that conjugate to form a loosely 
definable but temporarily locatable subject (Braidotti “The Ethics” 136).  Another way of 
formulating a “subjectless subjectivity,” as Paul Bains puts it, is as an autopoietic self, 
which is an autonomous self-producing entity.  The notion of the subject as an 
autopoietic event signals the capacity for subjects to affirm themselves in relation to other 
self-affirming entities in the world.   It should be immediately understood that this view 
of subjectivity runs counter to Hegelian dialectics in which the subject is formed through 
the acknowledgement of the other.  What needs to be made clear is that “affirming 
oneself,” in this context, is not a conscious process nor is it one of individuation.  It is an 
imperceptible-becoming.  The body always begins in the thick of things.  The body- 
becoming is the line of pure resistance that effectuates an autonomous zone.  As Massumi 
tells us: “The body-in-becoming does not simply react to a set of constraints.  Instead, it 
develops a new sensitivity to them, one subtle enough to convert them into opportunities—
and to translate the body into an autonomous zone effectively enveloping degrees of 
freedom” (UG 102, emphasis added). 
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In the next chapter, I introduce the concept of the queer autonomous zone.  This 
zone is a zone of affective relations that diagrams new potentials for resistance that 
“envelop degrees of freedom” within the sexual surveillance assemblage.  To diagram 
these potentials, I expand on the concepts I have introduced thus far and delve deeper into 
the underlying forces that govern sexual surveillance.  I locate the face as a primary site 
of subjection that advances the practices, techniques, and technologies of sexual 
surveillance that I have been discussing thus far.  As we shall see, this face is not one that 
is physical but one that is produced by an abstract machine.  In locating the face as a 
primary force of somatic control, I once again link surveillance and recognition as twin 
forces that suspend the body’s movement either physically or affectively from crossing a 
threshold toward becoming-imperceptible.  In other words, I claim that the face operates 
as a line of destruction to restrict the body-in-becoming from forging affective relations.  
In many ways, the following chapter “zooms out” to look at the machinic operations of 
control in the production of surveillance to “zoom in” on the abstract and yet specific 
ways that sites of resistance cultivate to “dismantle the face.” 
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4 
Dismantling the Face: Diagramming a Queer Politics of 
Imperceptibility 
Thus far I have argued that during moments of somatic suspension—when the body is 
caught between flows of escape and the grid of identification, between a becoming and a 
black hole—a line of pure resistance emerges to sustain a body’s becoming.  The line of 
pure resistance is a virtual event that resists a becoming’s complete annihilation.  It 
emerges when a line of flight risks turning into a line of destruction.  The line of pure 
resistance affirms and amplifies the body-in-becoming,63  and in doing so generates zones 
of autonomy that resist the black hole of sexual surveillance.  I now want to explore these 
“zones of autonomy” and investigate the ways in which they contribute to a queer politics 
of imperceptibility.  To this end, I identify two different types of zones created by the line 
of pure resistance; one is actual and the other is virtual.64   The actual zone is locatable in 
space and time in which activisms take place, whereas the virtual zone is composed of 
63 I define the body-in-becoming as a field of intensities that is constantly in motion and that 
resists the imposition of a static unitary subject. 
64 The virtual and actual are not mutually exclusive; the division I invoke between them should be 
understood as superficial.  As Deleuze and Claire Parnet explain, the virtual and actual operate as 
a circuit, constantly feeding back into one another to produce the real (148).  Nonetheless, I make 
the distinction here to locate the differences between the two types of zones I map: actual zones 
of autonomy and the virtual queer autonomous zone.  For clarity sake, I will refer to the actual 
zone of autonomy as a “concrete assemblage of resistance.” To provide a brief example, I 
consider the Two-Spirit Camp discussed in the previous chapter as an actual zone of autonomy— 
or a “concrete assemblage of resistance” given that it is an actual tangible event located in a time 
and space. 
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intensities and relations of affect.  The latter does not occupy a physical space, rather it 
is a plane of potentials from which new activisms are actualized.  I call this virtual zone 
the “queer autonomous zone.” 
The queer autonomous zone is an abstract machine.65  It functions to zone and 
rezone the sexual surveillance assemblage to generate new potentials of resistance.  As 
we began to see in chapter two, the “abstract machine” is a diagram that maps relations 
of force within a given assemblage (Deleuze F 27).  For example, we saw that in 
disciplinary spaces such as the prison, panopticism diagrams the relation between 
elements and mechanisms, such as the relation between light and architectural design, to 
produce relations of power that actualize within the prison as spatial arrangements of 
surveillance and control.  The prison is an assemblage comprised of heterogenous 
elements and panopticism is the abstract machine that establishes the relations between 
those elements.  Likewise, I present the queer autonomous zone as an abstract machine 
that organizes forces within an assemblage, but it does so not to produce mechanisms of 
control but relations of resistance.  I understand these “forces” not as exterior elements 
65 It should be noted that I make a slight departure from Deleuze and Guattari who characterize 
the abstract machine not as virtual but as an “actual yet not effectuated” (ATP 511).  For them, 
abstract machines are “nonconcrete actuals” rather than virtual intensities because they are 
effectuated from relations that already exist within an assemblage.  As we shall see, abstract 
machines are encased in the strata of the assemblage that they diagram; for example, I will argue 
that the queer autonomous zone is encased within the assemblage or assemblages of resistance 
(144).  However, in my view, an abstract machine diagrams both perceptible and imperceptible 
(or virtual) forces.  An abstract machine composes relations within an assemblage and at the 
same time, I suggest that it produces lines of flight that go beyond the assemblage.  For this 
reason, I characterize the abstract machine as a virtual. 
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that act on or constitute subjects but as the affective relations between subjects, 
bodies, events, and environments. 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari define two types of abstract 
machines, those that overcode and those that mutate.  Overcoding machines diagram 
control and mutating machines diagram resistance (511).  Although they perform 
different functions, both machines operate simultaneously as two dimensions of the same 
machinic assemblage: the mutating machine transforms flows of power by opening the 
assemblage up to new becomings and the overcoding machine blocks lines of flight by 
closing the assemblage down (145, 223).  Despite their shared presence within a single 
assemblage, one machine may take precedence over the other giving the assemblage 
either its supple or rigid form, molecular or molar intensity, positive or negative function.  
For example, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the concrete assemblage of the State 
apparatus is governed by an overcoding machine that they call “faciality” (175).  They 
argue that faciality governs and organizes relations of control through the production of 
the face. 
As we shall see, the face is not a given nor is it a neutral extension of the body, but 
a social construction that locates the subject within a social and political hierarchy. 
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The face overcodes the body with identity to block its lines of flight.66  Although not 
explicitly named as such, throughout this project I have already discussed several 
instances produced by the faciality machine including the colonial heteropatriarchal 
violence at Standing Rock, somatic suspension at the airport, flows of digital modulation 
within the control society, the development of biometric surveillance based on 
prototypical whiteness, as well as disciplinary modes of surveillance such as the spatial 
arrangements of in-visibility—all of which necessitate the production of a recognizable 
and controllable face. At its core, faciality can be defined as an overcoded politics of 
recognition based on subject/object.  If the face diagrams relations of control within the 
State apparatus, then Deleuze and Guattari insist that resistance to the State requires 
“dismantling the face.” 
This chapter posits the queer autonomous zone as a mutating abstract machine 
capable of dismantling the face.  I suggest that when it comes to theorizing sexual 
surveillance, an investigation of the politics of the face both complicates and strengthens 
our understanding of resistance by allowing us to discern more completely the political 
stakes of thinking-feeling-doing resistance beyond a politics of recognition—which is to 
66 Deleuze and Guattari make a clear distinction between the head and face.  They explain that 
the head is part of the body whereas the face overcodes the body within an identity.  The face is 
interpreted or “read” for an expression.  For this reason, they assert that the faciality machine 
deterritorializes the head onto a face (ATP 175).  Succinctly, Deleuze and Guattari write: “The 
head, even the human head, is not necessarily a face.  The face is produced only when the head 
ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a 
multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code—when the body, head included, has been decoded 
and has to be overcoded by something we shall call the Face” (170, emphasis original). 
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say, beyond a politics of the face.  In short, what is at stake for a queer politics of 
imperceptibility is not surveillance of the face but rather “surveillance by the face” 
(Deleuze and Guattari ATP 115, emphasis added).  I begin the chapter by outlining 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality further in order to examine the ways in which 
the face diagrams oppressive regimes of capture and control.  I argue that the face 
overcodes the dynamic fluxes and forces of sexuality with identity in ways that thwart the 
material relations of becoming.  Next, I discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s call to dismantle 
the face.  I contend that dismantling the face involves the politics of location, which I 
locate as a necessary ethical intervention in the process of “defacialization.” In the 
following section, I consider Simone Bignall’s essay “Dismantling the Face: Pluralism 
and the Politics of Recognition,” to explore the tensions and potential passageways 
between postcolonial recognition politics and a politics of imperceptibility when it comes 
to dismantling the face.  I will show that postcolonial practices of recognition and 
approaches to cultural identification are equally capable of disrupting the politics of the 
face.  However, I caution against using the language of recognition to elucidate these 
transformative potentials.  Attempting to build a more fluid vocabulary, one that is 
congruent with a queer politics of imperceptibility, I introduce the queer autonomous 
zone as a “wave of sensory vibrations” and “weave of affective textures.” More of a 
creative exploration than a definitive proposition, I suggest that the queer autonomous 
zone cultivates a structure of feeling that cuts across the strata of sexual surveillance to 
diagram potentials for new collective becomings.  My goal in this chapter is to ascertain 
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faciality as the underlying system of sexual surveillance and advance the queer 
autonomous zone as a diagrammatic force capable of producing the activist tools 
necessary to engage with and intensify a queer politics of imperceptibility. 
4.1 Faciality 
A horror story, the face is a horror story. 
-Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “faciality” is commonly read as a critique of 
Emmanuel Levinas’ ethical face-to-face relation.67  Whereas Levinas understands the face 
as the fulcrum for ethics, Deleuze and Guattari argue that “the face is a politics” (ATP 
181).  For both, the face is not merely a body part that refers to an individual visage but a 
force with a function.  Levinas claims that the face constitutes an ethical encounter with 
the Other, while Deleuze and Guattari delineate the face as an “ordering device” that 
subtends identity formation.  Unlike Levinas who claims that the face-to-face encounter 
precedes and conditions the possibility for discourse,68   Deleuze and Guattari maintain 
67 See Mary Bunch’s essay, “Posthuman Ethics and the Becoming-Animal of Emmanuel 
Levinas.” 
68 For Levinas the face is a “living presence” beyond representability (Totality 50-51).  He writes 
that the face is a precognitive articulation of “extreme exposure, defencelessness, vulnerability 
itself … the face before me summons me, calls me, begs for me, as if the invisible death that must 
be faced by the Other, pure otherness, separated in some way, from any whole, were my 
business” (“Ethics” 83).  The face of the Other is encountered prior to any signification and 
cannot be reduced to countenance (97).  The “exposed face” of the Other refers to the face’s 
“nakedness” or “nudity” that demands us to recognize the embodied mortal vulnerability of not 
just the Other but also of humanity.  Crucially, as Judith Butler clarifies, this demand, for 
Levinas, is pre-discursive (Precarious Life 138). 
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that the face is effectuated by a “regime of signs” which in turn organize social and 
political relations.  In the first case, the face is the face of humanity that demands an 
ethical response to the Other.69  In the second case, the face is “naturally inhuman, a 
monstrous hood” produced by the abstract machine of faciality (190).  Faciality is a 
concept that considers the centrality of the face in the organization of power. 
The abstract machine of faciality is machinic because it is not random.  As Deleuze 
and Guattari state, “continuities, emissions, and combinations, and conjunctions do not 
occur in just any fashion” (ATP 71).  This is because faciality is enveloped by the 
concrete assemblage of the State, which carries out functions of its own.  As we will see, 
faciality mixes the State’s strata to create new stratifications.  Strata are the “layers” and 
“belts” of meaning that imprison intensities into a system of representation and 
redundancy (40).  Faciality is an abstract machine encased within the State apparatus and 
the State apparatus is an assemblage that functions to produce a social hierarchy of faces. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the face is produced through a mixture of signifiers 
and subjectifications.  For example, the celebrity face, the teacher’s face, the despotic 
face, the authoritative face, the face of your neighbour are symbols of fame, of 
69 According to Levinas, the face compels us to recognize the other as exterior rather than a 
reflection of the self.  In Butler’s reading this disjuncture between the Other’s face—its 
unknowability—and our recognition of its exteriority is the site of the ethical encounter 
(Precarious Life 144-7). 
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inspiration, of power, of salvation, of betrayal, of compassion.  Still, beyond the wall of 
signifiers we search for deeper meaning, looking for the dark hidden regions of the face, 
gazing into the empty holes of its eyes.  It is there, in the empty hole, that our own 
subjectivity begins to form—or rather, it is there that we “get snapped up by black holes” 
(ATP 183).  Deleuze and Guattari identify this mixture between signifiers and conscious 
and unconscious identification as the “white wall/black hole” machine: white walls of 
signifiers and black holes of subjectivity.  As I will discuss below, signs and subjection 
to the sign work together as two cogs in a wheel to constitute the face as identity. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the white wall/black hole machine that 
produces the face operates at the nexus of two sign regimes: the “signifying regime” and 
“postsignifying regime.” A “sign regime” is a semiotic system that formalizes unformed 
content and expression as an ordered system of meaning (ATP 148).  Deleuze and 
Guattari explain that although sign regimes are concerned with linguistic forms of 
expression within an assemblage, they are not based on language; rather, the opposite is 
true: language is based on the pre-linguistic expressions (of matter) within an assemblage 
(148).  To understand how the face is socially produced as well as its role in the 
organization of power, including within systems of surveillance and recognition, it is 
important to examine how each sign regime operates.  In what follows, I outline the 
“signifying regime” and “postsignifying regime” separately before discussing their 
interpenetration, which Deleuze and Guattari argue engenders the face. 
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What establishes one sign regime from another is the way in which it orders signs 
and performs deterritorializations (ATP 112).  In the case of the signifying regime, signs 
are hierarchically organized around a despotic centre, such as the despotic centre of a 
King (115).  Deleuze and Guattari define this as a circular regime in which “every sign 
refers to another sign, and only to another sign, ad infinitum” (112).  The sign never 
refers to a signified entity; there are only chains of signifiers that proliferate outward 
spiralling an infinite network of signs.  For example, when the despotic King speaks, 
only those in his inner circle are privy to his word.  Those on the outer circles—the 
knights, servants, and peasants—only hear interpretations of what was said.  Spiralling 
outward, the King’s word becomes less clear as it is interpreted on each outer ring of the 
circular regime (Adkins 85).  Despite the movement of the sign (the King’s word), its 
meaning always relays back to the same despotic centre.  Deleuze and Guattari name this 
circular aspect of the signifying regime “signifiance.” They contend that the perpetual 
referral of one sign to another sign triggers relative deterritorializations.  The sign—the 
King’s word—is deterritorialized from one ring and reterritorialized on another.  The 
periphery of the circular regime is ever-expanding, with new rings of meaning and new 
interpretations constantly being added, but they always refer back to the despotic centre 
of power (114).  For example, (Male)—female—trans—non-binary—gender fluid—and 
so forth are linked together in a hierarchy of privilege that mushrooms from Molar 
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Man.70  Although the chain continues to grow, each sign signifies its distance from the 
centre.  This biunivocal relation,71 where one sign as defined as a derivative of the other 
produces a chain of signifiers, which form an infinite network of signs, such that the sign 
never refers to a signified (body) but only to Molar Man (112). 
Anything that attempts to escape the concentric radiation of the despotic centre is 
vilified (Adkins 86).  Deleuze and Guattari explain this aspect of the regime as a 
“scapegoat.” The scapegoat represents “the inverted figure of the king”—the tortured 
slave whose becomings-molecular and lines of flight escape the despotic centre (ATP 
116).  The tortured slave does not identify with the King nor does he absorb the King’s 
power.  Deleuze and Guattari explain that the molecular-becomings of the tortured 
slave/scapegoat unleash absolute deterritorializations “that the signifying regime cannot 
tolerate…the regime must block a line of this kind or define it in an entirely negative 
fashion precisely because it exceeds the degree of deterritorialization of the signifying 
sign, however high it may be” (116).  In other words, the scapegoat’s line of flight breaks 
through the chain of signifiance, posing a threat to the entire regime.  In turn, the 
70 The order of signs may change depending on the circumstance, however the centre of 
signifiance, (Male) in this example remains dominant.  Another way of expressing this 
relationship is as follows: (Male-white-cisgender-able-bodied-heterosexual-middle class-English 
speaking-property owner)—all other identities. 
71 “Biunivocal” is a mathematical term that designates “a type of relation that exclusively links 
two terms to one another, and where one of the two dominates depending upon the circumstances, 
point of origin or purpose in establishing the polar relation” (Welsh 10n5).  Biunivocity defines a 
relation in which terms or statements share the same meaning that privileges the dominant term or 
statement. 
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despotic King demonizes the scapegoat and its becomings, assigning a negative value to 
its line of flight (116).  The scapegoat is cast out of the regime through expulsion and the 
line of flight is “cursed” (116). 
In the postsignifying regime, however, the expelled line of flight gains s positive 
value.  Deleuze and Guattari clarify: 
What happens in the second regime, by comparison with the signifying regime as 
we have already defined it?  In the first place, a sign or packet of signs detaches 
from the irradiating circular network and sets to work on its own account, starts 
running a straight line, as though swept into a narrow, open passage.  Already the 
signifying system drew a line of flight or deterritorialization exceeding the 
specific index of its deterritorialized signs, but the system gave that line a 
negative value and sent the scapegoat fleeing down it.  Here, it seems that the 
line received a positive sign as though it were effectively occupied and followed 
by a people who find it in their reason for being or destiny. (ATP 121, emphasis 
original) 
To provide a concrete example, Deleuze and Guattari relate the postsignifying regime to 
the exodus of the Jews from Egypt.  Slaves escape the despotic signifying regime of the 
Pharaoh by drawing a line of flight into the desert.  The line of flight is given positive 
value not only because it facilitates an escape from the despotic King but also because a 
people is constituted on it (121).  I will return to this point in the following paragraph. 
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First, it is important to note a second characteristic of the postsignifying regime, which is 
that it marks a turning away from despotic power.  As such, Deleuze and Guattari 
characterize this regime as a “double turning away,” which they define as a moment of 
“betrayal” (123).  Whereas the signifying regime is one of endless paranoia and deception—
the people are deceived by endless interpretation of the King’s word, and the King is 
paranoid of molecular-becomings that break his chain of command, the postsignifying 
regime is characterized by passion and betrayal (125). 
In the postsignifying regime, betrayal becomes a “point of subjectification.” 
Whereas the signifying regime is concerned with circular uniformity, the postsignifying 
regime is defined as a linear proceeding (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 129).  Returning to 
the above example of the Jews’ exodus from Egypt, the first point of subjectification on 
this proceeding is the exodus itself.  When the Jews exit the desert and their wanderings 
in the wilderness come to an end,72  a new proceeding begins, segmenting their line of 
flight.  Deleuze and Guattari explain that each proceeding carries out one after another, 
creating multiple points of segmentation, which become multiple points of 
subjectification (129).  The subject is constituted by, or rather subjected to, the 
culmination of these various points.  To illustrate, Deleuze and Guattari write: “The 
history of the Jews is punctuated by catastrophes after each of which there were just 
72 The Jews’ “wanderings” in the desert are defined by Deleuze and Guattari as an entry into the 
nomadic “counter-signifying regime.” All sign regimes mix however; therefore, the counter- 
signifying regime also includes elements of the signifying and postsignifying regime to varying 
degrees (ATP 122). 
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enough survivors to start a new proceeding.  In the course of a proceeding, while there is 
linear movement the plural is often used, whereas there is a return to the Singular as soon 
as there is a pause or stoppage marking the end of one movement before another begins” 
(128).  These moments of pause or stoppage are the points of subjectification.  The 
Jewish subject as such is defined by tracing the linear proceedings that make up its 
broken line—i.e. the exodus from Egypt, exile from Rome, expulsion from Spain, the 
Holocaust in Eastern Europe, fleeing Iran.  The stop and start between each line are the 
points in which singular subjectivities are constituted. 
Although Deleuze and Guattari associate the two sign regimes with specific 
historical events to illustrate how each function, they assert that sign regimes are not 
linear and should not be considered as successive evolutionary moments (ATP 171).  
Indeed, signifiance and subjectification clearly operate in similar fashion today.  For 
example, as we saw in the previous chapter, water protector-becomings unleash lines of 
flight that escape State surveillance.  Quoting Deleuze and Guattari once again, these are 
absolute deterritorializations “that the signifying regime cannot tolerate…the regime 
must block a line of this kind or define it in an entirely negative fashion precisely because 
it exceeds the degree of deterritorialization of the signifying sign” (116). Water 
protector-becomings pose a threat to the colonial system of signifiance.  They unlink 
from the proper chain of its command by refusing to absorb the face of a “violent 
protestor” and “savage Indian.” The water protectors’ peaceful demonstration breaks the 
colonial chain of signifiers, creating an absolute deterritorialization of State power that 
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allows a line of flight to escape.  In response, the State demonizes water protectors as 
“jihadi terrorists” and characterizes the demonstration as hostile, assigning a negative 
value to their line of flight.  The water protectors’ efforts are met with scorn and their 
line of flight is “cursed.” 
However, as we saw above, the expelled line of flight gains a positive value.  The 
line facilitates an escape from colonial violence, allowing water protectors to turn their 
back on its repressive regime.  Rather than responding to militarized police violence 
with violence, the water protectors followed a different line in another direction, turning 
away from the State that had already turned its back on Indigenous peoples and land 
treaties.  After the water ceremony ended, a new proceeding began: a peaceful 
demonstration happened elsewhere (e.g. the #NoDAPL National Day of Action) 
establishing a new point of subjectification.  A water protector subjectivity73  is 
subjected to the culmination of these various points so that an understanding of the self 
as a water protector is punctuated by a series of events tethered to the colonial State. 
73 Here, I am referring to a process of identification, which should not be confused with “water 
protector-becomings” that I outlined in the previous chapter.  Becomings are non-linear 
movements away from identification.  Water protector becomings, for example, dismantle (a 
protestor) identity by establishing collective relations with other bodies (human and non-human) 
within the immediate environment.  Whereas understanding the self as a water protector is a 
process of identification with a series of events.  As such it is a process of faciality in which the 
self is tied to the dominant discourse on water security.  Which is not to say, however, the 
identification with water protection is negative, as I will discuss later in the chapter; collective 
and mobile identifications may act as an affirmation to the subject’s becoming. 
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Deleuze and Guattari contend that anything can become a point of subjectification 
if it has the following three traits: “the double turning away, betrayal, and existence under 
reprieve” (ATP 129).  For example, they aver that food becomes a point of 
subjectification for the anorexic: “For anorexics, food plays this role (anorexics do not 
confront death but save themselves by betraying food, which is equally a traitor since it is 
suspected of containing larvae, worms, and microbes)” (129).  Anorexics save 
themselves as anorexics by tracing a line of flight away from routine meals.  They betray 
food, for example, by expelling it or avoiding it to sustain their existence as an anorexic.  
The food on the other hand does not so much betray the anorexic, as the colonial State 
betrays Indigenous water protectors, but rather the anorexic suspects a betrayal in the 
food.  Food is given a face from which the anorexic turns away.  At the same time, the 
facialized food repels the anorexic, constituting the double turning away.  In this way, 
food is a point of subjectification in which an anorexic subjectivity takes shape.  To 
reiterate, the signifying regime of signifiance is concerned with circular uniformity and 
mapping degrees of sameness, whereas the postsignifying regime of subjectification is 
defined as a linear system that creates individuated points of subjectivity, for both 
individuals and groups. 
Deleuze and Guattari maintain that each point of subjectification determines in the 
subject (or group) a “mental reality,” or a mindset (e.g. one understands themselves as 
destined to protect water) (ATP 129).  However, because the linear proceeding of 
subjectification is tied to the State—with each event or point of subjectification produced 
by a betrayal, double turning away, and existence under reprieve—the mental reality that 
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forms is always already connected with the “dominant reality” of the State (e.g. one is 
only a water protector insofar as water needs protection from the State) (129). Thus, for 
Deleuze and Guattari the subject is always doubled; she is both the subject of enunciation 
(“me,” the speaking subject) and the subject of the statement (the “I”) who is “bound to 
statements in conformity with a dominant reality” even if she opposes it (129).  Through 
this doubling, the speaking subject is normalized by the power of the spoken statement. 
The State apparatus forces the subject to interpret her own feelings, sensations, thoughts, 
and actions so that “The subject of enunciation recoils into the subject of the statement, to 
the point that the subject of the statement resupplies subject of enunciation for another 
proceeding” (128).  In other words, the subject’s mental reality “recoils” into the 
dominant reality of the State and becomes indistinguishable.  Deleuze and Guattari warn 
that the mixture of the two semiotics, signifiance and subjectification—the first guided by 
interpretation and the second by passional identification—effect this dangerous 
normalization of power.  Poignantly, they write: 
There is always an appeal to a dominant reality that functions from within... 
There is no longer even a need for a transcendent center of power; power is 
instead immanent and melds with the “real,” operating through normalization.  
A strange invention: as if in one form the doubled subject were the cause of the 
statement of which, in its other form, it itself is a part.  This is the paradox of the 
legislator-subject replacing the signifying despot: the more you obey the 
statements of the dominant reality, the more in command you are as subject of 
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enunciation in mental reality, for in the end you are only obeying yourself!  You 
are the one in command, in your capacity as a rational being.  A new form of 
slavery is invented, namely, being slave to oneself, or to pure “reason,” the 
Cogito.  Is there anything more passional than pure reason?  Is there a 
colder, more extreme, more self-interested passion than the Cogito?  (130, 
emphasis original) 
Illustrating the enslavement to Cogito, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the 
relationship between the psychoanalyst and the analysand: 
The psychoanalyst presents him- or herself as an ideal point of subjectification that 
brings the patient to abandon old, so-called neurotic, points.  The patient is partially 
a subject of enunciation in all he or she says to the psychoanalyst, and under the 
artificial mental conditions of the session: the patient is therefore called the 
“analysand.” But in everything else the patient says or does, he or she is a subject  
of the statement, eternally psychoanalyzed, going from one linear proceeding to 
another, perhaps even changing analysts, growing increasingly submissive to the 
normalization of a dominant reality.  In this sense, psychoanalysis, with its mixed 
semiotic, fully participates in a line of subjectification.  The psychoanalyst does not 
even have to speak anymore, the analysand assumes the burden of interpretation; as 
for the psychoanalyzed patient, the more he or she thinks about “his” or “her” next 
session, or the preceding one, in segments, the better a subject he or she is. (ATP 
130)
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In its linear proceeding, with one session taking place after another, psychoanalysis, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue, normalizes for both the psychoanalyst and analysand the 
fusion of a mental reality with the dominant reality of the State (131).  Crispin Sartwell 
articulates this fusion as the moment “When the world and the self are collapsed into the 
order of the sign as a condition of possible experience, the political power that is 
exercised through the sign, and which inheres in the character of the sign, is 
simultaneously activated and concealed; it is activated by its concealment” (45).  In other 
words, the passional line of subjectification, such as an affective attachment to the events 
at Standing Rock, produce within the individual a sense of destiny and identity that 
conceals the normalization of power exercised on the body through the inscription of the 
sign: water protector becomings are replaced by a water protector face. This is precisely 
how the State thwarts material becomings: it forces us to interpret and represent our 
affective relations so that experiences and expressions in the world are reduced to 
symbols and metaphors.  Faciality lodges lines of flight in the strata of the State to block 
becomings and normalize attachments to identity. 
Thus far we have seen that the semiotic of signifiance establishes power by 
ordering signs around a despotic centre of power, and the semiotic of subjectification 
subjects individuals to power by determining multiple points of identification in relation 
to signification.  The face, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is produced by the 
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interpenetration of signifiance and subjectification, the recoiling of a mental reality into a 
dominant one, and the mixture of the signifying regime and the postsignifying regime’s 
primary characteristics: deception and betrayal respectively.  The question of concern for 
Deleuze and Guattari is: what triggered these fusions?  What effectuated the faciality 
machine?  They aver that the face came into full bloom during the time of “Christ and the 
historical development of White Man” (ATP 182).  In their words, “Our semiotic of 
modern White Men, the semiotic of capitalism, has attained this state of mixture in which 
signifiance and subjectification effectively interpenetrate.  Thus, it is in this semiotic that 
faciality, or the white wall/black hole system, assumes its full scope” (182).  Deleuze and 
Guattari make an important distinction between the “white wall/black hole system” and 
the “faciality machine.” Both are abstract machines; however, the white wall/black hole 
system is produced by the mixture of signifiance and subjectification whereas faciality is 
the machine that performs the mixture.  As Deleuze and Guattari contend, “the faciality 
machine is not an annex to the signifier and the subject; rather, it is subjacent (connexe) 
to them and is their condition of possibility” (180, emphasis original).  Accordingly, the 
white wall/black hole system is an abstract machine that operates within the faciality 
machine.  The former performs facializations and the latter mixes and remixes sign 
regimes.  For Deleuze and Guattari, Jesus Christ interpenetrates and mixes the signifying 
and postsignifying regimes because he is both God and man, King and slave, despot and 
scapegoat, authoritative face and cursed becoming.  His face is worshipped, produced 
and reproduced, but he is also betrayed, turned away, cast out on a passional line of 
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departure.  Christianity thus brings together the paranoid and passional, deception and 
betrayal, signifiers and subjects, interpretations and emotions, conscious and 
unconscious identifications.  The distinction between the white wall/black hole 
machine and the faciality machine is important because it tells us that faciality (an 
overcoded politics of recognition) organizes power whereas the white wall/black hole 
machine (identity) normalizes power, which I demonstrate in the next section.  
Ultimately, Deleuze and Guattari argue that concrete faces are determined by a 
combination of White Man’s power and the subject’s eagerness or acquiescence to 
absorb or reject that power (182). 
In the “semiotic of modern White Men, the semiotic of capitalism,” the State 
apparatus administers chains of signifiers that determine status, wealth, health, notoriety, 
and so forth which individuals internalize as their face.  The face of a professor, a 
lawyer, a doctor, the homeless, a bartender all signify a different social status that is 
determined by their proximity (or distance) from the ideal Face.  Regardless of how 
“divergent” a given face is from the face of White Man, it still signifies and circulates his 
power.  For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari state that “Faces are not basically 
individual: they define zones of frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralizes 
in advance any expression or connections unnameable to the appropriate significations” 
(ATP 168).  Every face relates to another face and any non-conformity is integrated 
through “backward waves” of sameness (178). 
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In our semiotic of advanced capitalism, with Molar Man standing erect at the 
center, power continues to spiral outward, just as it did for the King in the signifying 
regime.  But now, rather than expelling lines of flight, faciality acts as a strange 
attractor74  point sucking becomings in so that lines of flight turn into destruction, 
recoiling around White Man. Deleuze and Guattari explain: 
What accomplishes this is the screen with holes, the white wall/black hole, the 
abstract machine producing faciality…A concerted effort is made to do away with 
the body and corporeal coordinates through which the multidimensional or 
polyvocal semiotics operated.  Bodies are disciplined, corporeality dismantled, 
becomings-animal hounded out, deterritorialization pushed to a new threshold.  
(ATP 170, 181) 
In other words, control in our current semiotic operates by thwarting the material 
relations of the body and its becomings in service of maintaining the power of Molar 
Man.  To unearth how corporeality is dismantled and bodies disciplined, I want to now 
turn to the machinic operations of faciality, not in a metaphorical sense but truly. 
Faciality is an operating system that runs a binary program: the white wall/black hole 
74 The Merriam Webster dictionary defines the “strange attractor” as follows: “mathematics: the 
state of a mathematically chaotic system toward which the system trends: the attractor of a 
mathematically chaotic system.  Unlike the randomness generated by a system with many 
variables, chaos has its own pattern, a peculiar kind of order.  This pattern is known whimsically 
as a strange attractor, because the chaotic system seems to be strangely attracted to an ideal 
behavior” See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strange attractor. 
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machine.  The white wall/black hole machine functions through two specific 
algorithms that combine social, political, and material forces to ensure that: “You will 
be pinned to the white wall and stuffed in the black hole” (181). 
4.2 The White Wall/Black Hole Machine 
The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start. 
-Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus
Deleuze and Guattari define the white wall/black hole machine as a central computing 
device that functions through two specific commands: “selecting facial units” and 
“making choices” (ATP 177).  Given the authors’ careful wording of each function, I 
have decided to quote them at length.  Deleuze and Guattari explain the two functions of 
the white wall/black hole machine as follows: 
Under the first aspect [selecting facial units], the black hole acts as a central 
computer, the third eye that moves across the wall or the white screen serving as 
general surface of reference.  Regardless of the content one gives it, the machine 
constitutes a facial unit, an elementary face in biunivocal relation with another: it is 
a man or a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a 
subject, “an x or a y.” The movement of the black hole across the screen, the 
trajectory of the third eye over the surface of reference, constitutes so many 
dichotomies or arborescences, like four-eye machines made of elementary faces 
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linked together two by two.  The face of a teacher and a student, father and son, 
worker and boss…concrete individualized faces are produced and transformed on 
the basis of these units, these combinations of units—like the face of a rich child in 
which a military calling is already discernible, that West Point chin.  You don’t so 
much have a face as slide into one. 
Under the second aspect [making choices], the abstract machine of faciality 
assumes a role of selective response, or choice: given a concrete face, the machine 
judges whether it passes or not, whether it goes or not, on the basis of the 
elementary facial units.  This time, the binary relation is of the “yes-no” type.  
The empty eye or black hole absorbs or rejects, like a half-doddering despot who 
can still give a signal of acquiescence or refusal.  The face of a given teacher is 
contorted by tics and bathed in an anxiety that makes it “no go”…At every 
moment, the machine rejects faces that do not conform, or seem suspicious.  But 
only at a given level of choice.  For it is necessary to produce successive 
divergence-types of deviance for everything that eludes biunivocal relationships, 
and to establish binary relations between what is accepted on first choice and what 
is only tolerated on second, third choice, etc.  The white wall is always expanding, 
and the black hole functions repeatedly. (177, emphasis original) 
Anything can be given a face.  The machine does not limit itself to the body.  For 
example, you might say that the stack of ungraded student essays is staring at me, this is 
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not because the essays resemble a face, “but because it is taken up in the white wall/black 
hole process, because it connects to the abstract machine of facialization” (175).  Below, 
I illustrate how the white wall/black hole machine programs student essays with a face.  
To make this point, I use Deleuze and Guattari’s language and italicize my additions: 
The first function: Selecting units or elements: 
The black hole [of the grading rubric] acts as a central computer, the third eye 
that moves across [the white paper] serving as general surface of reference. 
Regardless of what [is written], the machine constitutes an elementary [grade], 
an elementary [grade] in biunivocal relation with another: it is [an A or B; B or 
C; C or D], “an x or a y.” The movement of the black hole across [the white 
paper,] the trajectory of the third eye over the surface of reference, constitutes so 
many dichotomies or arborescences, like four-eye machines made of elementary 
[grades] linked together two by two.  The [grade of good grammar and the grade 
of bad grammar, the grade of original analysis and the grade of undeveloped 
analysis, the grade of creative writing and the grade of repetitive word choice] … 
concrete individualized [grades] are produced and transformed on the basis of 
these units, these combinations of units—like the [essay with good grammar and 
original analysis] in which [an A grade] is already discernible, that [clear thesis 
statement.] You don’t so much have a [grade] as slide into one. 
The second function: Making choices: 
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the abstract machine of faciality assumes a role of selective response, or choice: 
given a concrete [grade], the machine judges whether it passes or not, whether it 
goes or not, on the basis of the elementary [grade] units.  This time, the binary 
relation is of the “yes-no” type [Does the given grade fit the essay: yes-no?].  
The empty eye or black hole absorbs or rejects, like a half-doddering despot who 
can still give a signal of acquiescence or refusal.  The face of a given [essay] is 
contorted by [bad formatting] and bathed in [spelling errors] that makes it “no 
go.” At every moment, the machine rejects [essay grades] that do not conform or 
seem suspicious.  But only at a given level of choice.  For it is necessary to 
produce successive divergence-types of deviance for everything that eludes 
biunivocal relationships, and to establish binary relations between what is 
accepted on first choice and what is only tolerated on second, third choice, etc. 
[the essay needs revision, but revision is a grade conforming to another choice: 
fail, incomplete, revise, resubmit].  The white wall is always expanding, and the 
black hole functions repeatedly. 
Everything is all there: black holes, white walls, and the two functions: the unit selector 
and the yes-no deviance detector—the essay grading machine. 
More severely, faciality is a machine of racial and colonial domination.  It 
creates identity categories and hierarchical binaries in which subjects are slotted in 
accordance with the State.  In order for the white wall/black hole system to perform its 
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two functions—selecting units and making choices—there needs to be a grid of 
identification already set in place.  Facial units must be lined up ready for selection and 
the yes-no barometer must be calibrated in advance to a standardized face.  White Man 
serves as the general reference point for the State.  So that “yes-no” choices are made 
based on binary and biunivocal categories to decide whose face conforms with the image 
of the State and whose face poses a threat: Is this the face of the nation?  Are the facial 
units selected those of a trusted citizen, or are they units that belong to the face of a 
terrorist?  If a face does pass, which is to say, if the composing units are recognized by 
the State as those that belong to the face of the nation, then the subject is afforded rights 
and representation, and given social and political mobility.  If a face is not acknowledged, 
if the units do not pass and a “no” choice is made, then the subject’s rights are denied. 
Regardless of the outcome, a face never escapes the purview of the State because 
every face is made in its image, either for or against it, but always in its benefit.  For 
example, in chapter three I argued that the State characterizes Native men’s sexuality as 
deviant to secure the post-colonial imaginary.  As TigerSwan’s surveillance at Standing 
Rock demonstrates, Indigenous men were facialized as sexually “savage” and violent in 
order to proximate them with the face of terror.  In this colonial process of facialization, 
Native women were also given a face that benefited the State.  This face was produced as 
heteronormative and one that needed White Man’s “protection.” Facialization is a 
process of colonization that integrates difference through backward waves of 
assimilation. 
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In terms of biometric sexual surveillance, it should come as no surprise that 
faciality governs this assemblage as well.  For example, in chapter two, I discussed the 
ways in which biometric surveillance and its failures operate through a racist and 
cissexist cultural logic that not only tracks but also regulates the capacity of a body’s 
movement in surveilled space.  As Shoshana Magnet and Simone Browne both 
demonstrate, biometric technologies work by establishing degrees of sameness to White- 
Man as the universal face-prototype who is also defined here as cisgender and able- 
bodied.  Face recognition technology or fingerprint and body scans, for example, 
determine whether a body passes, whether it moves through space uninterrupted or is 
somatically suspended, based on its ability to conform to a point already plotted on the 
grid of identification.  If a body cannot be identified by the biometric machine, then 
subjective choices must be made; the white wall/black hole machine persists as an 
authority figure that facializes the body through additional scrutiny.  For example, the 
TSA agent picks up where the machine left off to determine the security threat status of 
the traveller—a yes-no choice is made.  The privileging of Molar Man in the design and 
development of biometric technologies, what Browne refers to as the logic of 
“prototypical whiteness” (110), is diagrammed by the white wall/black hole machine. 
Faces that are “unrecognized” do not escape surveillance but are conversely captured and 
given the face of “biometric failure”—a “divergence-type” on the white wall of 
signification; “You don’t so much have a face as slide into one” (Deleuze and Guattari 
ATP 177). 
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Because everyone is always already given a face within the white wall/black hole 
system, the demand for recognition or to be “seen” does not necessarily threaten the State 
apparatus and the semiotic of White Man’s advanced capitalism.  As Deleuze and 
Guattari explain, the white wall/black hole machine is able to discern that, 
It's not a man and it's not a woman, so it must be a trans-vestite [sic]: The binary 
relation is between the “no” of the first category and the “yes” of the following 
category, which under certain conditions may just as easily mark a tolerance as an 
indication of an enemy to be mowed down at all costs.  At any rate, you've been 
recognized, the abstract machine has you inscribed in its overall grid… the 
computation of normalities. (ATP 177, 178, emphasis added) 
Everyone is folded in.  Everyone is seen.  Everyone is always already given a face.  
“The white wall is always expanding, and the black hole functions repeatedly” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 177).  What poses a threat to faciality then, is collective becomings and 
lines of flight that move toward imperceptibility.  Imperceptible-becomings cannot be 
captured by the state, and in this sense they glitch the faciality machine.  As we shall see 
in the next chapter, these glitches need not be intentional or overt; the slightest 
incoherence, crack, or slippage in the chain of signifiance reveals the potential for 
escape. 
Returning to Deleuze and Guattari, they write: “The face is not a universal.  It is not 
even that of the white man; it is White Man himself, with his broad white cheeks and the 
black hole of his eyes.  The face is Christ…Jesus Christ superstar: he invented the 
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facialization of the entire body and spread it everywhere” (ATP 176).  The grid of 
identification determines “divergence-types” based on their degrees of distance to White 
Man as the universal face.  Fittingly, Deleuze and Guattari claim that the first 
divergences to be mapped in the State apparatus are always racial: “If the face is in fact 
Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the 
first divergence-types, are racial” (178).  Moreover, they argue that: 
European racism as the white man's claim has never operated by exclusion, or by 
the designation of someone as Other…Racism operates by the determination of 
degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate 
nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves…From the 
viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside.  There 
are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be… Racism 
never detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness. (178) 
By indicating that racism does not operate through “Othering”—there is no Other in the 
white wall/black hole system—Deleuze and Guattari claim once again that power is 
organized by calculating degrees of sameness rather than establishing differences from 
Molar Man.  For this reason, Sam Okoth Opondo asserts that “faciality [is] a non- 
dialectical theory of racism” (250).  That is, in the white wall/black hole system, 
difference is not regarded as “Other”; instead, it is taken up by the machine “as a proper 
object of colonization” and racism is “only a matter of closing the distance” (Winet 34). 
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Writing in the same anthology as Opondo, Claire Colebrook explains that the problem 
with racism is not that it discriminates but that it doesn’t discriminate enough (“Face 
Race” 36).  Said another way, racism is not a system based on exclusion but inclusion 
(Saldanha “Mixed-Blood” 19).  The White Face of Molar Man eclipses difference. 
Nonetheless, difference itself cannot be totally captured.  As Deleuze tells us in 
Difference and Repetition, difference is a force that is always in the process of acting and 
reacting and therefore becoming otherwise (28).  Deleuze and Guattari further attest that 
every body is a singularity of difference—a multiplicity—composed of unique expressive 
intensities.  It is only when an expression, such as skin colour, is continuously 
reterritorialized on the social stratum in recurring ways that a homogenous “race” begins 
to form (Saldanha “Mixed-Blood” 10).  With this in mind, Arun Saldanha proposes that 
the category of race is best thought of as an assemblage; “a fuzzy collection of biological, 
social, and political problems, an obscure attractor actualised in varying degrees” (10). 
Racism does not operate through individual prejudice or ideological discrimination but 
through material formations of domination.  Bodies are defined in their relation to other 
bodies and to social forces such as capitalism, climate change, food security, and 
globalization.  Saldanha posits that racial identification occurs when positive 
reterritorializations on the strata affirm a multiplicity’s “homeostasis” and “stability” 
(10).  Racism then, is established through negative reterritorializations.  What Saldanha 
wants to underline is that racism does not occur through difference and opposition. 
Rather, as Deleuze and Guattari state above, racism institutes “backward waves of 
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sameness.” Saldanha avers that because racism happens through a series of 
reterritorializations, it is an inherently unstable operation (“Assemblage” 196).  
Continuing this reasoning elsewhere, he explains: 
Race is built upon fully contingent territorialisations of power and desire which 
could be disassembled and differently reassembled.  That race is immanent to the 
machinics of bodies and flows does not mean it is automatic, any more than that it 
is autonomous in relation to, for example, capital or sexual difference.  The 
immanence of race does suggest, however, that an end to racism is an always 
already incipient reality. (“Mixed-Blood” 8) 
Following Saldanha, Simone Bignall asserts that “race can also be positively seductive; it 
can draw disparate bodies together in joyful acts of association and communal 
identification.  Race is therefore not negative, but rather is simply one way of shaping 
desire through apprehending and interpreting others in order to shape the form of an 
alliance” (“Dismantling White-Man” 89).  As I argued in the previous chapter, 
identification may be a necessary point of resistance when facing a line of destruction. 
From this viewpoint, a sense of cultural or racial identification does not necessarily 
suspend a becoming; instead, it may enable an individual to rest and take refuge in a 
shared sense of belonging while striving to dismantle the face. 
Faciality, as I have attempted to illustrate thus far, extends to situations beyond 
those that directly involve a concrete face.  The body can be given a face, as can a 
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political party, the classroom is facialized with its white boards of meaning and black 
holes of student grades in which a student subjectivity begins to form.  Faciality diagrams 
a politics of recognition that pins a fixed identity onto the subject; it occurs at the moment 
of somatic suspension at the airport when a black hole of identification forms on the 
white screen of the body scanner, and during the police brutality at Standing Rock when 
the black hole of surveillance facialized water protectors as jihadi terrorists, sucking in 
“souls and subjects” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 180). The expanse of faciality is far 
reaching; faciality has its hand in—or rather face on—the grid of identification, a rigid 
politics of recognition, State racism, biometric failure, and sexual surveillance.  Faciality 
is not an individual or “natural” process: it is machinic.  The white wall/black hole  
system programs binaries and binunivocalizations to consolidate difference as 
“divergence.” This occurs not through confrontation but through continuous consultation 
with the grid of identification—does the face fit?  Yes-no?  The faciality machine is 
composed of mobile relations—always expanding its white wall of signification.  The 
ability of the grid to mutate, adapt, and relate is what constitutes both its machinic 
operation and its insidious domination.  Alterations to the grid and glitches to the 
machine, therefore, require a stealth and spontaneous imposition of resistance from 
within. 
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4.3 Dismantling the Face 
Yes, the face has a great future, but only if it is destroyed, dismantled…If 
the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real 
becomings, an entire becoming-clandestine. 
-Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus
Deleuze and Guattari’s call to “dismantle the face” is a fierce polemic against the 
individualizing forces of power that keep each of us enamoured with our faces.  Rather 
than postulating a universal theory of resistance, they argue that to confront the face of 
Molar Man, we must first interrogate the “microfascisms” harboured in our own faces.  
That means to resist the organization of power—to deterritorialize from the strata of 
sexual surveillance—“we” must shake ourselves out of the inhabitancy of the faces “we” 
have come to call our own.  This requires a self-critical and self-reflexive analysis of the 
power of one’s own face and the sites of privilege we occupy (or not) on the grid of 
identification.  Dismantling the face is not a generalized theory of resistance because it 
begins by locating the face in its embedded and embodied context.  As Deleuze and 
Guattari affirm: “Only across the wall of the signifier can you run lines of asignifiance 
that void all memory, all return, all possible signification and interpretation…Only on 
your face and at the bottom of your black hole and upon your white wall will you be able 
to set faciality traits free like birds…” (ATP 189).  Just as the face is produced from 
somewhere specific so too must its disassembly.  Every person will have a different 
starting point to battle the face, which will generate different tools to dismantle the 
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Master’s Face.  In this section, I suggest that dismantling the face is a process of 
becoming that both begins from and becomes with the politics of location. 
However, Peta Hinton warns that a politics of location risks inadvertently 
reterritorializing subjectivity within a rigid structure of identification.  In her response to 
Donna Haraway’s essay “Situated Knowledges,” she contends that although a politics of 
location acknowledges the speaking subject as embodied, partial, and embedded within 
a social context (to dislodge essentialist categories of identity and the notion of an 
objective view from nowhere), it simultaneously “reinstalls” a Cartesian notion of 
subjectivity (105).  In her words, a politics of location “demands a self-presence of that 
speaking subject and its identity—the same claim for self-presence which informs the 
rational subject’s capacity to stand back from the world in order to take measure of it” 
(105).  Although contemporary feminist theory on the politics of location has long since 
addressed Hinton’s concerns on “second-wave” feminist scholarship, which she states 
does “not take savvy theoretical intervention to re-mark the complexity of identity” 
(110),75  I believe her apprehension on the politics of location foregrounds an important 
point when it comes to dismantling the face, which is: how does one dismantle identity if
75 For example, Mariana Ortega defends identity politics by reframing it as a “coalition politics,” 
which acknowledges the self as multiple, transformative, “becoming,” “belonging,” and “being- 
with” others (163).  A coalition politics, she affirms, understands that identity is never fixed but 
is always in an active process of becoming based on one’s intersecting social locations and 
relations with others (163).  Taking a phenomenological approach to identity, Ortega redefines 
identity politics as an “intermeshed” and “multiplicitious” experience of “being-in-worlds” and 
“being- between-worlds” (169).  Considering the complexity of identity, she concludes that there 
can never be an exhaustive account of what identity and identity politics are supposed to look 
like (169).
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one is asked to speak from an identity?  How do you “Find your black holes and white 
walls, know them, know your faces” so that “you will be able to dismantle them”?  
(Deleuze and Guattari ATP 188).  Does knowing all your faces and locating yourself in 
the social strata reinstall the notion of an all-knowing and knowable subject as Hinton 
avers?  How do you “detach” from or “destroy” the sites of privilege you inhabit on the 
grid of identification? 
To answer these questions, I begin with Deleuze and Guattari’s basis that to 
dismantle the face we must begin with locating our deepest and darkest entanglements 
with the machinic operations of the State.  Borrowing Foucault’s words, we might say 
that dismantling the face entails “tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from the 
enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical 
bitterness of our everyday lives” (Preface xiv).  Dismantling the face means locating “the 
fascisms in us all, in our heads and everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love 
power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (xiii).  Deleuze and 
Guattari elaborate: “Facialization operates not by resemblance but by an order of 
reasons” and “It is a much more unconscious and machinic operation that draws the 
entire body across the holey surface, and in which the role of the face is not as a model or 
image, but as an overcoding of all of the decoded parts” (ATP 170).  Dismantling the 
face, it would seem, obliges us to locate the overcoded parts of the unconscious to set its 
potentials free.  While I do not go into detail on the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari 
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overhaul the concept of “the unconscious” from its conventional psychoanalytic 
trappings, I want to briefly outline my use of the term here. 
Following, Deleuze and Guattari, I understand the unconscious not as a Freudian 
theatre of symbols and representations or as “a repository of submerged feelings and 
images” (Massumi UG 82), but as a creative force.  Deleuze and Guattari delineate the 
unconscious as “material rather than ideological…real rather than symbolic…machinic 
rather than structural—an unconscious, finally, that is molecular, microphysical, and 
micrological rather than molar or gregarious; production rather than expressive” (AO 
120).  The unconscious is not a part of the natural organism; rather, it is a machinic 
process connected to the social and political strata.  In this sense, the unconscious is 
inseparable from the human and non-human “machinic assemblages” that produce it 
(Guattari 156).  The unconscious, as the machinic unconscious, may be overcoded but 
always has positive potential.  It is inherently creative rather than repressive; it is a 
“molecular pack” of intensities or “packs of multiplicities” and these packs have an 
infinite number of non-representational potentials.  The unconscious then constitutes a 
force that extends beyond the “self” (Semetsky et al. 70).  It connects with social and 
political forces and is a productive machine that is both social and desiring (AO 127).  If 
the unconscious is a creative force of multiple packs of intensities, and a machinic force 
inseparable from machinic assemblages that extend beyond the self as suggested, what 
does “locating” your deepest and darkest entanglements with the State mean?  How do 
you break apart the chains of signifiers that work to capture the productive forces of the 
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unconscious?  How do you wrest a mental reality free from its enslavement to the 
dominant reality?  How do you identify your microfascisms and overcoded parts?  
“Identifying” the overcoded mechanisms of the unconscious may in fact, not be possible 
at all—all one may be able to do is sense the fascisms lodged in the mind that constantly 
work to segment the soul.  What I am suggesting is that Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
dismantling the face challenges one to embark on a sort of “unguided exploration” of the 
machinic unconscious—an exploration guided only by sensation. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari warn that there are real risks involved in the 
process of dismantling the face.  Confronting your face “from the bottom of your black 
hole,” wading through the uncharted territories of the mind to find what microfascisms 
lurk there, may be a process too intense and too forceful for a body to endure.  The body 
could spiral out of a becoming and be cast into a faceless oblivion or be caught in an even 
more rigid strata of segmentation.  For example, Deleuze and Guattari caution that: 
Every undertaking of destratification (for example, going beyond the organism, 
plunging into a becoming) must therefore observe concrete rules of extreme 
caution: a too-sudden destratification may be suicidal, or turn cancerous.  In 
other words, it will sometimes end in chaos, the void and destruction, and 
sometimes lock us back into the strata, which become more rigid still, losing 
their degrees of diversity, differentiation, and mobility. (ATP 503) 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s last assertion, that one may construct a face more rigid than the 
one that existed before, speaks to Hinton’s concern with regards to the risks involved 
with a politics of location: that one may confirm rather than displace an essentialist 
politics of identification. 
A failed attempt to dismantle the face and the emergence of a more rigid face in its 
place that “locks us back into the strata” is a mental reality, mindset, or a sense of identity 
composed of the very microfascisms one originally set out to dismantle.  In this scenario, 
the mind becomes part of the “supermind”—individual microfascisms turn into the 
collective macrofascisms of the State, effecting a “mind-meld” in which a mental reality 
recoils even deeper into the dominant reality of the State (Massumi UG 4).  This newly 
rooted face sees only itself; pontificating about the world—or how the world ought to be 
according to one’s own “dismantled” face.  Yet, the face is not dismantled at all.  It has 
been rebuilt and overcoded once more.  This face is more dangerous than the last; it is the 
face of the profit, preacher, guru, self-proclaimed empath, Narcissus—the always 
knowing, ever shifting chameleon face, that cannot hear difference but only Echo.  This 
face disguises itself as a faceless becoming that traverses molecular lines, turning rigid 
segments into supple ones, water into wine.  This disguised face substitutes the 
macropolitics of Molar Man with a whole micropolitics of Molecular Man. Deleuze and 
Guattari describe this disguised face as one that: 
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deterritorializes, massifies, but only in order to knot and annul the mass 
movements and movements of deterritorialization, to invent all kinds of marginal 
reterritorializations even worse than the others... and acts instead as viruses 
adapting to the most varied situations, sinking voids in molecular perceptions and 
semiotics.  Interactions without resonance.  Instead of the great paranoid fear, we 
are trapped in a thousand little monomanias, self-evident truths, and clarities that 
gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and 
buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of self-appointed 
judge, dispenser of justice, policeman, neighborhood SS man.  We have overcome 
fear, we have sailed from the shores of security, only to enter a system that is no 
less concentricized, no less organized: the system of petty insecurities that leads 
everyone to their own black hole in which to turn dangerous, possessing a clarity 
on their situation, role, and mission even more disturbing than the certitudes of 
the first line. (ATP 228) 
Dismantling the face then, traverses a fine line between breaking apart an identity and 
building a new one based on self-evident Truths.  These truths take hold in the mind as a 
sense of authenticity, corrupting a becoming from the inside out. 
To avoid the perils of dismantling the face and to stabilize a becoming, Rosi 
Braidotti asserts that becomings mandate an “intensive ethics,” which she defines as “the 
shared capacity of humans to feel empathy for, develop affinity with and hence enter in 
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relation with other forces, entities, beings, waves of intensity” (“The Ethics” 140).  An 
intensive ethics, she argues, “requires dosage, rhythms, styles of repetition and 
coordination or resonance” to sustain the subject as they cross the threshold to becoming- 
imperceptible and meet their limit (140).  Dismantling the face is an arduous becoming 
and a painful process that requires letting go of one’s attachments to identity and 
therefore necessitates an ethics that reworks negative encounters with absolute thresholds 
of identity into positive becomings (140).  In her discussion of Haraway, Hinton 
ultimately affirms that feminist inquiry is produced through material entanglements and 
that it is these entanglements with the world that enable us to call upon identity as a 
politically valuable tool without getting trapped in essentialism.  Similarly, dismantling 
the face requires a shared acceptance of the face as an assemblage of social, political, and 
material entanglements.  Understanding the face as an assemblage underscores its 
malleability and enables us to call upon the politics of location as an “intensive ethics” 
that is capable of dismantling the face. 
The goal for the queer politics of imperceptibility that I propose is not to know all 
your faces by locating yourself within an identity, but to locate instead the social and 
political relations that materialize that identity and one’s attachment therein.  In my view, 
it is only by focusing on the relation between things, that the face reveals itself both as a 
subjugating force and as a potential tool of resistance.  Dismantling the face with an 
ethics of the politics of location does not proffer the notion of absolute facelessness nor is 
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it a strategy of concealment.  Dismantling the face with a politics of location reinvents 
and reveals new and affirmative uses for the face. 
Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that we cannot simply rid ourselves of a 
face nor should we simply disregard its political use (ATP 189).  In their words: “The 
white wall of the signifier, the black hole of subjectivity, and the faciality machine are 
impasses, the measure of our submissions and subjections, we are born into them, and it 
is there we must stand battle.  Not in the sense of a necessary stage, but in the sense of a 
tool for which a new use must be invented” (189).  This last assertion is particularly 
important for a queer politics of imperceptibility.  Because our mental reality is deeply 
entwined with a dominant one, and the politics of recognition is an inescapable aspect of 
the lives of minoritarian subjects, absolute facelessness—a condition where a politically 
recognizable subjectivity, a social status, or agency is absent—is, therefore, not the 
objective of a queer politics of imperceptibility.  For Deleuze and Guattari, dismantling 
the face is not a step toward total obscurity; rather, it is a non-directional movement of 
becoming that creates new potentials and new tools of resistance that imagine the face 
afresh (189).  Hence, to dethrone the regnant Face from its self-appointed seat of power, 
we must craft new and unexpected faces that are divested from identity.  These faces are 
“subjectless subjectivities” (Bains 2002) —agentic bodies that move through the world 
without the drag of the face. 
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If dismantling the face is to affect political change, Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
it must be considered as an action that returns us to molar organization so that we can 
inject and mutate the rigidity of the overcoding machine with new potentials.  They write, 
“molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to the molar 
organizations to reshuffle their segments, their binary distributions of sexes, classes, and 
parties” (ATP 216-7).  That is, dismantling the face only weakens the molar forces of the 
State if the affects and intensities freed from the face return to the mechanisms of power 
and sites of control to create actual change.  Massumi states that the goal of dismantling 
the face is to release “a bundle of potential affects” (UG 152n36), and a queer politics of 
imperceptibility, as I present it, aims to actualize these affects as bundles of dynamite that 
are ready to ignite.  Before lighting the fuse however, we must consider the critical 
question posed by Deleuze and Parnet: 
Even if we had the power to blow [the molar line] up, could we succeed in doing so 
without destroying ourselves, since it so much a part of the conditions of life, 
including our organism and our very reason?  The prudence with which we must 
manipulate that line, the precautions we must take to soften it, suspend it, divert it, 
to undermine it, testify to a long labour which is not merely aimed against the State 
and the power that be, but directly at ourselves. (138) 
How do we ensure that we do not implode our becomings along with Molar Man?  How 
does one dismantle the face without passing their (unmarked) limits?  How does one 
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destroy binary machines and escape devices of power in which one is born without also 
at the same time conditioning one’s complete annihilation?  How does one get to 
“know” all of one’s faces without slipping back into a molar framework of 
identification, interpretation, and overcoding practices?  What is the virus that infects the 
system without deleting itself in the process of crashing the machine?  What is the card 
trick that reshuffles power?  How do you invent new subjectivities from the shambles of 
a dismantled face?  How do you style a subjectless subjectivity?  How do you remain 
accountable to a politics of location while at the same time dismantling the face?  What 
manipulates molar forces with care and precaution?  The line of pure resistance. 
4.4 Dismantling the Face and the Line of Pure Resistance 
The line of pure resistance, as I outlined in the previous chapter, is an unplanned event 
that arises to sustain a multiplicity in its becoming.  This occurs by worlding—which 
means that the line of pure resistance involves the conjugation and convergence of new 
relations.  Bodies conjugate with their surrounding environment to make connections 
with other bodies, both human and non-human, which, I suggest, breaks up the 
microfascisms of the face and the macrofascisms of the State.  For example, the line of 
pure resistance that emerged during the water ceremony at Cantapeta Creek enabled 
Indigenous water protectors to endure and divert the violence imposed on them by the 
faciality machine.  They dismantled the “violent-protestor” face that was enforced on 
them by the colonial State and at the same time resisted constructing another face in its 
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place.  By conjugating with the intensities of water, plants, animals, prayer, and 
tradition, the water protectors created the conditions for a new subjectivity to emerge, a 
subjectivity free from a face.  Water protector-becomings move away from the face 
towards becoming a subjectless subjectivity.  This is activated not by a double turning 
away from the State but through the forging of affective relations with others during the 
water ceremony.  It is in this way that the imperceptible relations generated by the line 
of pure resistance serve to undermine the face with care. 
I am suggesting that the line of pure resistance emerges as an intensive ethics to 
ensure that dismantling the face happens in “dosages” and at a pace that the body-in- 
becoming can endure (Braidotti “The Ethics” 140).  Might it be possible to think of the 
line of pure resistance as the virtual dimension of a politics of location?  Just as a politics 
of location tethers a subject to her embedded and embodied social location, the line of 
pure resistance safeguards the body from falling into total faceless abstraction by 
tethering it to its social environment through affective relations.  As Braidotti argues 
throughout her oeuvre, the subject and her becomings do not exist in isolation; and, as 
Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate, the body is always already a multiplicity composed of 
numerous relations.  The line of pure resistance is a concept that illustrates the 
conjugation between subjects, bodies and their particular social location. 
As I have previously mentioned, there is no way to plan for a line of pure 
resistance.  Everything depends on the circumstances of the bodies involved and the 
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forces they confront.  As Braidotti clearly contends, an intensive ethics—the pace one 
takes, the dosages one requires when entering into a becoming—will depend on what a 
body is capable of doing (“The Ethics”140).  There is thus no one way to predetermine 
what thresholds a body will cross, what dismantling the face will actually entail, what it 
will move toward, what black holes it will face—and what lines of pure resistance will 
emerge.  Nonetheless, as I demonstrated in chapter three in my discussion of the water 
ceremony at Cantapeta Creek, there are ways to “locate” the line of pure resistance, 
thresholds, and becomings.  Furthermore, as Braidotti argues, locating such lines is 
essential for an ethics of becoming-imperceptible.  She explains, 
“I can’t take it anymore” is an ethical statement, not the assertion of defeat.  It is 
the lyrical lament of a subject-in-process who is shot through with waves of 
intensity, like a set of fulgurations that illuminate his self-awareness, tearing open 
fields of self-knowledge in the encounter of and configuration with others.  
Learning to recognize thresholds, borders or limits is thus crucial to the work of 
the understanding and to the process of becoming. (140) 
During the water ceremony there were water-protectors who could not take the police 
brutality anymore, who could not hold the line in the freezing water, who had to step 
back and concede— who had to mark a threshold that for one reason or another could not 
be crossed.  But, as Braidotti points out, this did not mean an assertion of defeat.  “I can’t 
take it anymore” is a line of pure resistance that safeguarded some water protectors from 
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passing their absolute threshold and falling into a black hole.  I am arguing that when it 
comes to dismantling the face, a line of pure resistance also emerges to disentangle the 
subject from negative points of subjectification and entangle her instead with the energies 
and affects that sustain her becoming.  In sum, the line of pure resistance, as I theorize it, 
protects the body-in-becoming from slipping into abject facelessness76 and “annihilate 
itself in a black hole” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 134).  Recognizing the limits of 
dismantling the face intensifies one’s ability to discern and avoid the point at which one 
is dismantled into irreparable pieces. 
The politics of location, an intensive ethics, and the line of pure resistance all 
demonstrate that resistance is a process of deterritorializations and reterritorializations.  
In the context of this project, I have introduced the queer politics of imperceptibility as a 
theoretical framework that deterritorializes the face, recognition, and identity from a 
rigid framework of recognition and reterritorializes their positive intensities toward a 
politics of imperceptibility.  My primary concern has been: How can we subvert sexual 
surveillance by introducing new and unexpected subjectivities that are only tangentially 
attached to a face?  Richard Rushton entitles his 2002 essay on faciality with a similar 
question: “What can a face do?”.  The answer, in my view, is entirely up to us.  We can 
keep constructing and deploying faces to institute rigid structures of identity and 
76 An example of abject facelessness is the drug addict who in taking mind altering drugs 
transforms her perception in ways that dismantle the face—however, as an addict she becomes a 
“scapegoat,” the inverse of the ideal subject, the one without a face, not because she has escaped 
but because she is stuck in a black hole of bodily decay.  Or, she is otherwise cast out of society 
and her line of defacialization is cursed. 
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recognition or we can disrupt and dismantle them to transform the overcoded politics of 
the State.  As we have seen, the notion of dismantling the face does not stipulate a 
specific type of activism nor does it offer a definitive solution of how to escape sexual 
surveillance.  Dismantling the face is a conceptual tool that enables us to reimagine the 
relationship between resistance and the State as a process of embodied relations and 
collective material becomings that exist beyond identification.  The politics of location 
has shown that such a reimagining necessarily will be practiced and theorized in 
alternative and perhaps conflicting ways.  However, different ways of dismantling the 
face do not signal conceptual deficiencies nor pragmatic short-comings; neither do they 
indicate political rifts—different approaches only serve to populate the conceptual 
toolbox of resistance. 
In what follows, I examine dismantling the face in the context of postcolonial 
recognition politics.  Although a queer politics of imperceptibility ultimately seeks to 
develop a way of thinking-feeling-doing resistance beyond frames of recognition, I have 
also stated that it does so by building alliances between feminist perspectives and 
locating the possible passages toward becoming-imperceptible that already exist within 
supple feminist frameworks and practices of recognition.  Indeed, as I discuss next, 
Simone Bignall offers an entry point to consider postcolonial recognition politics that are 
unfettered by the face. 
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4.5 Opacity and Affect in Postcolonial Recognition Politics 
Writing in the context of Australian settler colonialism, Simone Bignall traces the activist 
efforts of the Ngarrindjeri Nation indigenous to Southeastern Australia and examines the 
ways in which postcolonial practices of recognition dismantle the face.  She demonstrates 
how participants engage in pluralist expressions of cultural belonging in ways that 
divorce the notion of authenticity from cultural identity.  Postcolonial subjects come 
together through complex assemblages of colonialism which, she contends, incite 
collective strategies of recognition whereby the “self” is understood as multiple, 
relational, and fluid (“Dismantling the Face” 404).  Within this paradigm, Bignall argues 
that the postcolonial subject “deconstructs the established power of the face” and 
reterritorializes identity to forge new styles of cultural belonging and political 
engagement (401).  Deconstructing the face, she asserts, involves the location of 
contradictions within representational systems of power and the search for points of 
instability within regulatory frameworks that cleave together the notion of authenticity 
and identity (401).  More explicitly, she stresses that one must look for points of 
ambiguity within their own identifications, expose them, and push the boundaries of 
those “moments of uncertainty” to collapse so that rooted attachments to identity can be 
weeded out (401).  For Bignall, it is in these moments of uncertainty that the faciality 
machine becomes “(partially) transparent,” and brings into focus the ways in which the 
State grinds together identity, recognition, and representation (401).  Once cognizant of 
the inner workings of the colonial Face, she contends that participants are able to 
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transform their understanding of cultural identification in ways that furnish a pluralist 
approach to recognition. 
The resulting rapprochement between dismantling the face and postcolonial 
recognition politics, according to Bignall, culminates in “processes of becoming-minor” 
(“Dismantling the Face” 403), which she proposes constitute a “virtual alternative” to 
conventional paradigms of State recognition predicated on the acknowledgment of a 
fixed identity (404).  Becoming-minor, she claims, is achieved by paying close attention 
to one’s affective relations and creative engagements with others.  Such attention enables 
individuals to recognize their cultural and experiential differences while at the same time 
striving toward “affirmative acts of shared recognition” (403).  Participants’ open-ended 
relations with one another and their willingness to experiment with new forms of cultural 
identity transform rigid structures of reconciliation and effect instead a “new regime of 
political negotiation” (407).  For Bignall, dismantling the face is figured as the creation 
of an alternative mode of existence—a transformed identity—one that destabilizes the 
colonial production of the Indigenous face while triggering the becoming of 
reconciliation. 
Bignall conveys defacialization as a process of relative reterritorializations, where 
the face is dismantled and then reconstructed in ways amenable to Ngarrindjeri Nation’s 
traditions and beliefs.  Thus she argues that postcolonial recognition politics is not sullied 
by defacialization.  Indeed, she asserts that Deleuze and Guattari’s rejection of the 
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“politics of the face” (the politics of recognition) align with Ngarrindjeri-State 
engagements (“Dismantling the Face” 406).  For example, she discusses the ways in 
which postcolonial subjects often withhold information from the State as an affirmative 
act of becoming: “Ngarrindjeri now often refuse to divulge cultural knowledge, having 
learned from [previous encounters with colonial violence] how detrimental and damaging 
the sharing of knowledge can be when it is received unwilling by closed ears and 
reluctant minds” (406).  Here, Bignall notes an important and often missed aspect of 
dismantling the face, which is that it necessarily requires a level of opacity.  Thus far I 
have posited dismantling the face as a becoming that exposes micro and macrofascisms, 
reveals thresholds and limits, and illuminates the relations between bodies.  Now, I would 
like to consider how dismantling the face can be achieved through opacity, which defines 
an act that protects, preserves, and keeps sacred an individual’s or group’s faciality traits 
(aspects of identity) that may or may not be known to the individual or group. 
In Poetics of Relation, Édouard Glissant introduces opacity as an encounter with 
the Other that resists imperialist and colonial frameworks of recognition that hinge on 
making the subject Transparent to the state.  He argues that formal structures of 
recognition, much like eugenics, measure the subject against state ideals to make 
comparisons, judgments, and establish the grounds by which she will be made or unmade 
in the eyes of the law (190).  The subject is recognized through a reductive framework of 
transparency.  Elaborating, Glissant maintains that Western frameworks of recognition 
proceed as follows: “In order to understand and thus accept you, I have to measure your 
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solidity with the ideal scale providing me with grounds to make comparisons and, 
perhaps, judgments.  I have to reduce” (190).  A politics of recognition values 
transparency and reduces differences among others.  Against this, Glissant argues that 
we must “clamor for the right to opacity for everyone” (190).  Importantly, the right to 
opacity is not a call to become opaque per se.  It is not a call to go unseen or become 
invisible.  Indeed, he is careful to warn against falling into individual obscurity, which he 
argues, turns difference into “apartheid” (201).  Opacity is an ethical relation, that I 
suggest signals dismantling the face. 
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome, Glissant writes, 
“Rhizomatic thought is the principle behind what I call the Poetics of Relation, in which 
each and every identity is extended through a relationship with the Other” (11).  At first 
glance, Glissant’s demarcation between self and Other would appear to go against 
Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic philosophy of becoming and their call to dismantle the 
face.  As we have seen, a rhizome is an assemblage of multiplicities—concepts, humans, 
animals, things, the cosmos— that extend through horizontal relations and lines of flight, 
bringing things together and creating becomings.  The rhizome emphasizes random 
movement over structure, instability over fixity, networks over centralized points, 
relation over root.  Significantly, Glissant notes, however, that: “The notion of the 
rhizome maintains…the idea of rootedness but challenges that of a totalitarian root” (11).  
Unlike the upward root that takes “all upon itself and killing all around it”—defined by 
Deleuze and Guattari as Molar Man and arborescent thought— the rhizome is “an 
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enmeshed root system, a network spreading either in the ground or in the air, with no 
predatory rootstock taking over permanently” (Glissant 11).  Just as Deleuze and 
Guattari warn of dismantling the face, Glissant contends that “uprooting can work 
toward identity” (18).  That is, he suggests that when uprooting is experienced as forced 
exile, one may imagine or long for an identity that was never there before or search for a 
new one (18).  Uprooting, like dismantling the face, is dangerous if the rootedness of the 
rhizome (i.e. the politics of location are not taken into careful consideration.  Moreover, 
Glissant writes: “the image of the rhizome, prompt[s] the knowledge that identity is no 
longer completely within the root but also in Relation” (18).  Put another way, while 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome focuses on horizontal movement; it does 
so not by uprooting but by leaving the root positively opaque.  For Glissant then, 
“opacity” signals a rhizomatic and ethical encounter with others that does not attempt to 
root or uproot them but acknowledges their opacity thus keeping their particularity in 
place. 
Importantly, Glissant contends that the Other is opaque to itself.  There is no 
transparent unity of the self.  He writes, “it does not disturb me to accept that there are 
places where my identity is obscure to me, and the fact that it amazes me does not mean I 
relinquish it” (192).  Understanding the self as opaque acknowledges the potential of 
one’s becoming.  It confirms that one’s relation with others—human and non-human— 
happens on both perceptible and imperceptible wavelengths.  Opacity thus affirms the 
potential of moving toward a subjectless subjectivity.  And, “the right to opacity for 
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everyone” foregrounds the becoming of and with all others.77 I turn to Glissant to argue 
that opacity, in terms of the Ngarrindjeri’s refusal to share knowledge, is an affirmative 
practice of dismantling the face.  Opacity is not an unwillingness to detach from identity 
nor is it an oppositional strategy that conceals, masks, or hides the face.  The distinction 
I am making between opacity and concealment is that the former affirms and values 
unknown differences whereas the latter aims to hide what is already known (to oneself). 
Another way to consider the value of opacity and the refusal to divulge cultural 
knowledge is to view it in the context of a “refrain.” As I noted in chapter three, Deleuze 
and Guattari define the concept “refrain” as that which holds an assemblage together: “A 
territorial or territorialized component [that] may set about budding, producing” (ATP 
325).  Offering a more complex definition Deleuze and Guattari write: 
the refrain is a prism, a crystal of space-time.  It acts upon that which surrounds it, 
sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, projections, 
or transformations.  The refrain also has a catalytic function: not only to increase 
the speed of the exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to 
77 Glissant writes: “I am able to conceive of the opacity of the other for me, without reproach for 
my opacity for him.  To feel in solidarity with him or to build with him or to like what he does, it 
is not necessary for me to grasp him.  It is not necessary to try to become the other (to become 
other) nor to “make” him in my image.  These projects of transmutation—without 
metempsychosis—have resulted from the worst pretensions and the greatest of magnanimities on 
the part of the West” (193). 
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assure indirect interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural 
affinity, and thereby to form organized masses. (348) 
Here, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that a refrain involves an act of “bringing something 
along” from the territory from which one is deterritorializing.  In the context of the 
present study, the refrain is a face that is brought along during a becoming as a way to 
retain familiarity, humanity and a sense of subjectivity—it is an act of preservation.  In 
this sense, when the Ngarrindjeri refuse to share their cultural knowledge with the State, 
they preserve their culture and humanity.  In doing so, they leave the territory of the 
face.  What I am suggesting is that blocking the possibility for colonial appropriation by 
refusing to divulge cultural knowledge is a radical act of defacialization. 
As I have suggested above, dismantling the face is a dangerous process that risks 
spiraling the individual into abject facelessness and abolition.  As I hope to show in the 
following chapter, one way to dismantle the face and become-imperceptible is to glitch 
systems of signification and subjectification.  As Warren Smith et al. argue “staying 
incomprehensible and anonymous are all strategies which quietly refuse, which say ‘I 
would prefer not to’ to a world which demands so much.  In this way, practices of 
imperceptibility might be understood as the pursuit of space from the endless demand to 
say who you are” (68).  The pursuit to carve out and cultivate zones of reprieve from the 
State’s incessant demand to know, identify, and classify to control, is to engineer a site of 
resistance within a rigid politics of recognition.  Becoming-opaque, becoming- 
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imperceptible is a disruption from within the semiotic of White Man’s advanced 
capitalism.  Refusing to divulge (what is both known and unknown) reterritorializes 
recognition politics onto a more positive plane.  This act of resistance draws a line of 
flight toward “the cosmic forces” of new becomings, which as Bignall asserts in her 
essay, is far more important to postcolonial subjects than is establishing a new structure 
of recognition. 
4.6 The Material Relations of Affect and the Politics of Location 
For affect is not a personal feeling.  Nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation 
of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel. 
-Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus
Bignall characterizes the participants of recognition politics as multiplicities who 
continuously transform as they come into relation with other multiplicities.  She argues 
that the dynamic movement between multiplicities resists the rigid frame of hierarchical 
State recognition, which, in turn, surges new political potentials to rethink recognition as 
an affirming practice that intensifies the individual and group’s capacity to act 
(“Dismantling the White-Man” 86).  Echoing Deleuze and Guattari, she explains that a 
multiplicity is not defined by its composing elements, nor are assemblages of 
multiplicities understood through a center of unification; rather, a multiplicity is defined 
by its “number of dimensions” (86).  A multiplicity is defined by its degrees of potential 
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to act, and the number of dimensions or potentials to act that a multiplicity enjoys is 
determined by its affective connections with others (86).  Therefore, a pluralist 
postcolonial politics of recognition, according to Bignall, aspires to intensify affective 
relations therein as the primary means to multiply participants’ potentials to act. 
Participants disrupt cultural uniformity by acknowledging each other’s difference rather 
than emphasizing shared characteristics.  Bignall concludes that an emphasis on 
difference and relationality within recognition creates “complex and diffuse engagements 
with the State,” which shift the terms of recognition politics in ways that align with 
Ngarrindjeri traditions of agreement-making (“Dismantling the Face” 406). 
Hence, Bignall views recognition politics as a positive process which increases 
postcolonial subjects’ potentia.  The concept of potentia signals the impersonal and 
affirmative forces between subjects.  In Braidotti’s formulation, potentia is “the positivity 
of the intensive subject—its joyful affirmation…the capacity to express his/her 
freedom…the preindividual or impersonal power; the affirmation of multiplicity and not 
of one-sidedness and the interconnection with an ‘outside’ which is of cosmic dimension 
and infinite” (“The Ethics” 134).  In short, potentia is “the desire to become” (157).  By 
spotlighting the potentia of participants’ intersubjective relations, Bignall validates that 
the process of dismantling the face, within recognition politics, does not spiral the 
individual into a dark abyss of absolute facelessness or dehumanization, nor does 
defacialization incur the loss of one’s intensive social relations and political 
interconnections.  Bignall’s retooling of recognition aligns with Braidotti’s contention 
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that dismantling the face takes “the alternative, nomadic path [that] also moves toward 
discovering and experimenting with many possible other faces one might be capable of 
inhabiting” (NT 48).  In other words, a pluralist politics of recognition aims to produce a 
plurality of faces that render a single subjectivity opaque. 
By foregrounding the role of affect in the process of defacialization, Bignall 
illustrates that disrupting the social production of the face does not require the negation of 
others.  Dismantling the face is an affective and relational event that heralds the potential 
to create a multiplicity of emergent subjectivities that collectively expand the dimensions 
of political resistance.  Experimenting with “many more faces” is not a colonization of 
the faces of others; these faces are faces that are yet to come.  In this sense, Bignall’s 
framework of postcolonial recognition politics gestures toward a politics of 
imperceptibility.  As I previously argued alongside Braidotti, a nomadic flirtation with 
recognition and identity do not short circuit the potential for becomings.  Indeed, Bignall 
builds an alliance between recognition and imperceptibility by celebrating the becomings 
that operate within postcolonial practices of cultural belonging. 
Nevertheless, I want to gently trouble Bignall’s characterization of dismantling the 
face as that which happens by way of “careful observation,” “interpretation,” and 
“deconstruction” (“Dismantling the Face” 403).  If dismantling the face is a process of 
“becoming-minor,” as she states, then how might practices of “interpretation” and 
“deconstruction” (of the self or the State) work against a politics of dismantling the face? 
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Asked another way: does the practice of deconstruction and interpretation run counter to 
dismantling the semiotic systems of signifiance and subjectification that a process of 
defacialization entails?  In my view, interpretation and deconstruction are overcoding 
practices that, although they may trouble chains of signifiance, never break from the 
concentric power of Molar Man.  Although my disagreement with Bignall on the use of 
deconstruction and interpretation may be a simple case of preferred semantics, I call 
attention to these terms not as a punctilious critique, but to illustrate the difficulty, and 
perhaps impossibility, of articulating the process and potentials of dismantling the face 
within the frame of recognition.  To be clear, I am not suggesting that defacialization does 
not happen within recognition politics.  What I want to illustrate is the ease with which 
the concept of becoming may be easily swept up in the language of recognition.  For 
example, Bignall defines dismantling the face as “carefully observed processes of 
collective agreement about the preferred nature and good conduct of social engagements” 
and in “finding agreement concerning…the creation of provisional rules of (non- 
imperial) association” (“Dismantling the Face” 408).  While these aspects of 
decolonization are important and desirable within the context of State recognition, it 
appears to me that they remain heavily tied to the production of a face.  As stated above, 
Bignall does acknowledge “possible passages” and “thresholds” between sign regimes 
that deterritorialize “relations of domination in the signifying field” (“Dismantling the 
White-Man” 77).  The limitations of the language of recognition politics, however, make 
it abundantly clear that the affective relations and thresholds between subjects, to which 
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Bignall wishes to point, can be easily made to disappear.  Is it possible to engage with 
a politics of recognition and at the same time discuss the imperceptible forces that are 
already at work within this politics?  Can we make the discourse of recognition politics 
more abstract while at the same time working toward concrete political change? 
Departing from Bignall, I want to explore the subterranean affective relations that 
exist between bodies—or rather, I want to propose a queer politics of imperceptibility 
that goes beyond the limitations of (the language of) recognition.  Deleuze and Guattari’s 
provocation that you dismantle the face by “knowing all of your black holes” is not a call 
to interpret and deconstruct the system of signifiance and subjectification that landed you 
there.  Instead, I suggest that knowing all of your black holes requires a sensory 
exploration of the politics of your location.  The politics of location (which I have argued 
is integral to a queer politics of imperceptibility) must take a posthumanist feminist 
approach to “plug the tracings [of identity] back into the map [of becoming], connect the 
roots or trees back up with a rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 14).  That is, a politics 
of location must be viewed (and practiced) as a rhizomatic sensory and material process 
that contributes to the development of new abstract machines.  To counter the abstract 
machine of faciality, we must invent new abstract machines of resistance.  An abstract 
machine of resistance battles faciality and its overcoding forces by forging imperceptible 
networks of human and non-human bodies.  It operates to reprogram resistance from 
acts of opposition that demand recognition to acts of relation that emerge the political 
potentials of becoming a subjectless subjectivity.  Put simply, the queer politics of 
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imperceptibility I propose understands the politics of location as machinic, as that which 
asserts the importance of difference while also moving toward becoming everything and 
everyone.  On the concept of machinic, Braidotti writes: 
The machinic for Deleuze is yet another figuration that expresses the non-unitary, 
radically materialist and dynamic structure of subjectivity.  It expresses the 
subject's capacity for multiple, non-linear and outward-bound inter-connections 
with a number of external forces and others…It is about multiple alliances, 
symbiotic connections and fusions…What the “machinic” element is expressing 
is the directness, I would say the literal-ness of the relations between forces, 
agents, sites and locations of subjectivity.  This is supposed to challenge the 
dominant paradigm of linguistic mediation, with the twin forces of representation 
and interpretation which have dominated our images of what it means to be a 
subject.  Signals replace signs, expression replaces representation and codes 
replace interpretation.  The machinic expresses the impersonal, or intra-personal 
intensive resonances between the multiple levels of inter-connections that make 
living beings tick. (“Affirming”) 
A queer politics of imperceptibility employs the machinic operations of the politics of 
location to resist faciality and the somatic suspension of sexual surveillance.  It turns to 
the politics of location to uncage our shared potential for becoming-imperceptible and to 
“set faciality traits free like birds” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 189). 
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How does this happen?  How are faciality traits (aspects of identity) freed from 
somatic suspension and carried away toward becomings-imperceptible?  I propose that 
this happens through the intensification of zoe, which Braidotti defines as “a nonhuman 
yet affirmative life-force”78  (“The Politics” 203).  An encounter with or a politics 
centered on zoe79  marks a shift away from anthropocentric perspectives of social 
transformation to emphasize the (non-negotiable importance of) material relations 
between the earth, environment, humans, animals, other sentient beings and nonsentient 
things and their “mutual interdependence of material, biocultural, and symbolic forces in 
the making of social and political practices” (204).  In other words, the politics of 
location frees faciality traits by acknowledging not only the subject’s social situation but 
also its material location.  Throughout the project, I have argued that a queer politics of 
imperceptibility moves away from the notion of a conceptually coherent and materially 
bounded human being toward a posthuman subject who is always and only ever 
becoming.  This movement is the movement of zoe.  The concept of the line of pure 
resistance also necessarily relies on zoe as the force of resistance.  Zoe is the vital force 
78 Braidotti makes a distinction between her understanding of zoe and Agamben’s position on 
bios/ zoe, where the former is considered bare life.  She writes that zoe “becomes for Agamben 
the ever-receding horizon of an alterity which has to be included as necessarily excluded in order 
to sustain the framing of the subject in the first place.  This introduces finitude as a constitutive 
element within the framework of subjectivity, which also fuels an effective political economy of 
loss and melancholia at the heart of subjectivity” (“The Politics” 211).  Differently, Braidotti 
defines zoe as an affirmative generative force that conditions the positivity of life and death.
79 Braidotti introduces the notion of “zoepolitics” as an amendment to “biopolitics.” Zoepolitics 
extends Foucault’s notion of “bio”-political governmentality to all forms of Life and not just the 
human (The Posthuman 111). 
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that enters bodies into becomings.  For example, zoe was the conjugating force at 
Cantapeta Creek that brought together water protector-becomings, environmental- 
becomings, animal-becomings, and spiritual-becomings, increasing the potentia of each. 
An emphasis on material experimentation over resignification allows us to consider 
the asubjective energies involved in dismantling the face.  It compels us to consider the 
“causation” of systemic oppression in terms of the interlocking forces of complex 
phenomena (Coole and Frost 7).  From this posthuman materialist perspective, human 
agency as such can be unearthed from its neoliberal rootedness in individualism and 
understood instead as the emergence of a “complex, pluralistic, relatively open process” 
of interactions between human and non-human matter (Coole and Frost 7).  In the 
introduction to their anthology New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, Diane 
Coole and Samantha Frost advocate that: 
It is in choreographies of becoming that we find cosmic forces assembling and 
disintegrating to forge more or less enduring patterns that may provisionally exhibit 
internally coherent, efficacious organization: objects forming and emerging within 
relational fields, bodies composing their natural environment in ways that are 
corporeally meaningful to them, and subjectivities being constituted as open series 
of capacities or potencies that emerge hazardously and ambiguously within a 
multitude of organic and social processes. In this monolithic but multiple tiered 
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ontology, there is no definitive break between sentient and nonsentient entities or 
between material and spiritual phenomena. (10) 
A materialist perspective is essential when it comes to conceptualizing a queer politics of 
imperceptibility.  Attention to the materiality of becomings—the ways in which the 
subject is embedded in and radically immanent with the unfolding of the universe— 
enables us to focus on the embodied and situated relations of the subject in ways that 
avoid overcoding a politics of location with identity politics.  A zoe-centric feminist 
approach to a politics of imperceptibility understands difference as interconnectedness.  
It recognizes differences between subjects as well as difference itself—the productive 
force of the cosmos of which we are all a part, and that we should all consider when 
thinking-feeling-doing resistance. 
4.7 Probe-heads 
In the last few paragraphs of “Plateau 7-Year Zero: Faciality” in A Thousand Plateaus, 
Deleuze and Guattari offer the seductive and somewhat unsatisfactory concept of the 
“probe-head.” Probe-heads, they tell us, are “guidance devices” capable of breaking 
through the strata, tearing down the walls of signifiance, and “pour out of the holes of 
subjectivity, fell trees in favor of veritable rhizomes…forming strange new becomings, 
new polyvocalities” (190-91).  Probe-heads, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
dismantle the face—although how they do so is not quite clear.  Characteristically, 
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Deleuze and Guattari do not provide a straight-forward definition of the probe-head; even 
though it seems that probe-heads, whatever they might be, are a key aspect of becoming- 
imperceptible because, as we are told, they unlock us from the repressive regime of 
Molar Man (191).  For Bignall, the probe-head is a “destructive-creative process” that 
tears through a rigid structure of recognition to forge new affective relations with 
“neighbouring bodies” (“Dismantling the White-Face” 85, 86).  She contends that probe- 
heads are launched via participants’ open-ended affective relations with one another and 
their willingness to experiment with new forms of cultural belonging.  For Bignall, 
participants actively cultivate and “send out” probe-heads by paying close attention to 
“moments of uncertainty” when it comes to identification, which, in turn, reveals to them 
their sites of subjection (“Dismantling the Face” 407). 
Similarly, Patricia MacCormack contends that probe-heads are created when 
subjects use the “traits of the face to forge connections, to differentiate or extend rather 
than affirm meaning (and consequently to differentiate and extend subject potentials and 
positions)” (138).  Discussing the sites of resistance activated in queer performance art, 
MacCormack argues that probe-heads do not emerge from forcible insertions into the 
strata but by a willingness to use one’s facial traits to invent new sites of connection 
(138).  Probe-heads therefore are something that emphasize haptic connections between 
bodies.  Simon O’Sullivan also links the probe-head to art, stating that “in the realm of 
art […] we can identify a key modality of probe-heads: that they are somehow oriented 
against the present time” (“Pragmatics” 313).  For O’Sullivan, probe-heads signal a 
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reinvention of “our own faces, or rather our own heads—probe-heads—which 
themselves will be the platforms for other, perhaps even stranger modes of organization 
and subsequent deterritorialization” (312).  However, O’Sullivan also submits that a 
probe-head can be anything that sets one on the course of becoming; “It will depend on 
the specifics of time and place, on the particular materials at hand—and on the concrete 
practices of individuals (313).  Elsewhere, he concludes that “Probe-heads are in this 
sense a move into chaos (“From Stuttering” 254).  Like O’Sullivan, I think that probe- 
heads are conjugating “devices” that rupture the constraints of the face by opening the 
door for a future yet to come. 
 
In my view, a probe-head is therefore best thought of as a portal-head.  It is a 
social-material energy that facilitates the crisscrossing of bodies, human and non-human, 
into each other’s dimensions decentering the sense of a unitary subjectivity.  While 
probe-heads may signal a future yet to come, I also want to suggest that they operate in 
the here and now.  They exist between bodies, not beyond them.  I posit probe-heads as 
actual forces of resistance that move horizontally, pulling in asignifying intensities to 
diagram new strategies of resistance.  Probe-heads are not immaterial forces that push 
bodies outward and upward into the abyss.  Deleuze and Guattari state that the goal of 
a probe-head is to “become clandestine, make rhizome everywhere” (ATP 191).  In this 
sense, a probe-head makes material connections, conjugates with bodies, and increases 
potentia.  Nevertheless, probe-heads should not be romanticized.  Deleuze and Guattari 
tell us quite clearly that they are produced when “the faciality machine forces [the 
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body’s] flows into signifiances and subjectifications, into knots of arborescence and holes 
of abolition; sometimes, to the extent that it performs a veritable ‘defacialization’” (190, 
emphasis added).  Probe-heads rip through the faciality machine, but, nevertheless, they 
emerge from a state of emergency, when a becoming faces a black hole.  Thus it would 
seem that probe-heads cannot be controlled or predetermined.  Probe-heads have a virtual 
quality that “steer the flows down lines of positive deterritorialization or creative flight” 
(190).  I suggest that probe-heads emerge from the slippages, cracks, and fissures within 
the State apparatus, opening passageways for escape, which is not an escape out of the 
State, but an escape crafted from within.  Probe-heads, as we shall see in the following 
chapter, are glitches that emerge during moments of somatic suspension. 
 
I will attempt to argue that chasing or following a probe-head, once it has emerged, 
involves following dissymmetrical lines of flight—one line cuts through striated space to 
“reveal” the faciality machine and thus “transform identity” (Bignall “Dismantling the 
Face” 403), and the other line voyages the smooth space of the virtual taking the body 
“beyond” a static sense of “self.” In sum, dismantling the face means confronting “the 
established power of the face [and] reterritorializing alternative structures of meaning” as 
Bignall suggests (401), but it also means taking part in asignifying practices that “delink” 
(Braidotti NT 48), rather than deconstruct, the face from the white wall/black hole 
machine.  Said another way, if dismantling the face requires identifying the roots that 
plant identity and tracing the structures of signifiance, it is only to connect those roots 
back up with rhizomes and plug tracings back into the map to diagram offshoots from the 
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face.  In what follows, I suggest that the queer autonomous zone is a mutating abstract 
machine capable of diagramming those offshoots. 
 
 
4.8 The Queer Autonomous Zone: An Abstract Machine for a Queer Politics of 
Imperceptibility 
 
 
To conclude the chapter, I present the concept of the “queer autonomous zone” as a 
mutating abstract machine that diagrams resistance within the concrete assemblage of 
sexual surveillance.  As I define it, the queer autonomous zone operates on two registers: 
first, it produces the potential for new activisms to take place within the surveillance 
assemblage, opening the assemblage up to new becomings.  Second, it orchestrates a shift 
in thinking-feeling-doing resistance from a politics of recognition to imperceptibility. 
 
Recall that Deleuze and Guattari argue that an assemblage effectuates every 
abstract machine.  For example, faciality is effectuated by the interpenetration of sign 
regimes within the concrete assemblage of the State apparatus.  I suggest that 
assemblages of resistance effectuate the queer autonomous zone.  While faciality 
manufactures the white wall/black hole machine to create binary and biunivocal relations 
that produce the face, I posit the queer autonomous zone as a diagrammatic force that 
gives an assemblage a structure of feeling to create unstructured affective relations that 
dismantle the face. 
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The queer autonomous zone, as an abstract machine, can only be defined 
abstractly.  Attempting to describe an abstract machine is not only impossible (given that 
I understand it as virtual), but to do so would only serve to overcode its potentials and 
block its lines of flight.  Consequently, I define the concept of the queer autonomous 
zone not by what it is but by what it can do.  What the queer autonomous zone can do is 
diagram potentials of resistance.  Deleuze and Guattari explain the diagrammatic 
function of an abstract machine as follows: 
 
Defined diagrammatically… an abstract machine is neither an infrastructure that 
is determining in the last instance nor a transcendental Ideal that is determining in 
the supreme instance.  Rather it plays a piloting role.  The diagrammatic or 
abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather 
constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality. (ATP 142) 
 
Just how the queer autonomous zone diagrams resistance will be highly dependent on the 
situation that effectuates it given that it is the relations within an assemblage that 
determine its piloting role.  Moreover, defining how the machine functions ahead of its 
circumstance would result in a limited and constrained understanding of its potentials. 
The operations of the queer autonomous zone will unfold more clearly in the following 
chapter in my discussion of glitch art. Be that as it may, I want to introduce the queer 
autonomous zone and its importance for a queer politics of imperceptibility here by 
defining its mutating function and how that function counters faciality. 
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Adding to the difficulty of the task at hand is that the concept of the mutating 
abstract machine appears throughout A Thousand Plateaus in varied and complex ways.  
Deleuze and Guattari often turn to art, music, or literature as conceptual entry points.  For 
example, they reference Virginia Woolf’s 1931 novel, The Waves (as well as the ocean’s 
waves) to characterize the abstract machine.  They write: “Waves are vibrations, shifting 
borderlines inscribed on the plane of consistency as so many abstractions.  The abstract 
machine of the waves” (252).  Here, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the novel’s structure as 
an abstract machine.  The novel is written as a series of interludes and episodes that 
alternate between third person narration of a coastal seascape that details the activity of 
the waves throughout the course of a day and first-person soliloquies spoken by the 
novel’s six characters.  There is a seventh character who does not speak but who we hear 
about by way of the other characters in the novel.  Deleuze and Guattari define each 
character as a multiplicity with the seventh silent character being the “ultimate 
multiplicity that envelops the greatest number of dimensions” as he is discussed by all the 
other characters (252).  When reading the novel, it is not always easy to discern which 
character is speaking given that Woolf does not offer narrative interventions (e.g. “said 
Jinny”); but each character has recognizable traits (such as Jinny’s emphasis on the body) 
that enable the reader to determine the speaker’s identity.  A common interpretation of 
the novel is that the characters (or multiplicities) compose a single plane of consciousness 
and each character represents one facet of the same mind.  Indeed, the characters flow 
into one another as each soliloquy is prefaced by an interlude that diagrams a different
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intensity of the waves.  As David Bradshaw writes in his introduction to the 2015 reprint, 
“The function of these interludes, Woolf explained in her diary, was to create ‘a 
background—the sea; insensitive nature’” (Woolf xii).  The sea draws a plane of 
consistency across the novel; the background of the sea is not so much insensitive nature 
as it is intensive nature in that it brings all the multiplicities together by diagramming 
their intensities.  For example, during a rare occasion in the book, when all the characters 
are together speaking as “we,” Woolf writes: 
 
the moment of ravenous identity is over…the circle in our blood, broken so often, 
so sharply, for we are so different, closes in a ring.  Something is made…this 
common feeling…we are not slaves bound to suffer incessantly unrecorded petty 
blows on our bent backs.  We are not sheep either, following a master.  We are 
creators.  We too have made something that will join the innumerable 
congregations of past time.  We too…stride not into chaos, but into a world that 
our own force can subjugate and make part of the illumined and everlasting road.  
(83, 84, 85) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari contend that each character in the novel “crosses over into 
others,” marking the edge of a multiplicity of which they are all a part: “Each [character] 
advances like a wave, but on the plane of consistency they are a single abstract Wave 
whose vibration propagates following a line of flight or deterritorialization traversing the 
entire plane” (ATP 252).  Each soliloquy marks the cutting edge of the other so that they 
4: Dismantling the face 246 
 
 
 
 
compose a single plane of consistency.  Life in the novel emerges as a series of events 
marked only by varying degrees of intensity: there is no plot, only becomings; “chapters” 
are unnumbered, leaving Life80 as it is—a rhizome composed only of plateaus.81 The 
waves narrated throughout the novel are an abstract machine that diagram relations of 
intensity between characters, opening their multiplicity to new becomings.  In its written 
form, The Waves is also an abstract machine that mutates the conventional novel structure 
rendering it as a rhizome. 
In a more literal figuration, the actual waves of the ocean are also an abstract 
machine; they diagram the assemblage of the sea.  Waves collect and mix the things of 
the sea and tide together new relations.  Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the mutating 
abstract machine is not a physical container; “it has no form of its own (much less 
substance)” (ATP 141).  It serves only to conjoin flows of intensity through rhythms of 
speeds and slowness.  The abstract machine does not distinguish between matter and 
meaning, substance and form, content and expression; everything smooths out on a plane 
of consistency (510-11).  The term “consistency” does not refer to coherence or 
cohesion, rather it signals the materiality of intensities—their density and viscosity—that  
 
80 I capitalize Life to indicate life in its impersonal sense—what Deleuze refers to as immanence.  
He writes, “We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else.  It is not 
immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life...a life, no longer dependent 
on a Being or submitted to an Act” (PI 27, emphasis original). 
 
81 Deleuze and Guattari define a plateau as a “continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities 
whose development avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or external end” (ATP 2).  
I will discuss plateaus in the next chapter—which I understand to be itself a plateau. 
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is, their consistency.  Following Deleuze and Guattari’s claim, waves also transfer 
energy from one point to another by way of oscillation independent of a container of 
transportation.  Waves diagram the ocean as a single indivisible flow—a plane of 
vibration composed only of pulsations.  Indeed, as Woolf illustrates: “[The waves] 
drew in and out with the energy, the muscularity of an engine which sweeps its force 
out and in again” (63).  Waves carry quanta and matter which, on the plane of 
consistency, conjugate and forge potentials for new oceanic relations.  The vibrations 
of the wave-machine extract contents from the ocean and carry them away in their 
wake, creating continuums of intensity that engender new vibrations and new relations.  
For example, the abstract machine of waves engenders the potential for new 
interactions among mammals, fish, plants, ships, swimmers, fish netting, oil, plastic.  
Nonetheless, it is the concrete assemblage of the ocean that determines “which 
variables will enter into constant relations or obey obligatory rules and which will 
serve instead as a fluid matter for variation” (ATP 100).  For example, mammal-
becomings, fish-becomings, plant-becomings, ship-becomings, swimmer-becomings 
are reterritorialized by the ocean’s relations, defining them as either rigid or supple 
segmentations, molar or molecular lines, predator or prey, determining whether they 
are washed up on shore or carried out to sea, contaminated or purified, and whether 
they sink or swim. 
 
The abstract machine catches “a bundle of potential affects” (Massumi UG 152n36) 
and fans them across its fluid plane, sending the relation between elements to their 
furthest threshold: “I threw my bunch into the spreading wave.  I said, ‘Consume me, 
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carry me to the furthest limit’” (Woolf 121).  As I indicated earlier, resistance is a 
process of reterritorialization as much as it is deterritorialization; potentials riding on the 
plane of consistency reterritorialize on the strata where they are assigned a form with a 
function: “The wave has broken; the bunch is withered” (121).  Waves steer the ocean’s 
deterritorializations and the ocean reterritorializes the potentials of the waves.  The ocean 
determines how elements riding on the wave will settle on the seabed; will things come 
together to grow as arborescent kelp forests or plant themselves rhizomatically as beds of 
seagrass?  Or, will potential relations be left on the surf to catch another wave, another 
abstract machine: “The wave paused, and then drew out again, sighing like a sleeper 
whose breath comes and goes unconsciously” (Woolf 2).  The assemblage of the 
ocean— not the wave— determines what form potentials will take and the course of their 
direction. 
 
The mutating abstract machine, such as the ocean’s waves, creates becomings and 
lines of flight, whereas the overcoding machine of faciality, forms black holes and lines 
of destruction.  The two machines draw different planes: the mutating machine draws a 
plane of consistency which, as we just saw, is a plane of undefined flows and intensities.  
In contrast, the overcoding machine establishes a plane of organization to produce and 
reproduce rigid lines of segmentarity.  But it is the concrete assemblage (of the ocean or 
of the State respectively) that realizes the abstract machine.  The overcoding machine and 
the mutating machine are equally diagrammatic; waves diagram the ocean just as faciality 
diagrams the State.  As we will see next, the queer autonomous zone diagrams a new 
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politics of resistance.  It creates the potential for new modes of activism within the 
surveillance assemblage.  Unlike the abstract machine of faciality that overcodes and 
organizes strata, as a mutating machine, the queer autonomous zone is only concerned 
with flows of desire and destratified intensities. 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, “desire” is a productive, positive, and vital force that 
enhances the capacity of a body to act.  Desire is always productive: “there are no 
internal drives in desire, only assemblages.  Desire is always assembled; it is what the 
assemblage determines it to be” (ATP 229).   In other words, desire is not the desire for 
an object nor can it be understood in an abstract sense; desire, Deleuze argues, must 
always be understood in its particular context.  Desire is a flow that moves within a 
specific “milieu” or “landscape” (Deleuze A to Z).  For example, the desire to protect 
water is not a desire for water protection in the abstract—One desires to protect water 
within the context of the environment, health, as a life-giving resource, in the context of 
tradition and so forth: “I never desire some thing all by itself…there is no desire that does 
not flow within an assemblage…to desire is to construct an assemblage…when anyone 
says…I desire this or that, that means that he/she is in the process of constructing an 
assemblage…desire is nothing else” (A to Z). The desire to protect water contributes to 
the construction of the NoDAPL assemblage, it constructs all of its aggregates: the 
aggregate of the water ceremony, of community, of the choices made; and the relations 
built and sustained. 
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However, desire is not a personal force.  As Colebrook explains, “Deleuze set 
himself the task of thinking desire positively: not desire that someone has for something 
she wants or lacks; but a desire that is just a productive and creative energy, a desire of 
flux, force and difference, a revolutionary desire that we need to think in ways that will 
disrupt common sense and everyday life” (Understanding Deleuze xv).  Colebrook 
articulates profound implications to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of desire.  She 
identifies its potential to phenomenally shift our fundamental orientation to our sense of 
identity, our way of thinking and being in the world.  She continues: 
 
Through this concept of desire, Deleuze and Guattari presented a challenge to the 
relation between theory and life.  How might we think differently in order to 
avoid the notion that “we” have a fixed identity or being that we then engage with 
through ideas?  Would it be possible to think without assuming some pre-given 
(or transcendent) model?  If we accept that life is desire—a flow of forces that 
produces relations—then we can no longer rely on a single relation or being to 
provide a foundation for thinking.  We can no longer think of humanity, language 
or culture as the ground of life, for human life and thinking would be one flow of 
desire among others. (xvi-xvii, emphasis added) 
 
Returning to the example of water protection, the protection of water may be something 
“that one may want,” but desire precedes the want.  Desire is the productive energy that 
attracts elements together to create an assemblage in which the articulation of “I want” is  
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just one flow of desire among others, one element of the desiring-machine.  This 
perspective on desire allows us to consider the connective tissues and functions that come 
before desire is assigned a purpose.  It underscores, as Colebrook puts it, that “Desire is a 
process of increasing expansion, connection and creation” (xxii).  Desire does not 
originate from the self; it is a becoming engendered by relations between multiplicities. 
 
What is the role of desire when it comes to formulating the queer autonomous 
zone?  If desire constructs an assemblage—or, as Massumi argues, is an assemblage that 
brings together elements through waves of attraction and particles of desire (UG 82)— 
and it is the concrete assemblage that effectuates the abstract machine, then the site of 
mutation necessarily begins not with the abstract machine but from relations of desire.  
Resistance to sexual surveillance begins from creative social energy, which is the 
relations of desire that exist within the sexual surveillance assemblage.  Revolutionary 
forces are created by relations of desire which the overcoding machine cannot anticipate 
or perceive. 
 
The question, as Deleuze asks, is: “what is the nature of relations between elements 
in order for there to be desire, for these elements to become desirable?” (A to Z).  Where 
does desire flow in an assemblage?  How can we open passageways for desire to flow 
while also destroying its roadblocks?  As I have demonstrated, the line of pure resistance 
is a concept that enables us to map these passages, roadblocks, and as well, the nature of 
relations between elements that create desire.  As we saw in the previous chapter, the line 
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of pure resistance detects subterranean and imperceptible-becomings to map the flows of 
desire that produce resistance during an event in which a body faces a black hole of 
destruction.  Indeed, the line of pure resistance is itself a flow of desire.  It produces and 
sustains becomings by creating multiple relations in its immediate environment.  The line 
of pure resistance is produced through and productive of desire.  Conceptually, the line 
of pure resistance enables us to locate roadblocks and passages, and the queer 
autonomous zone functions to clear the blockages.  The faciality machine, as we saw 
above, gridlocks the material relations of becoming by giving those relations names, 
places, and faces.  The queer autonomous zone draws new lines and pathways for desire 
to flow.  If, as Deleuze and Guattari contend, “it is always by rhizome that desire moves 
and produces” (ATP 14), then the task at hand, the task of the queer autonomous zone is, 
quite simply, to make rhizomes. 
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5 
 
Plateau: The Queer Autonomous Zone in Action 
 
In Deleuze and Guattari, a plateau is reached when circumstances combine to 
bring an activity to a pitch of intensity that is not automatically dissipated in a 
climax.  The heightening of energies is sustained long enough to leave a kind of 
afterimage of its dynamism that can be reactivated or injected into other activities, 
creating a fabric of intensive states between which any number of connecting 
routes could exist. 
 
-Brian Massumi, Foreword, A Thousand Plateaus 
 
 
In this concluding chapter, I call upon the concepts and arguments I have presented thus 
far to posit glitch art as an example of the queer autonomous zone in operation.  Briefly, 
glitch art is defined as the practice of manipulating data files to produce unexpected 
digital images or sounds.  I will return to glitch art below when I discuss its potentials to 
dismantle the face.  I divide the chapter into several “plateaus” to probe deeper into the 
intensities of the queer autonomous zone as I see them unfolding during the glitch art 
event.  As Massumi indicates above, for Deleuze and Guattari, plateaus are “continuous 
regions of intensities” that curtail any sense of cohesion and do not “allow themselves to 
build toward a climax” (ATP 158).  In like manner, the plateaus that follow here are 
provocations, probes, and wavelengths that aim to bring the project to a sort of “pitch of 
intensity” without dissipation.  While each section below connects with the other, my 
goal here is not to build an argument; rather, I seek to generate a momentum and 
intensity.  If the queer autonomous zone, as a mutating abstract machine, functions to 
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make rhizomes, then it follows that it should be explored rhizomatically.  Equal parts 
hypothesis, creative exploration, art exhibition, and manifesto, the chapter aims to 
develop a coalescence of ideas that assemble the concepts of somatic suspension, 
imperceptibility, dismantling the face, and glitch art in unexpected ways. 
 
I present glitch art as an “afterimage” of the project that aims to “reactivate” the 
concepts that I have presented thus far.  I want to stress that my focus on glitch art should 
not be taken to mean that I understand it as the only or superior form of resistance 
diagrammed by the queer autonomous zone.  The queer autonomous zone, like a 
plateau,82  diagrams resistance by “creating a fabric of intensive states between which any 
number of connecting routes could exist” (Massumi Foreword x).  Glitch art is but one 
route amongst many possibilities.  My decision to focus on glitch is based on its growing 
prevalence as an art medium as well as the rise of recent scholarship in this field.83 
Moreover, as I will show, glitch can be harnessed as a mode of “self”-styling that 
foregrounds the potential for a non-unitary subjectless subjectivity which, as I have 
argued, is a crucial element for a queer politics of imperceptibility. To refresh, in the first 
 
82 For Deleuze and Guattari, “each abstract machine can be considered a ‘plateau’ of variation that 
places variables of content and expression in continuity.” (ATP 511).  In this sense, the queer 
autonomous zone is a plateau that converges intensities and affective textures to create a plane of 
consistency of moving parts with different trajectories.  See Massumi’s forward to ATP for a 
definition of plateau as a convergence of disparate trajectories (iv). 
 
83 See Shabbar 2018; Braidotti and Hlavajova 2018; Fournier 2018; Cubitt 2017; Pasek 2017; 
Wolfgang et al. 2017; Haber 2016; Brooks 2015; Sundén 2015; Marenko 2015; Parkhill and 
Rodgers 2011; Menkman 2011.  The emerging field of glitch studies (not always named as such) 
is multidisciplinary, including crossovers with hacktivism, tactical media, wearable technologies, 
virus and viral theory, Afrofuturism, and posthumanism more broadly. 
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chapter, following Deleuze and Guattari, I introduced sexuality as a flux—a movement 
and impersonal flow of a multiplicity.  In the second chapter, I argued that sexual 
surveillance blocks and suspends this movement by plotting bodies on the grid of 
identification.  In the third chapter, I suggested that instead of a politics of recognition, 
based on defining subject/object relations, resistance to sexual surveillance ought to be 
considered in terms of movements of imperceptibility and desubjectification.  There, I 
also introduced the line of pure resistance as a concept that allows us to trace the 
embedded and embodied human and non-human relations that emerge during becomings- 
imperceptible.  In the last chapter, I identified faciality as the machinic operation that 
diagrams surveillance and controls sexuality by giving it a face.  To counter faciality, I 
proposed the queer autonomous zone as a mutating force that creates relations of 
resistance within the surveillance assemblage.  Here, my goal is to conclude the project 
by demonstrating that a queer politics of imperceptibility is already underway.  To flesh 
out this conclusion, I explore Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “possible worlds” and 
delineate how it reveals a move toward non-unitary subjectivities and collective 
becomings.  I underpin this movement by discussing the effects and affects of glitches 
and glitch art with a presentation of my art project Queer-Alt-Delete, which will bring us 
to view the queer autonomous zone in action. 
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5.1 Plateau: What is Glitch? 
 
Glitches are rogue algorithms, unforeseen conjugations that interrupt the human/machine 
separation.  They disrupt the body’s habitual movements and jerk it into a new situation.  
For example, when a computer crashes, a screen freezes, or a sound is stuck on repeat, 
the user is forced into action: stop, restart, reboot, or retreat.  Annoyance and agitation 
well up in the body; hands clench, eyes roll, heart-rate increases, perspiration forms at the 
brow as an exasperated sigh escapes from the user’s lips.  Glitches are haptic.84   They 
create an embodied response and felt experience that involuntarily contracts the distance 
between user and computer, animating a hiccup between the interface of self and 
machine.  Glitches may occur because of a system malfunction or they may be provoked 
by misuse of the system.  However, they often seem to appear without justification.  
Does the computer need an update?  Is there a virus?  Is the system overloaded, 
overcoded?  Regardless of the root cause of a glitch, it produces an intimate relation of 
frustration in which both user and computer need time to cool down.  A glitch is a high 
 
 
 
 
 
84 Laura U. Marks, drawing from Deleuze, defines haptic as follows: “the use of the sense of 
touch, isolated from its narrative functions, to create a cinematic space” (8).  Although both 
Deleuze and Marks are writing in the context of film/video, I argue that haptic space manifests 
during the relational “viewing” and creating of glitch images, which I discuss further below.  For 
example, when it comes to the hapticity of glitches, Marks asks: “When your computer jitters and 
crashes, do you not bleed too?  Does the aborted connection remind you of your tenuous hold on 
this world?  When your computer sprouts a rash of warnings and mindless confirmation messages 
on its face, do you similarly grow hot and bothered?  I know I do.” (191). 
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intensity situation that corrupts the plane of organization.85   The sheer affectivity that 
glitch produces signals its potential for serious disruption. 
 
A more positive experience of glitch than I have just described was given by artist 
and writer Legacy Russell in 2012.  Russell coined the phrase “glitch feminism” and 
defines glitch as a “digital orgasm, where the machine takes a sigh, a shudder, and with a 
jerk, spasms” (“Digital Dualism”).  For Russell, glitch serves as a source of feminist 
pleasure that activates a new politics.  Glitch feminism, she writes: 
 
embraces the causality of “error,” and turns the gloomy implication of glitch on its 
ear by acknowledging that an error in a social system that has already been 
disturbed by economic, racial, social, sexual, and cultural stratification and the 
imperialist wrecking-ball of globalization—processes that continue to enact 
violence on all bodies—may not, in fact, be an error at all, but rather a much- 
needed erratum. This glitch is a correction to the “machine,” and, in turn, a positive 
departure. (“Digital Dualism,” emphasis original) 
 
Placing this argument within the context of cybersex and online pornography, Russell 
situates glitch in the “realm of foreplay, whether it be ‘play’ with oneself, or with a 
virtualized other, imagined, or waiting just on the other side of the proverbial screen” 
(“Digital Dualism, emphasis original).  The glitch, she reasons, is a “happy accident” that 
85 To reiterate, the plane of organization organizes relations between signs and subjects, forms and 
functions; it performs the function of stratification (ATP 269).  As we saw in the previous chapter, 
faciality operates on and creates a plane of organization to overcode the body with a face. 
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reworks the regulatory and routine experience of sex and sexuality by prompting a 
sudden awareness that we can and ought to “choose-our-own-adventure” when getting 
intimate with technology and when navigating the “hegemony of a structured system” 
(“Digital Dualism”).  The sensuous and tantalizing portrait she paints of glitch as a 
“third-party” in a much-needed ménage à trois with technology, sharply contrasts the 
characterization of “error” in consumer culture as a miserable lag that occurs as a result 
of operating on last year’s technology or the drudgery of a slow internet speed while 
trying to navigate capitalism’s highspeed highway.  Like Russell, I also posit glitch as an 
affirmative tool that reveals and widens the cracks in an already corrupt system. 
 
A glitch meddles with the process of computational stratification.  It unravels 
algorithmic functions, chains of code and extracts them from their plane of organization.  
Bits of data “spin off the strata, scrambling forms by dint of speed or slowness, breaking 
down functions” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 270).  Although Deleuze and Guattari, to 
the best of my knowledge, do not discuss computer glitches, I insert their words here to 
gesture toward the ways in which a glitch not only corrupts a plane of organization but 
also performs a destratification whereby elements and bits of data are only distinguished 
from one another by their varying “speeds” and by the micro-assemblages they enter into 
(255). The glitch introduces algorithmic uncertainty, creates chaos within a system, and 
unleashes new and unexpected connections with no seeming rhyme or reason.  The 
glitch event threatens control by jamming its overcoding mechanisms. 
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The etymology of the word “glitch” comes from the Yiddish word glitsh “to slip,” 
“slither” or “slide and glide”— a glitch makes something slippery or throws things off 
balance (Sundén 6).  I suggest that computational glitches have the capacity to slide the 
body out of a moment of somatic suspension86 by exposing the instability of identity, the 
corruptibility of the face, and the inherent fallibility of the overcoding machine.  If, as 
Deleuze argues, first, that disciplinary mechanisms of control are susceptible to “the 
passive dangers of entropy” and second, that “the active dangers of sabotage” and 
societies of control are jammed by “piracy” and “the introduction of viruses” 
(“Postscript” 6),87   then I suggest that glitch is a weapon that can be used to counter both 
dangers.  A glitch jams the white wall/black hole machine, and sabotages faciality, not 
only by exposing the inner workings of the system but also by offering itself up as a tool 
of resistance, as we shall see. 
Glitch has an important relationship to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of possible 
worlds because glitch is intimately connected to facilitating the opening of new 
possibilities.  Glitch gives way to possibility: something alien may flash on the screen 
before it crashes or a frame freezes, forcing a new thought or contemplation.  
86 In chapter two, I define somatic suspension as the occasion when the body’s movement is 
suspended, either physically or affectively, from crossing a threshold.  Somatic suspension is a 
technique of control that exists within the surveillance assemblage along with spatial 
arrangements of in-visibility and digital modulation (for my discussion on somatic suspension see 
p. 84).
87 For my overview of Deleuze’s arguments on the relation between disciplinary societies and 
societies of control see p. 43-50. 
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According to Simon O’Sullivan, “glitches—or breaks in the typical—are a kind of 
reverse technology in that they offer an escape from the manipulation performed by 
those other affective assemblages that increasingly operate in a parallel logic to art” 
(“From Stuttering” 251).  Seeing the proliferation and circulation of mass media 
images as an exercise of affective control, O’Sullivan argues that glitching dominant 
images of the world not only breaks a world but makes one: “[glitches are the] betrayal 
of one world and the affirmation of a world-yet-to-come” (251).  Glitches reveal 
possible worlds that trouble the veracity of the subject/object division (249). 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari the term “possible” has a specific meaning.  It is in 
opposition to the real and differentiated from the virtual.88 As Ronald Bogue notes in his 
extensive genealogy of Deleuze’s treatment of the possible, there are two definitions of 
the possible for Deleuze (277).  First, following Henri Bergson, Deleuze rejects the 
possible as that which conditions the real.  The possible, Deleuze argues, “is opposed to 
the real,” where on the other hand the virtual “possesses a full reality by itself” (DR 211).  
As well, the possible is only realized by an actual event.  For example, after we trip and 
fall, we may reflect on the situation and play out other possible scenarios that could have 
happened: it could have been worse; if I was more careful, this would not have happened, 
I should have taken the other path, and so forth.  None of these possibilities existed as 
 
88 On p. 151, I define the relation between the virtual and actual as follows: the virtual is not 
something we can perceive.  It is only something we can intuit.  Nevertheless, the virtual is still 
active; it is not something waiting to be actualized for us to perceive; becomings are virtual.  The 
virtual is a political potential that exceeds actual ideologies and systems of knowledge that we 
have produced thus far. 
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such (as a way to avoid the fall) until the event took place, and yet tripping and falling 
itself unfolds as one of the many possibilities that could have happened, thus rendering it 
as an actual event that is part of the real.  As Bogue explains, the problem that Deleuze 
has with this conceptualization of the possible is that “since every possible is not realized, 
the actual event is merely a limitation or filtering of possibilities, on possibility passing 
into existence while the others are discarded” (277). 
 
The problem with this definition of the possible, for Deleuze is that it suggests that 
reality is simply created by adding existence to an already perceived possibility.  Against 
this, he argues that the real precedes and conditions what is possible (Bogue 276).  The 
possible is not real but it exists.  Which is to say that possibilities are realized.  Virtuals, 
on the other hand, are actualized.  But a possibility, once it is realized can be 
“potentialized” so that it feeds into the virtual and becomes a reality.  For example, 
tripping and following is a realized possibility that unleashes the potential for new events 
to take place (a sprained ankle, a missed appointment, a connection with a stranger who 
has lent a helping hand).  The difference between the virtual and possible is that the 
possible is comprised only of resemblance whereas the virtual is composed of pure 
difference (Bogue 212). 
 
The first definition of the possible, that it operates within the realm of resemblance, 
limitation, and representation, may appear to have a negative value.  However, Deleuze 
gives the possible a second definition, which is more positive in that the possible 
5: Plateau 262 
 
 
 
 
expresses a world yet to come.  Deleuze and Guattari write: “This possible world is not 
real, or not yet, but it exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists only in its 
expression…. And this possible world also has a specific reality in itself, as possible” 
(WP 17).  These two different definitions of the possible given by Deleuze affirm that 
there are both rhizomatic possibilities and arborescent possibilities.  The rhizomatic realm 
positively effects that which exists but is not yet real.  In other words, its gives potential 
to possible worlds imagined.  Importantly, Deleuze and Guattari identify the probe-head 
as that which “opens a rhizomatic realm of possibility effecting the potentialization of the 
possible, as opposed to arborescent possibility which marks a closure, an impotence” 
(ATP 191).  Indeed, in this quote, Deleuze and Guattari give us the closest definition of 
the probe-head function: it effects the potentialization of the possible.  Hence, a probe- 
head not only leads to dismantling the face but also creates the possibility for new faces  
to emerge. 
 
Bogue maintains that for Deleuze and Guattari, the “invention of possible worlds 
proceeds through embodiment, by way of an experimentation on the sensations that 
traverse bodies, such that the virtual, which is immanent with those sensations is given a 
new material form” (286).  The probe-head then, can be figured as an embodied 
experience and sensation that gives the virtual a new material form.  This accords with 
my claim in the previous chapter that probe-heads are portal-heads that facilitate the 
crisscrossing of bodies, human and non-human, into each other’s dimensions, unleashing 
virtual intensities and entering the subject into new states of becoming.  There, I also 
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suggested that probe-heads are glitches that emerge during moments of somatic 
suspension.89   Following this, I claim here that glitches, as probe-heads, slide the body 
out of somatic suspension by revealing and potentializing the possibility of a different 
world. 
 
5.2 Plateau: Sliding out of Somatic Suspension 
 
Although Deleuze and Guattari indicate that the probe-head potentializes possible worlds, 
they also assert that probe-heads emerge when the abstract machine of faciality “forces 
flows of signifiance and subjectification, into knots of arborescence and holes of 
abolition” (ATP 190).  As such, I hypothesize that a probe-head emerges during somatic 
suspension, when the body is caught between a threshold and the grid of identification, 
when flows of becoming are forced into black holes of abolition.  Somatic suspension, if 
it produces a probe-head, as I suggest, can then be seen as a technique of surveillance that 
inadvertently and intimately reveals the cracks and fissures of the system.  Somatic 
suspension reveals new possibilities of resistance.  I would like to now propose that 
somatic suspension and the emergence of a probe-head therein glitches the grid of 
identification and “opens a rhizomatic realm of possibility” (Deleuze and Guattari 190). 
 
Somatic suspension both is and is not a glitch.  For example, when somatic 
suspension is the result of a biometric failure it is not a glitch.  As Shoshana Magnet and 
 
89 See p. 241 
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Simone Browne demonstrate, failure is encoded into biometric technology.  Failure here 
is not a spontaneous event.  As we saw previously, security scanners in airports that 
reinforce the gender binary (when a TSA agent determines a traveller’s gender by 
choosing either a blue button for male or a pink button for female) are designed to fail to 
recognize certain bodies (Magnet 30).  Yet, it is possible in this moment that somatic 
suspension may reveal the inevitable failure of identification, exposing the instability of 
the grid of identification and causing the face to slip.  Said another way, during somatic 
suspension the body has the potential to momentarily glimpse “the ruin of representation” 
(Olkowski 1999).90 What I am suggesting is that somatic suspension is a technique of 
surveillance that could go both ways, it may create arborescent possibilities or rhizomatic 
ones.  Although somatic suspension may incur negative effects and affects for the body 
suspended, the chain of signifiance is nonetheless momentarily broken, the body is hurled 
off course, and a line of flight escapes reterritorialization. 
 
Glitch art, as I will show, can capitalize on this failure by exploiting and exposing 
the weakness of technology.  At the same time, glitch art acknowledges the 
inseparability between human and machine and the possible worlds that exist between 
 
 
 
90 Briefly, the ruin of representation, according to Dorothea Olkowski, distorts homogenic world 
views and glimpses possibilities of new worlds beyond hierarchies, binaries, and rigid 
stratification.  She contends that this “ruin” is produced through creative means.  For example, 
she writes, “distorting tendencies (distorting in relation to the rigid hierarchies of representation) 
have always been present in selected works of art and, to some extent, even in the work of 
representational artists, as the crack or the catastrophe that emerges in the midst of 
representation” (25). 
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them.  We shall traverse closer to one possible world in the next two plateaus: Glitch 
Art and Queer-Alt- Delete. 
5.3 Plateau: Glitch Art 
Glitch art is defined as the practice of manipulating media in ways that produce 
unexpected images or sounds.  This may include data manipulation, corrupting 
algorithmic code, mashing together different programming languages, or using hardware 
in unintended ways to introduce an element of error into the art making process.  The 
resulting artwork varies greatly depending on the file’s format and the technique used. 
Moreover, it is usually the case that the creator cannot predetermine the “look” of a 
glitched image.91
Glitch art produces technical errors to betray form in favour of generating 
“atypical expressions,” which have the power to effectuate change and reveal difference 
and potential.  In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, “atypical expression constitutes a cutting 
edge of deterritorialization of language…it causes language to tend toward the limit of its 
elements, forms, or notions, toward a near side or a beyond of language” (ATP 99).  An 
91 That said, there are several glitch artists who make glitch images and sounds using photo 
editing software, which allows the creator to carefully curate an aesthetics.  There are also online 
“glitch generators,” which do not require any actual data bending or code corruption on behalf of 
the user.  My analysis of glitch art does not extend to these practices given that they privilege 
technique and form over expression and experience. 
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atypical expression pushes form and elements to their absolute limit.92 In Massumi’s 
articulation: 
The atypical expression pulls language into a direct contact with its own futurity.  
It forcibly twists it into glints of forms, hints of contents, as-yet-functionless 
functions which, however ‘unmotivated’ or ‘arbitrary,’ could be.  The atypical 
expression puts the screws on the system of language in a way that forces its actual 
operation to overlap with its zone of potential….  Language has been made to 
coincide, ‘on the near side or beyond’ of its conventional usage, with its own 
intensity. (A Shock to Thought xxii-iii, emphasis original) 
Paraphrasing Guattari, Massumi further continues that “the atypical expression is a 
‘nucleus of expression’ that may evade capture long enough to continue its autonomous 
formations as a ‘node’ of self-creative or ‘autopoietic’ subjectification” (xxviii).  I 
92 Relevant to understanding “atypicality” is Deleuze and Guattari’s delineation between 
“content” and “expression.” They define content and expression as the formalizations of 
unformed intensities and potentials.  When an assemblage is stratified by an overcoding machine, 
intensities and potentials are articulated on the strata as content and expression.  Deleuze and 
Guattari explain this “double articulation” of intensities and potentials as follows: 
It is on the strata that the double articulation appears that formalizes traits of expression 
and traits of content, each in its own right, turning matters into physically or semiotically 
formed substances and functions into forms of expression or content.  Expression then 
constitutes indexes, icons, or symbols that enter regimes or semiotic systems.  Content 
then constitutes bodies, things, or objects that enter physical systems, organisms, and 
organizations ….  All of this culminates in a language stratum that installs an abstract 
machine on the level of expression and takes the abstraction of content even further.  
(ATP 142-3) 
The queer autonomous zone is a mutating abstract machine that deterritorializes expression and 
entangles it with new intensities, conditioning the potential described by Massumi, for 
“atypicalities [to] slip out of signification’s sleeves” (Massumi A Shock to Thought xxvii). 
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suggest that glitch art is an atypical expression.  It pulls the language of code into an 
uncertain futurity, forcibly twisting it into arbitrary states in which an image could be.  
Glitch art bends and contorts the language of code taking its expression to the absolute 
limit.  Glitch art experiments with nodes of indeterminacy and encourages the autopoiesis
of error93  to contort algorithmic rules and occasion the spontaneous eruption of the 
unknown.  As is often the case with art forms, glitch art invokes an embodied and sensory 
relationship with its creator.  However, glitch art engages the artist with a canvas of code 
and a paintbrush of data in which the intent is not to make something appear on the 
surface, but to erase bytes of information and make things disappear from the surface.  
Or, the code may be doubled, pushed to its limit, to create a sensor(y) overload within the 
processing machine. 
In his 1987 lecture, “What is the Creative Act?” Deleuze contends that “The work of 
art is not an instrument of communication; the work of art has nothing to do with 
communication.  The work of art does not contain the least bit of information.” It would 
seem then, that glitch art subverts communication.  It scrambles information, breaks 
information, and renders communication opaque.  However, glitch introduces a new 
mode of “communication.” It does not dispense information, but it signals the very 
failure of informatic communication.  Glitch art can be defined as a “minor literature” 
(O’Sullivan 250).  Deleuze and Guattari define minor literature as an experimentation 
93 By “autopoiesis of error” I mean to signal the capacity of a computer glitch or error to 
reproduce and maintain itself. 
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with the form of language.  It is created when a writer encounters the forces and 
intensities of the world that exist outside of order-words94  and the relations of power that 
govern them (O’Sullivan 249).  Experiments with writing rupture language by producing 
asignifying potentials (e.g., Virginia Woolf’s novel The Waves, that I discussed in the 
previous chapter).  Deleuze and Parnet affirm: “To write is to become but has nothing to 
do with becoming a writer” (43).  Deleuze and Guattari continue, “The writer uses 
words, but by creating a syntax that makes them pass into sensation that makes the 
standard language stammer, tremble, cry, or even sing: this is the style, the ‘tone,’ the 
language of sensations, or the foreign language within language that summons forth a 
people to come” (WP 176). 
Glitch art similarly makes a computational language stammer by corrupting chains 
of signifiers and deterritorializing the binary language of its “words” and “syntax”—i.e. 
its code and computation.  As O’Sullivan argues, glitch engenders sensations and 
vibrations by composing a new language that passes between human and machine 
(“From Stuttering” 249).  In the same way, I suggest that glitch art puts the body into 
motion by creating stammers, trips, slips, and malfunctions to the plane of organization.  
Glitch art opens the language of programming onto unexpected intensities so that the 
94 For Deleuze and Guattari, “order-words” are speech acts that fall in line with the dominant 
statement or reality of the State: “order-words mark stoppages or organized, stratified 
compositions” (ATP 108).  On language, more generally, they write: “Language is made not to be 
believed but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience” (7).  In ATP, see Plateau “November 20, 
1923: Postulates of Linguistics” for their compressive discussion of order-words. 
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creator is no longer a subject of the statement95  whose reality is confined within a 
dominant one.  The creator-subject is cyborg.  Glitch art, to borrow from Haraway, is an 
“ironic dream of a common language for [minor subjects] in the integrated circuit” (149) 
of the surveillance machine.  Glitch art, functioning in the same way that Deleuze and 
Guattari delineate minor literature, “make[s] sequences vibrate, to open the world onto 
unexpected intensities—in short, [makes] an asignifying intensive utilization of 
language…there is no longer a subject…Rather, there is a circuit of states that forms a 
mutual becoming, in the heart of a necessarily multiple or collective assemblage” (K 22). 
This integrated circuit is the becoming penetrable of seemingly impenetrable code and the 
becoming of the penetrable body as positively opaque. 
Glitch is a language beyond representation, recognition, and identity.  In “Glitch 
Studies Manifesto,” artist and curator Rosa Menkman affirms that, “Once the glitch is 
understood as an alternative way of representation or a new language, its tipping point 
has passed and the essence of its glitch-being is vanished.  The glitch is no longer an art 
of rejection, but a shape or appearance that is recognized as a novel form (of art)” (341).  
Glitches are not about negation and opposition; instead, they are an affirmation of what is 
yet to come.  As a mode of resistance, glitches deterritorialize code from a stratum of 
binary functions, glitching the field of in-visibility and destroying the calculated flow of 
digital modulation.  While glitch art, and the conjugation between machine and  human, 
95  The subject of the statement is subjected to the dominant reality of the State through a 
process of normalization.  “The subject of the statement is that which (or who) gets normalized” 
(Adkins 90). 
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may be considered an individual and isolated activity with little social effect or collective 
purpose, I argue that it is not the computational error per se that promulgates a line of 
flight—“non-responsive” technologies alone do not radicalize a politics of resistance. 
The potentials for resistance are much subtler: a glitch is a subterranean force that sets 
the body off on a new course of action. 
5.4 Plateau: Queer-Alt-Delete: “Passing from One World to Another” 
Fig. 5: “Glitch 1,” Queer-Alt-Delete, Andie Shabbar, 2017. 
Queer-Alt-Delete is a series of “self”-portrait images that engage with computational 
chaos to glitch the face.  In computer sciences, “computational chaos” is defined as an 
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event where two algorithms in close proximity suddenly disperse after travelling together 
for a given interval of time.  The dispersion creates an “explosive amplification” of 
numerical errors (Yao 109).  Likewise, Queer-Alt-Delete plays with error to enact a 
sudden dispersion from the rigid segmentation of identity heralded by the face.  The 
project interlaces algorithmic uncertainty with subjectivity to experiment with the 
possibility of creating an explosive amplification of new potentials for a subjectless 
subjectivity (Shabbar 197). 
Fig. 6: Screenshot of the hexadecimal data file of the image shown in Fig. 5. 
To produce the images, I glitch the data file of each photograph.  I convert the 
image into a text file first, which enables me to access the file’s binary or hexadecimal 
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code to perform random deletions of data (Fig. 6).  I also use another technique which 
involves accessing the ascii code (a code that uses every button on the keyboard) (Fig. 7).  
This technique makes it possible to write words into the code, copy and paste poems, and 
even mash together different data from separate image files.  Binary, hexadecimal, and 
ascii are distinct kinds of code but they all signify the same image file; ironically (or not), 
their relationship is often described as a “sliding scale of redundancy.”96
Queer-Alt-Delete may be conceptualized as an actual tool of resistance to 
surveillance, given its ability to produce biometrically unidentifiable images of the face.  
However, I am wary of framing the glitched images as a sort of mask97 that can be used 
on social media sites to obscure one’s identity, for example.  In my figuration, glitch 
does not attempt to conceal, hide, or mask the face.  Rather, glitched images intend to 
96 Recall that for Deleuze and Guattari, “the face itself is redundancy.  It is itself in redundancy 
with the redundancies of signifiance or frequency and those of resonance or subjectivity.  The 
face constructs the wall that the signifier needs in order to bound off of; it constitutes the wall of 
the signifier, the frame or screen” (ATP 168). 
97 This is not to say, however, that a mask does not have political value.  Indeed, wearing a mask 
during a protest or as part of a public demonstration is a central tool for collective anonymity.  A 
mask in this sense is a force capable of overriding individualism and of spotlighting a 
movement’s volume, texture, and de-subjectivizing intensity.  The mask has been crucial for 
activist groups including Pussy Riot, the Guerrilla Girls, Occupy Wall Street, and the Zapatistas, 
to name just a few.  Nonetheless, the mask does not dismantle the face.  Its function, here, is 
entirely different: the mask safeguards against the destruction of a possible world expressed by 
the protestors’ face.  For example, the balaclava protects an individual’s identity from being 
recorded and recognized by the State, and thus preserves the face’s expression of a possible world 
of collective social transformation.  On the other hand, a mask may be used to enhance the power 
of the State, as is the case for riot police who wear their foreboding masks to shield The Face, to 
appropriate facelessness as a way to secure Molar Man firmly on his throne.  In an effort to stave 
off the faciality machine and dethrone The Face, I turn away from the notion of the mask to 
emphasize glitch, not as an object, but as a practice of producing the intensities of resistance. 
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defacialize the face: break the face, dismantle the code, delete its signifiers.  If glitch 
escapes the face it does so “To flee, but in fleeing to seek a weapon” (Deleuze and Parnet 
136).  In other words, rather than running from the face, it turns it into a weapon.  Glitch 
is a double-edged sword that flays the illusion that the face is naturally human and at the 
same time cuts a new edge of deterritorialization. 
Fig. 7: Screenshot of a portion of the glitched ascii code of the image shown in Fig. 8. 
Despite the monstrous inhumanity of the face, or perhaps because of it, Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest that it is during an encounter with the face that a possible world 
begins to emerge.  They explain: 
5: Plateau 274 
Suddenly a frightened face looms up that looks at something out of the field.  The 
other person appears here as neither subject nor object but as something that is very 
different: a possible world, the possibility of a frightening world.  This possible 
world is not real, or not yet, but it exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists 
only in its expression-the face, or an equivalent of the face.  To begin with, the 
other person is this existence of a possible world.  And this possible world also has 
a specific reality in itself, as possible: when the expressing speaks and says, “I am 
frightened,” even if its words are untruthful, this is enough for a reality to be given 
to the possible as such. (WP 17)
If the expression on another person’s face—terror, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s 
example—reveals to me a possible world that is not yet real but exists all the same, what 
possibilities are unleashed when the face is glitched?  What reality is given to the face 
that expresses atypically?  What possible worlds unfold then? 
Bogue clarifies that for Deleuze and Guattari, “The Other as expression of a 
possible world holds the potential for liberating one from the constrains of common sense 
reality…rather than reinscribing one within them” (275).  I suggest that the glitched-face 
liberates the subject from the constraints of identity—or at least the representation of one, 
enabling the invention of unfamiliar faces—faces that integrate the body and code, faces 
that are human and nonhuman, fresh faces that potentialize unforeseen and unexpected 
possible worlds.  As I argued earlier, dismantling the face is not a concept that advocates 
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facelessness; it is a call to invent new polyvocalities, collective faces, and non-unitary 
subjectivities—faces that are not negatively inhuman but positively posthuman.98 
Dismantling the face, sending out a probe-head, potentializing possibilities are all 
pathways of resistance that invoke becomings-imperceptible—they world to make a 
world; they conjugate with others to potentialize affirmative possibilities. 
My project Queer-Alt-Delete consists of glitched images which evidence Deleuze 
and Guattari’s proposal that: 
The concept of the Other Person as expression of a possible world in a perceptual 
field leads us to consider the components of this field for itself in a new way.  No 
longer being either subject of the [perceptual] field or object in the field, the other 
person will become the condition under which not only subject and object are 
98 In The Posthuman, Braidotti makes a distinction between the inhuman and posthuman.  She 
argues that the inhuman in the last century, has come to signal “the alienating and commodifying 
effect of advance capitalism on the human”(108).  She writes: 
The inhuman is not what it used to be.  The relationship between the human and the 
technological other, as well as the affects involved in it, including desire, cruelty and 
pain, change radically with the contemporary technologies of advanced capitalism.  
For one thing, the technological construct now mingles with the flesh in unprecedented 
degrees of intrusiveness…Moreover, the nature of the human-technological interaction 
has shifted towards a blurring of the boundaries between the genders, the races and the 
species…The technological other today—a mere assemblage of circuitry and feedback 
loops—functions in the realm of an egalitarian blurring of differences, if not downright 
indeterminacy.  (109) 
In my understanding, the “inhuman” is that which is inhumane—the inhuman(e) forces of 
humanity.  For example, returning to Deleuze and Guattari, they define the inhuman in relation 
to the face: “The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start … The face, 
what a horror…natural inhuman, a monstrous hood” (171,190).  The posthuman subject, on the 
other hand, is not inhuman per se; the posthuman subject is human and non-human.  Unlike 
“inhuman,” “posthuman” signals an affirming movement toward a subjectless subjectivity. 
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redistributed but also figure and ground, margins and centre, moving object and 
reference point, transitive, and substantial, length and depth.  The Other Person is 
always perceived as an other, but in its concept it is the condition of all 
perception, for others as for ourselves.  It is the condition for our passing from 
one world to another. (WP 18, emphasis added) 
As the title of this plateau designates, Queer-Alt-Delete is a creative imagining of passing 
from one world to another.  It attempts to turn the subject/object split and the perception 
of a natural demarcation between the self and others on its head.  Glitch portraits alter our 
relationship with others by glitching the image of the self.  Deleuze and Guattari write, 
“the other appears as the expression of a possible.  The other is a possible world as it 
exists in a face that expresses it and takes shape in a language that gives it a reality.  In 
this sense [the other person] is a concept with three inseparable components: possible 
world, existing face, and real language or speech” (17).  Although the three 
components—the face, possible world, and language—remain distinct from each other in 
the concept of the other person, Deleuze and Guattari contend that something passes from 
one to the other, something that is undecidable between them” (19-20).  What passes 
between them is a vital potential to refigure the relation between these components.  How 
is this done?  How do we organize our relations with the face, language, and possibilities 
anew?  What passes from one to the other?  What passes between signifiance and 
subjectification, between the white wall and black hole to create affirmative possibilities 
of becoming otherwise?  As I have already state above, for Deleuze and Guattari that is 
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the probe-head.  The probe-head passes between the face, possibilities, and language to 
unravel new and unimaginable images of a (decentered) self. 
Fig. 8: “Glitch 2,” Queer-Alt-Delete, Andie Shabbar, 2018. 
Glitch art effectuates the mutating abstract machine of the queer autonomous zone 
by creating rhizomes between language, sensation, the face, and creativity.  It reveals 
new passageways for becoming-imperceptible, freeing desire and stimulating its flow 
toward escape.  It sustains the possible world by not collapsing language, sensation, and 
the face into one another but by coalescing their intensities.  In my imagining, glitch art is 
a cascading flow of dissonance between expression, the possible, signifiance and 
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subjectification.  It is but one way to dismantle the face that does not part ways from 
signification or subjectification or another person; instead, it invigorates a crisscrossing 
movement between them.  Glitch art traverses the virtual and actual and in doing so, 
potentializes the possible—that is, it moves between the potential of becoming and an act 
of resistance, and as such glitch potentializes the possibility for new subjectivities, faces 
yet to come.  Just as dismantling the face locates the points of instability within our own 
identifications, glitch portraits allow for the sensing of opaque possible worlds. 
As an atypical expression, glitch portraits deterritorialize facial traits.  Like Deleuze 
and Guattari write of probe-heads, I argue that glitch portraits move us closer to freeing 
faciality traits so that: 
Each freed faciality trait forms a rhizome with a freed trait of [art].  This is not a 
collection of part-objects but a living block, a connecting of stems by which the 
traits of a face enter a real multiplicity or diagram with a trait of [an artwork] that is 
thereby effectively produced, created, according to quanta of absolute, positive 
deterritorialization—not evoked or recalled according to systems of 
reterritorialization. (ATP 190)
The glitched face refuses representation, rebuffs interpretation in order to form rhizomes 
of intensity that render the face opaque.  At the same time, the opacity of the face 
expresses the possibility of a self, a world, a life without the constraints of the face. 
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Fig. 9: “Glitch 3,” Queer-Alt-Delete, Andie Shabbar, 2018 
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To summarize, glitch art engages in a creative process of transformation that is not 
wholly enacted through human intentionality.  Fusing together the unknown and 
unpredictable, my project, Queer-Alt-Delete, dissolves divisions between human and 
machine, self and object, opacity and resistance, potential and possible, art and language, 
perceptibility and imperceptibility.  It hacks into the faciality machine and deletes its code 
to reveal the chaotic material of unscripted “faces.” 
Fig. 10: “Glitch 4,” Queer-Alt-Delete, Andie Shabbar, 2017. 
As an act of resistance, Queer-Alt-Delete glitches the face to interrupt the continual 
overcoding and monitoring of the body.  The project “experiments with different 
modes of constituting subjectivity and different ways of inhabiting our corporeality” 
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(Braidotti “The Ethics” 134).  An act of infiltration and subversion, Queer-Alt-Delete 
works with algorithms of control, not only to confuse digital surveillance technology, 
such as facial recognition, but also to experiment with new ways of becoming-
imperceptible to faciality’s control.  Queer-Alt-Delete is a project that brings to the fore 
what faciality aims to obscure: that faces are always unstable and open to disruption. 
5.5 Plateau: From “Control-Alt-Delete” to Queer-Alt-Delete: Escaping control 
To escape from a frozen system, to exit a program, or to reboot the machine, we use the 
keyboard command “control-alt-delete.” We issue the command with agitation.  We want 
to interrupt the undesirable interruption imposed on us by the machine.  Pressing down 
on the control button, we are desperate to wrest free from the moment of suspension and 
to get things working again.  Likewise, Queer-Alt-Delete is an art project that aims to 
escape from the somatic suspension imposed on the body by binary order, corrupt rules, 
and faulty regulations.  Unlike its keyboard referent “Control-Alt-Delete,” Queer-Alt- 
Delete escapes suspension not by engendering “control” but by corrupting its 
(over)coding machine.  Queer-Alt-Delete imagines an alternative relationship between 
glitch and the body, user and computer, code and sexuality, data and surveillance.  No 
longer operating as a coherent command that the system recognizes, Queer-Alt-Delete is 
a desire to slip out of somatic suspension, become-imperceptible, and generate a positive 
mutating abstract machine.  Queer-Alt-Delete works with, rather than against, system 
malfunctions, identity errors, and unrecognizability; it acts as a line of pure resistance 
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that marshals error as a form of productive uncertainty (Shabbar 198).  Queer-Alt-Delete 
deterritorializes the function of “control” by deleting rather than rebooting identity.  
“Queer” becomes the operative force that gets things moving again. 
Fig. 11: “Glitch 5,” Queer-Alt-Delete, Andie Shabbar 2017. 
If, as Deleuze and Guattari write, “A plateau is always in the middle, not at the 
beginning or the end” and “[it] designate[s] something very special: a continuous, self- 
vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation toward a 
culmination point or external end” (ATP 21-2), then the queer autonomous zone does not 
end here nor is it just beginning. It is a mutating abstract machine composed of affective 
textures, planes of intensity, and plateaus of intensive states that are continuously 
diagramming waves of resistance.  All that is left is to sense the changing of the tide 
already underway
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